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                                                        Abstract  
 
This empirical study employs a different methodology to examine the change in 
wealth associated with mergers and acquisitions (M&As) for US firms. Specifically, 
we employ the standard CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model and the 
Carhart four-factor models within the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods to 
test the behaviour of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Whilst the standard 
CAPM captures the variability of stock returns with the overall market, the Fama-
French factors capture the risk factors that are important to investors. Additionally, 
augmenting the Fama-French three-factor model with the Carhart momentum factor 
to generate the four-factor captures additional pricing elements that may affect stock 
returns. Traditionally, estimates of abnormal returns (ARs) in M&As situations rely on 
the standard OLS estimation method. However, the standard OLS will provide 
inefficient estimates of the ARs if the data contain ARCH and asymmetric effects. To 
minimise this problem of estimation efficiency we re-estimated the ARs using GJR-
GARCH estimation method. We find that there is variation in the results both as 
regards the choice models and estimation methods. Besides these variations in the 
estimated models and the choice of estimation methods, we also tested whether the 
ARs are affected by the degree of liquidity of the stocks and the size of the firm.   
 
We document significant positive post-announcement cumulative ARs (CARs) for 
target firm shareholders under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods across all 
three methodologies. However, post-event CARs for acquiring firm shareholders 
were insignificant for both sets of estimation methods under the three 
methodologies. The GJR-GARCH method seems to generate larger CARs than 
those of the OLS method. Using both market capitalization and trading volume as a 
measure of liquidity and the size of the firm, we observed strong return continuations 
in the medium firms relative to small and large firms for target shareholders. We 
consistently observed market efficiency in small and large firm. This implies that 
target firms for small and large firms overreact to new information resulting in a more 
efficient market. For acquirer firms, our measure of liquidity captures strong return 
continuations for small firms under the OLS estimates for both CAPM and Fama-
French three-factor models, whilst under the GJR-GARCH estimates only for Carhart 
model. Post-announcement bootstrapping simulated CARs confirmed our earlier 
results. 
 
Keywords: M&As, ARs CARs, return continuations, liquidity, market efficiency, OLS, 
GJR-GARCH, bootstrapping, share price, firm size, event study. 
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                                                        CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been an increase in corporate failure following period of 
poor economic failure, including the financial credit crunch as well as, periods of 
greater global competition. Among other reasons, many companies have resorted to 
financial restructuring by engaging in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). M&As as the 
name suggests, is seen as a way for companies to save themselves from these 
economic doldrums. Therefore, corporate investment has become a phenomenon in 
which companies seek to maximise their profit by engaging in M&As. Firms expand 
through acquisition in order to increase shareholder wealth beyond organic growth. 
This empirical study aims to investigate the wealth effects of both target (acquired) 
and bidding (acquirer) companies on announcement of M&As for U.S. firms over the 
period1stJanuary 1988 to 31st December 2008. Specifically, the study aims to 
investigate the following: Firstly, this study will examine the impact of long-term event 
on M&As on shareholder wealth. Secondly, it will further examine the extent to which 
shareholder wealth is impacted by acquisition announcement. Again, we evaluate 
the impacts of market liquidity, measured by trade volume and market capitalization 
on the magnitude of cumulative ARs (CARs). We also developed hypotheses to test 
the estimation of GJR-GARCH mean and variance equations of the coefficients to 
see which of the coefficient variables has predictive power in explaining our cross-
sectional regression. This study will also perform bootstrapping to determine the 
degree of data mining. 
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The empirical study will use an event study methodology to examine the wealth 
effects of M&As. This approach has been a major tool for research in the area. This 
event study methodology will be applied to estimate the ARs in a window of twenty 
days using daily data. M&A announcements can trigger significant reactions in share 
prices which can be either positive or negative. Stock prices with positive reaction 
tend to slope upward while downward slopping is associated with negative reaction. 
For example, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) found that following the 
announcements of M&As, the stock price of the target firms’ increases to generate 
positive wealth for the target firm shareholders. However, Bosveld, Meyer and Vorst 
(1997) and Manasakis (2006) reported a decline in the stock price of the acquirer on 
announcement. Under the weak form of market efficiency, the stock price should not 
be predictable.  Fama (1998) put forward a striking argument that under the efficient 
market hypothesis the expected value of ARs is zero and that indication of ARs is by 
chance. This statement of Fama (1998) is still being debated in the financial 
research community. 
 
As already indicated the study aims to investigate: 
i) the wealth effects of M&As using the standard CAPM, Fama-French three-factor 
and Carhart four-factor models. The use of different specifications of the pricing 
model is useful for the following reason. First, Van Dijk (2007, p. 1) notes that ‘‘If the 
higher returns on small stocks are due to a large exposure to an underlying risk 
factor not incorporated in standard asset pricing models, firms should compute their 
cost of equity capital using a  pricing model that accommodates such risks”. Failure 
to do so can lead to biased estimates of the ARs. Indeed, the use of the Fama-
French three-factor model (1993) might explain differences on average across-
14 
 
sectional returns. Secondly, a mis-specification of the model can lead to conclusions 
that influence policy making, which in turn can have adverse effects (see e.g., 
Sudarsanam, 2004). Third, the use of the (asymmetric) GJR-GARCH method 
captures the conditional volatility and asymmetry in the ARs.  
 
ii) The impacts of different estimation methods on the ARs. To do this, all the models 
are estimated using the standard OLS and the (asymmetric) GJR-GARCH methods. 
It is well known that when the classical assumptions of normality and no 
autocorrelation do not applies, the OLS estimation method can lead to unreliable 
estimates. The use of the GJR-GARCH method leads to greater estimation efficiency 
relative to the OLS method particularly in daily data where ARCH effects and 
asymmetry are more pronounced compared to weekly or monthly data. Indeed, 
Corhay and Rad (1996) show that GARCH effects cause the standard OLS method 
to overestimate (underestimate) the regression parameters following positive 
(negative) shocks relative to the GARCH approach. So the GJR-GARCH method 
enables me to avoid some of the restrictive assumptions that underlie the standard 
OLS method. This present study will use daily stock data. The GJR-GARCH method 
is more efficient than the OLS when using daily data. The use of daily stock data will 
be preferred and that might alleviate one of the problems associated with weekly or 
monthly data explicitly, leading to flawed results due to the existence of a long event 
window. Again, unlike weekly or monthly data, the use of daily stock data gives an 
extra accurate measure of volatility and pins down the correlation between risk and 
return. 
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Prior research on M&As employed a different methodology to stock market returns 
leading to different conclusions. Using a suitable methodology could alleviate the 
problem of risk factors in stock returns, inefficient biased estimators and often 
produce a flawless result that makes comparison possible. Thus, empirical evidence 
has shown that the Fama-French three-factors model is capable of capturing the risk 
factors associated with stock market returns (see e.g. Faff, 2001; 2003; 2004; Pham, 
2007) which is of interest to bidding firm shareholders.  
 
iii) The sensitivity of the estimated CARs to bootstrapping estimates. 
One of the major setbacks of long-run event studies is the problem associated with 
data mining for the CARs obtained. Our use of a nonparametric bootstrapping 
simulation is to solve the bias in standard errors estimation because no assumptions 
are made about the underlying sample data of the distribution. Thus, the use of 
bootstrapping simulation has been solely to verify the reliability of the actual CARs 
obtained. 
 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to examine the ARs of firms 
associated with M&As in terms of the Fama-French and Carhart factors and to 
undertake a comparative estimation of the models using both the OLS and 
asymmetric GARCH model. Balaban and Constantinou (2006) is the closest 
empirical study to ours. Here they use the symmetric GARCH method to model the 
announcement effects of M&As for UK firms. However, they use the standard CAPM 
and they assume no asymmetry in the ARs.      
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1.1 Research Question and Theoretical Frame work 
One of the main tools used by companies to survive in the increasingly global 
competitive market is to merger with other firms. There have been a lot of questions 
as to why mergers occur and a lot of explanations have been given to account for 
this phenomenon. The alternative view is that most M&A activity rarely provides the 
highly anticipated synergies between firms. Alternatively, the proponent is of the 
opinion that empirical evidence has shown that mergers enable firms to implement 
an immense strategic shift mainly through the use of acquisitions. In other words, it is 
important to emphasize that acquisitions complement shareholders’ organic growth, 
and that is the underlying rationale for acquisition.  
 
In spite of extensive discussions and empirical work on M&As, there are still many 
unresolved issues in terms of the best methods to use and why M&As activity differs 
widely over time. These problems still remain a challenge to the finance academic. 
The current study will attempt to answer the question outlined below: 
 
Problem: To what extent does the M&As announcement impact on target and 
acquirer companies on the basis of their share prices. 
 
The main aim of the current study is to examine empirically the change in 
shareholders’ wealth following the M&A announcement of both target and bidding 
U.S. companies. The sample period is 1988 to 2008. We also investigate how the 
impact of market liquidity can influence the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in 
estimating the wealth effects of shareholders. We use the CARs of both target and 
acquirer firms’ market capitalization and trading volume as a measure of liquidity by 
17 
 
categorising them into small, medium and large firms. We estimate the CARs using 
standard CAPM, Fama-French three-factor models and Carhart four-factor models to 
ensure proper model specification. Also, the models are estimated using both the 
OLS and the asymmetric GJR-GARCH model. The use of the GJR-GARCH model is 
likely to increase estimation efficiency. Finally, CARs are bootstrapped to the degree 
of data mining. The bootstrapping simulation results did not suggest any reason for 
concern.  
 
1.2 Policies Implementation 
This study was done at a time in the development (event) of financial economies 
when the issue of M&As particularly in the company of or amongst banks took on a 
new dimension. In the recent past, most banks were bailed out by their respect 
governments due to the credit crunch. According to some financial commentators, 
some risks were underestimated and the importance of market liquidity was not 
completely acknowledged, hence banks’ credit crunch. The credit crunch has had 
very serious consequences for the banking industry and financial economists have 
not been able to tell how the impact on these banks will affect M&As.   
 
However, some analysts predict that the banking credit crisis will have serious 
repercussions in the M&As industry. In principle, there is a strong indication that 
there will be a decline in M&As since most banks are not financially self-sufficient 
and therefore cannot sponsor other companies’ M&As. Based on these recent 
developments, the M&As have attracted the unmatched attention of researchers, 
academics and government regulatory bodies. This empirical study will consider 
extent to which market liquidity affects the share price when estimating the wealth 
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effects of M&As. The research findings will have important for the investment banks, 
shareholders, practitioners, policy makers and accounting bodies could be interested 
in my research. 
 
1.3 Contributions of my Research to  Empirical Work 
My empirical study contributes to the empirical literature in the following ways: 
Firstly, modelling of mean and conditional variance will be effectively applied to the 
stock market data where the conditional variance captures the impacts of current 
and old news. In the M&A spectrum, a lot of news comes into the market and M&As 
provide a good opportunity to apply conditional variance for the news part. The 
results suggested that past news i coefficients appears to have not much effects on 
the current conditional variance and significant across all firm sizes for both acquired 
and acquiring firms’ shareholders. 
 
 Secondly, the standard CAPM, Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor 
models are estimated using both the OLS and the GJR-GARCH estimation methods. 
Fama-French (1992) argued that their three-factor model is capable of capturing 
cross-section variations in returns. The standard CAPM only captures the riskiness 
of a firm, relative to overall market. As such the Fama-French three-factor model will 
be better specified. The same argument holds for the Carhart four-factor models. A 
comparative study of the predicting accuracy of these models is conducted. The 
results indicated that the predictive accuracy of these models were not materially 
different. However, the results of the GJR-GARCH estimation methods were efficient 
compared to the OLS estimation methods.   
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Thirdly, it appears, as the review of the literature has shown that the ARs around 
official announcement dates on M&As are inconclusive. Prior empirical studies have 
not yet been able to produce consistent results with regards to or concerning ARs to 
acquiring firms. In this regard, our empirical research will provide a basis for 
investigation to find out whether announcement effect on M&As yield ARs for target 
and acquiring firms or otherwise. Thus, acquired and acquiring firms will be modelled 
separately in predicting wealth effect, to determine whether acquisitions actually 
create wealth effects for shareholders, that is, the impact of acquisition benefits on 
the share prices. The results showed that announcement returns to target firm 
shareholders’ are significant, whilst returns to acquirer firm shareholders’ are 
insignificant under the two estimation methods across all the methodologies.  
 
The fourth contribution is the size effect hypothesis. The literature has indicated that 
small firms ARs are higher than ARs of large firms on acquisition announcement. 
This analysis will be done using the market liquidity, measured by market 
capitalisation and trading volume measures to the ARs for firms that have big, 
medium and small capital and trading volume. We found that on announcement day 
t=0, CARs of small liquidity stocks are higher than both medium liquidity and large 
liquidity stocks. Nevertheless, we observed strong return continuations in medium 
liquidity stocks compared to both small liquidity and large liquidity stocks. An analysis 
based on ARs has confirmed this empirical finding of prior research. It seems our 
liquidity measure has a significant impact on the size effect. The significance 
contribution of this empirical study will add a valuable insight into the existing 
literature of M&As. 
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1.4 Conclusions 
Overall, the purpose of this chapter was to detail the research question, aims and 
objectives and the policies implementations as well as my empirical contributions to 
the literature of this thesis. The announcement returns for target firm shareholders 
are significant whilst we documented insignificant for acquiring firm shareholders 
under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods across all three methodologies. Our 
liquidity measure captured strong return continuations in the medium stocks relative 
to small and large stocks for target shareholders. For acquirer firms, our measure of 
liquidity captures strong return continuations for small stocks under the OLS 
estimates for both CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models, whilst under the 
GJR-GARCH estimates only for Carhart model. Post-announcement bootstrapping 
simulated CARs confirmed our earlier results. These are the main issues discussed 
in this chapter. Indeed, these theories have great impact on the economic life of the 
target and bidding firms shareholders. It also raises some concerns about how the 
market reacts to acquisition announcements. In this chapter, we have been able to 
demonstrate that our research will interest some key individuals who will use our 
research findings to formulate economic policies. 
                                
The thesis is organised as follows:  
Chapter two discusses the broad view of the survey of existing literature of empirical 
studies of M&As. In this chapter we present prior research work, researchers’ views 
and findings on announcement of M&As and its effect on share prices and the 
liquidity impact of the share price. This chapter will also discuss the limitations of 
prior studies.  
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Chapter three presents all the necessary information needed to analyze the current 
study. The chapter outlines and seeks to explain the hypotheses to be tested, the 
research design: the data and sample selection. It also states the parameter 
estimation and event period. The rationale for the choice of standard CAPM, Fama-
French three-factor models and Carhart four-factor models for the current study is 
identified. The use of OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods is presented. In 
addition, the chapter states the statistical problem associated with the long-run event 
study. This chapter analyses descriptive statistics in the present study as well as the 
correlation between target and acquirer firms and the summary conclusion of this 
section.  
 
Chapter four presents the empirical results of the ARs using the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimation methods. Acquirer’s method of payment is also presented.  
  
Chapter five presents the ARs and the market liquidity. In this analysis, we use the 
CARs of target and acquirer firms’ market capitalization and trading volume as a 
measure of liquidity. The firms are categorised into small, medium and large market 
capitalization and trading volume stocks. This followed by the conclusion. 
 
Chapter six analyse the GJR-GARCH-in-mean (GJR-GARCH-M) and variance 
equations of the coefficients to determine which of the coefficient variables has 
prophetic power in explaining our cross-sectional regression. 
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Chapter seven evaluates the bootstrapping simulation. We perform bootstrapping 
simulation to determine the robustness of the actual mean CARs obtained in the 
original data and conclusion. 
 
Chapter eight concludes this thesis and outlines the limitations of the current study 
and recommends potential areas for further research.   
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                                                        CHAPTER TWO 
 
                                                LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the prior finance theories and empirical studies on the 
corporate acquisition. It summaries the various theories for M&As and reviews the 
research that has explored those theories. This review especially relates to the 
intended area of research. The chapter is organised as follows: The first section 2.1 
focuses the economic impact of M&As. The next section 2.2 discusses the motives 
for M&As. The third section 2.3 presents the relevant literature regarding the 
apparent meaning of the market for corporate control. Section 2.4 describes 
defences against acquisitions. Section 2.5 discusses the short-run and long-run 
event studies on the impact of M&As. Section 2.6 deals with resource-based 
transfer. Section 2.7 describes the relationship between merger and tender offer and 
method of payment. The next section 2.8 examines the Efficient Market Hypothesis. 
Section 2.9 entails market anomalies. The next section 2.10 presents market liquidity 
and stock returns. Section 2.11 considers conditional volatility and stock returns. 
Section 2.12 discusses stock market size effect. Final section 2.13 entails the critical 
review of previous studies and conclusion. These are covered in 2.0-2.14. 
 
2.1 The Economic Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions 
The economic impact of M&As is huge as it affects many constituencies; employees, 
creditors, stakeholders, financial community and many more. Industrial economists 
had suggested that the likely effect of M&As on economic welfare is broad and 
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prolong negative employment repercussions due to lay-offs in the event of M&As. 
The most vulnerable are the employees who are in most cases likely to lose their 
jobs. As noted by Dutz (1989) cited in Conyon, Girma, Thompson and Wright (2002, 
p. 33) ‘’employment losses appear likely to be more substantial in horizontal mergers 
than in vertical or unrelated cases, particularly where the industry exhibits substantial 
economies of scale and/or surplus capacity’’. However some academic have 
suggested that restructuring (see e.g. Inoue, Uchida and Bremer, 2010) of distressed 
firms have help in enormous ways in safeguarding the entire workforce of a 
company. That is, without restructuring, these distressed firms might have collapse 
affecting the total workforce, but in M&As only a fraction might lose their jobs. Others 
had advocated that M&As enhance efficiency (see e.g. Al-Sharkas, Hassan and 
Lawrence, 2008) and risk alleviation thereby increasing shareholders wealth. 
 
 Carletti, Hartmann and Ongena (2008) analysed the effect of the introduction and 
strengthening of competition policy in industrial countries in which most of the 
modification transpired. The main event study methodology used in this study was 
the market model with both financial and non-financial variables. They use this 
exogenous policy change to pinpoint deferential reactions of banks and non-financial 
firms. As expected, changes in competitions policy have important economic effect in 
M&As arena. The logic behind M&As control is to prevent excessive market 
concentration that would lead to a strengthening position, and thus increase prices 
and a reduction in consumers’ welfare. It was found that bank stock prices react 
positively to the announcement of a change in competition policy but non-financial 
firms react negatively. In other words, stock prices of bank gain whilst non-financial 
firms loose due to changes in competition policy. Further analysis revealed that 
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target banks also grow in size after M&As, as well as profitability after the legislative 
changes. Their results show that banks gain tremendously, the less transparent the 
supervisory in a country is. The authors claim that the legal system governing 
competition and supervisory control of bank mergers has significant implications for 
the performance of banks and firms. 
 
 De Bondt and Thompson (1992) revisited the US market by examined the economic 
efficiency behind mergers. The study focuses long term stock market movement on 
announcement of M&As, running bivariate OLS regressions. The authors claimed 
that, although economic efficiency is an important motive for M&As there are also 
other motives that contribute to M&As, such as poor stock market performance and 
undervaluation motives. De Bondt and Thompson (1992) claimed that takeovers are 
linked to macro-economic variable terms of economic efficiency and that the 
efficiency motive is not a major role but other motives. It seems therefore that, there 
was evidence to suggest merger is motivated by stock market undervaluation.  
 
Cho and Cohen (1997) studied the economic effect of corporate divestitures by 
revisited the US stock market and extended Boot’s (1992) theoretical analysis that 
managers will not sell under-performing unit if it can be sustained by other units. The 
authors used a cross-sectional regression to assess changes in post-divestiture 
performance of the industry-adjusted cash flow return. Cho and Cohen (1997) noted 
a trivial post-divestiture operating cash flow returns for divesting firms. They 
contended that business units of firms are diverted when they encounter significant 
underperformance relative to their peers. In other words, companies are prepared to 
sell if business unit is considered to be unproductive. The results also concluded that 
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by diversion operating performance improves at the announcement of divestiture due 
to the reduction in the agency costs associated with holdings losing units. The 
general view that stock market reacts positively to divestiture was found to be 
preliminary improvement, eventually mean reverting. The study suggests a further 
investigation as to why after divestiture operating performance does not significantly 
increase. 
 
2.2 Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 
Acquisition has been seen as the significant investment of a corporate firm 
restructuring in the market for corporate control. A number of studies have shown 
that M&As manifest itself as a strategic point for restructuring. Therefore M&As have 
been seen as a turning point for companies to maximise the potential of economic 
benefit. A coherent acquisition strategy might have its ultimate aim of achieving or 
has to be based on efficiency gains. Ushijima (2010) indicated that both partial and 
total mergers result positive and significant ARs around first announcement date. 
 
2.2.1 Synergy Motive 
 Synergy theory suggests that companies are taken into acquisition mainly to 
increase the current value of the shareholders of the acquiring firm. That is to say, 
takeover arises due to economic benefit that results by unification of the two firms 
resources. Empirical evidence suggests that synergy is the major aim of takeover 
(see e.g. Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Gupta, LeCompte and Misra 1997; Bruce 
and Christopher, 2000; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Two types of synergies 
have been advanced in the literature: operational synergy and financial synergy.  
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i) Operating Synergy Motive 
The concept of operating synergy assumes that economies of scale in production 
are major determinants of accomplishment that will see various activity mergers as 
firms compete rapidly to achieve a dominant position. These give the firms the 
potential opportunity to increase their operating income. Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) used the market model methodology to compute the cumulative ARs for 
bidder and target firms. They state that if acquisitions are motivated by synergy, total 
gains to both target and bidder will be positively correlated with each other. Because 
target has ability to resist bidder and since competition exist among potential 
bidders, there will be an increase in total gain of target. Above all, mergers will 
foresee managerial economies that may lead to broad management functions. As 
noted by Weston, Siu and Johnson (2001), economies of scale arise because of 
indivisibilities of factors of production that result in lower costs of output thereby 
increasing shareholders’ wealth.  
 
While output and profit increase due to economies of scale and scope (Berger, 
Demsetz and Strahan, 1999; Lewis and Webb 2007), per unit cost of production 
decreases. The two merging firms enjoy operating synergies leading to economies of 
scale of profitability as the sum of the two firms is greater than each firm operating 
separately. Using the methodology of Bayesian estimated modified stochastic cost 
frontier, Lewis and Webb (2007) observed that cost of synergies arising from the two 
companies would lead to overall scale economy changes and the return of higher 
scale emerges. This suggests that as firms engage in merger activity, there is a 
possibility that both acquired and acquiring shareholders might measure gains 
through the deal. Therefore, it is imperative that firms operating below capacity and 
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with the potential to achieve economies of scale should engage in acquisition, and 
greater profitability should contribute to maximizing shareholder wealth. Behr and 
Held (2011) suggested that the main motive for mergers might be achievement of 
scale of economies or market power. 
 
ii)  Financial Synergy Motive  
This theory associated with the financial synergy motive has the premise that the two 
firms combine the cost of capital decreases whereas the debt capacity increases. 
This means that the two combined firms’ insolvency decreases as well as the default 
risk. We expect the two combined firms will become more profitable and cost 
efficient after post-merger than each firm operating on it own. Thus, a positive 
relation exists between the two combine firms and future profit maximization. The 
financial synergies hypotheses are motivated by reductions in the cost of capital due 
to a reduction in insolvency risk; hence we expect an increase in size as well as 
investment projects of the target’s firm thereby increasing shareholders wealth. This 
suggests that it would benefit shareholders’ when the two separate cash flows 
merged. 
   
2.2.2 Diversification Motive 
The concept of diversification as acquisition motive has been a debate over the 
years. There are conflicting results empirically documented in the literature whether 
diversification actually reduces risk. The advocate of this premise is that 
diversification is the most important constituent in achieving profit maximisation while 
at the same time minimising risk.  Acquiring firms’ management believe that through 
diversification they can reduce the returns volatility and risk associated with share 
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prices thereby increasing the potential value for their shareholders.  Studies have 
found that diversification has the tendency to create potential value (Villalonga, 2004;  
Mukherjee, Kiymaz and Baker, 2004). Portfolio theory in finance suggests that 
optimal diversification is achieved through a diversified range of stocks. Therefore, 
managers seek diversification to increase shareholder wealth through acquisition. 
There is a general perception that an undiversified firm will require a high risk 
premium in investment, hence diversification has the tendency to eliminate the 
negative impact of risk. Diversified firms have a significantly lower cost of debt than 
undiversified firms and also diversified firms have more positive premium than 
undiversified firms in the same industry (Aivazian and Qiu, 2006).  Aivazian and Qiu 
(2006) also found that with market friction corporation diversification assists creditors 
to hedge uncertain future cash flows as a means of lowering default risk. Harfoord, 
Jenter and Li (2011) suggested that diversified shareholders favour corporate 
policies that maximize their share prices value. However, Lang and Stulz, (1994) 
found strong evidence to prove that diversification add no value to shareholders’ 
wealth. To solidify their arguments they show that highly diversified firms do have 
significantly lower average and median q ratios relative to undiversified firms. Recent 
empirical study by Chollete, Pena and Lu (2011) indicated that diversification is 
associated with both benefits and costs. 
 
2.2.3 Tax Motive 
There is a general perception that M&As are motivated by tax benefit or tax savings 
that firms involved in acquisition enjoy. Potential acquirer can enjoy the tax benefit 
that might accrue from the acquisition taking advantage of the tax laws prevailing in 
the country. Therefore, as a matter of fact, companies engaged in acquisition due to 
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the tax benefit, which may be generous. As suggested by some commentators that 
M&As are linked to potential tax benefit that enable both firms to use their tax losses 
and tax credit to their advantage thereby reducing their tax liability (Auerbach and 
Reishus, 1986). In the same way Cook (1992) suggested the tax on companies 
maintaining that their merger is synergistic, and this tax incentive forces the two 
management teams engaged to have a second opinion. In an attempt to predict tax 
benefit to mergers, Shih (1994) examined conglomerate mergers as a tax motive. 
The author found that mergers are able to transfer surplus non-debt tax shields 
among themselves but such tax would be lost without mergers. His further analysis 
revealed that when firms with low earnings merged, their expected future tax 
burdens fall off signifying conglomerate mergers as an entirely tax-driven motive.  
 
2.2.4 Managerial Inefficiency  
The general perception of this hypothesis is concerned with asset management and 
its efficiency. Inefficient management pertains to under-utilisation of a firm’s 
resources to generate output. In this case, the full potential benefit of the firm’s 
resources cannot be achieved. Empirical studies show that an indication of inefficient 
management is when the assets of the company are not fully and efficiently utilised. 
In his empirical study, Rege (1984) noted that in some cases if lower activity is 
noticed as a sign of inefficient management, there is likelihood that takeover may be 
able to make the firm more efficient and profitable for the benefit of the shareholders. 
He states the limitation of his study as whether forecasted data are more efficient 
than historical data in predicting takeover targets.  
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North (2001) also tested this hypothesis. He said that since this argument assumes 
that takeovers partially serve to replace inefficient management, the issue to be 
examined here is whether a firm would be acquired due to its relatively poor financial 
performance in terms of efficiency as compared to not acquired. In pursuit of their 
business, an acquiring firm acknowledges mismanagement in a target firm and 
attempts takeover. This theory suggests that inefficient management will be removed 
and replaced. An acquiring firm serves to solve inefficiency in the target’s 
management which will, eventually, create value in the target firm. There is a 
potential gain to the shareholders through increased efficiency following the 
acquisition. Palepu (1986) suggested that the target’s return on equity prior to the 
acquisition can be used to measure the target’s management efficiency and this will 
indicates whether there is enough evidence of inefficiency management serving as a 
basis for taken over. 
  
2.2.5 Hubris Motive 
The concept of hubris is the premise that bidders pay higher value over and above 
the target’s true economic value. The perils of hubris have become obvious, that 
acquirer managers miscalculate the value in acquisitions hence leading to what is 
termed as the winner’s curse phenomenon. Roll (1986) documented that bidding firm 
managers commit errors in evaluating merger opportunities due to hubris. Therefore, 
it follows that if the hubris hypothesis holds, acquirers should not expect positive total 
gains in acquisition. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) stated that premiums paid by 
acquiring companies are significantly larger than the value they believe it will create. 
They also suggested that the relationship between management hubris and the size 
of premium paid is significantly expensive. 
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 Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) using the 
market model methodology of motives for takeovers documented that the hubris 
hypothesis maintains that there are no gains from takeover and that takeovers occur 
because acquirer managers make mistakes or poor decisions in estimating gains. 
Mueller and Sirower (2003) tested this hypothesis and claimed that hubris does not 
necessary mean that wealth is created by mergers. They suggested that for the 
hubris hypothesis of wealth creation to hold, one has to argue that managers of 
diversified firms create more hubris than undiversified firms. Consequently, poor 
managerial decision make acquirer managers undertake such gambles, said the 
authors, ‘‘they believe that they can see value in other firms that no one else can 
see’’ (p. 388). 
 
2.3 Market for Corporate Control   
Market for corporate control seems to suggest that there is a relationship between 
the market for corporate acquisition and corporate strategy. While there is a view 
that both the acquiring firm and target firm benefit from the deal, the market for 
corporate control has become heavily regulated in recent times. In a takeover bid, 
the corporate control right (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) of the target firm is 
transferred to the acquiring company. The risk-averse managers of the acquiring firm 
modify and transform target firm resources which, in turn, can reduce risk. The target 
firm resources are managed by the managers of the acquiring firm (Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983).  
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Numerous empirical studies have been advanced to explain the rationale behind 
market for corporate control in M&As. Given the relevance of market for corporate 
control there are opposing views on this concept. On one hand, market for corporate 
control thoroughly disciplines badly performing firms. Whilst on the other hand some 
researchers found no evidence to support this notion of discipline.  
 
De Young (1997) used cost frontier methodology and multi-product translog cost 
functions to estimate pre- and post-M&As cost efficiency. Interestingly both pre-
merger and post-merger efficiency signified that acquiring firms were more cost-
efficient than their target firms. Furthermore, both related and unrelated pre-merger 
and post-merger had important efficiency capability. Their study showed that bidding 
firms were more efficient than target firms, and proposed that in efficient markets, 
inefficient companies would be acquired. This implies that in the market for corporate 
control spectrum, underperforming firms should be acquired and run by efficient 
managers. The study results failed to support the traditional market for corporate 
control theory, where inefficient firms will be acquired but rather suggested that other 
motives as a factor for US mergers in 1980s but not cost efficiencies. Dickerson, 
Gibson and Tsakalotos (2002) studied the market for corporate control and takeover 
risk in the UK using matched sampling approach. This study used two 
methodologies: first, a standard probit model to compute the factors determining the 
probability of a firm being taken over; and second, a standard proportional 
continuous time hazard function methodology.  The study shows that the market for 
corporate control is a yardstick by which to measure or disciplines unsuccessfully 
firms. However, it fails to find evidence to support the free cash flow theory 
hypothesis that firms are likely to be taken over if there are no apparent profitability 
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investment opportunities that was captured by their Tobin’s q . Jensen (1987) 
theoretically was able to bring relation between market for corporate control and 
managerial ownership. According to Jensen (1987), M&As only take place due to 
changing technology or market conditions. However, the he acknowledges that 
takeover serve to replace inefficient management. 
 
Ferreira, Ornelas and Turner (2005) studied the ownership structure and efficiency of 
the market for corporate control and revisited the work of Cremton, Gibbons and 
Klemperer (1987) by using different framework, the separation of control from 
ownership and agency cost. Ferreira et al. (2005) documented that for effective 
restructuring, firms internationally increase their market share when incumbent 
managers remain in control. They reported that companies are not willing to assign 
full control and full ownership to one stockholder, unless agency costs are attached. 
Their analysis either support or fail to find evidence that market for corporate control 
disciplines underperforming companies. Weir and Laing (2003), Koke (2004), Weir, 
Laing and Wright (2005), Sinha (2006), and Siriopoulos, Georgopoulos and 
Tsagkanos (2006) studied the market for corporate control. Using a binary logit 
model methodology they reported mixed findings. It has been suggested that the 
probability of a firm being acquired is high when a firm has higher institutional 
shareholders and higher executive director shareholdings and non-executive 
directors, and that acquisition is driven by managerial disciplinary motives. The 
analysis showed that change in control is associated with poor performance and that 
control changes served as a disciplinary measure in market-based economies. 
There was an evidence to suggest that high ownership concentration makes control 
change impossible, in line with the proposition that tight shareholder control may 
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serve as a replacement of disciplinary control change. Weir et al. (2005) found that 
companies becoming private are associated with higher CEO shareholdings and 
higher institutional shareholdings, but are statistically insignificant with regard to the 
presence of non-executive and independent directors. Sinha (2006) indicated that 
when the market for corporate control is active top management are disciplined by 
outside directors, and in hostile takeovers, outside directors may be dismissed.  
 
However, contrary to some views the two studies of Weir and Laing (2003) in UK 
and Siriopoulos et al. in Greek (2006) failed to support the disciplinary motives as a 
significant in corporate control market. Interestingly these two studies suggested that 
acquisitions in these countries are friendly relative to disciplinary motives which are 
associated with hostile. Indeed, the majority of the literature on market for corporate 
control had disapproved the notion that firms with poor profitability or inefficient will 
be acquired. 
 
2.4 Defences against Acquisition  
Companies might institute defence tactics if they are vulnerable to be taken over.  
The purpose of defences against acquisitions is to salvage the interest of both the 
managers and the shareholders. Target management might apply excessive use of 
different defence’s strategies which will make it difficult to deal with and critically out 
of touch with realities. Over the years, there have been an increased number of 
M&As but some mergers have been unsuccessful. This is due to a number of 
acquisition defences that target management must apply in their attempt to 
overpower the acquiring firm management. The defiance might help the target to 
perform better on its own and to seek to entrench itself against loss of power if a 
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merger takes place. A plethora of empirical studies examining defence strategies 
have shown evidence that shareholders interest must be taken into consideration.  
 
Sarig and Talmor (1997) indicated that defensive measures have the tendency to 
increase shareholders’ wealth.  If directors agree acquisition, they must demonstrate 
that the price was fair to shareholders and that was the best price that could be 
achieved. The dominance of defence measures indicates that shareholders regard 
those measures as wealth creating. Some takeover defensive measures are 
greenmail, poison pills and golden parachutes.  
 
 Greenmail is where a target management firm repurchases stock from block holders 
at a premium. The aim of the premium buy back from raiders is to curtail their action 
in the event of a hostile takeover threat opposed by these block holders. Manry and 
Nathan (1999) found that greenmail premia paid are non-linear with inside 
ownership, but found a relationship between greenmail premiums and outside 
ownership.   
 
Poison pills are designed by directors without approval from shareholders to make 
the acquisition extremely expensive and can be a very successful way to discourage 
acquirers. Comment and Schwert (1995) proposed that poison pills had a tendency 
to increase takeover premiums without decreasing takeover likelihood. However, 
Field and Karpoff (2002) findings were pointing to the north, by establishing that 
poison pills and takeover defences decrease takeover likelihoods without any 
compensating increase in takeover premiums. Poison pills help directors to exercise 
their duties (Gorden, 2002; Stout, 2002) especially in matters regarding takeover 
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issues. They also show that post-pill performance does not depend on the pre-
existence of a staggered board. Danielson and Karpoff (2006) focused on firm 
adoption of poison pills and examined them with regard to the firm’s performance. 
They concluded that pill adoption substantially improves operational performance.  
 
Golden parachutes are the provision of employment contracts arranged to 
compensate managers if they are to lose their jobs as a result of acquisition. 
Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith (2000) found that golden parachutes may serve in 
part to mitigate the expected loss of salary when the managers’ share of acquisition 
gains from their stockholdings do not completely offset expected salary losses. Their 
final analysis reveals that managers with golden parachutes were, on average, 
younger and more highly compensated than targets without golden parachutes. The 
aims of golden parachutes have been well documented in the literature by 
Subramaniam and Daley (2000), Falaschetti (2002) and Small, Smith and Yildirim 
(2007) among others. These three studies reported that golden parachutes are found 
with external concentrated ownership. The studies also argued that the financial 
compensation from shareholders to managers served to alleviate the salary loss in 
acquisition, which enhanced efficiency of shareholder value. In this regard, in a 
takeover attempt a firm with these defence measures might discourage a potential 
acquirer. 
 
 
2.5 Short-run and Long-run Event Studies on the Impact of M&As 
In recent years, the short-run and long-run impact of M&As has been intensely 
debated in terms of whether post-acquisition performance actually benefits 
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shareholders of bidding firms. There are conflicting views empirically documented in 
the literature on the event studies time scale and its impact on M&As. It appears that 
the short-run is associated with risk of bias; however, the use of daily stock returns in 
the short-run window has a major advantage over the use of monthly data which 
exhibits the risk of obtaining flawed results due to the existence of a long-run event 
window (see Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) described 
short-run as the days or months around the announcement of the bid, whilst long-run 
denotes as periods of month or years. 
 
The short-run post-acquisition performance studies on bidders are mixed. Prior 
researchers have found either significant impact on shareholders’ wealth or 
insignificant negative return on announcement. Most of this research seems to report 
negative returns for bidders on post-acquisition performance. These studies in the 
UK and the US showed that returns to bidders’ firm shareholders is either zero or 
negative (see. e.g. Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; Higson and Elliott, 1998; Sudarsanam 
and Mahate, 2003; Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). The negative or zero returns to 
acquirers may be due to market mispricing or market reaction to overpriced on 
takeover announcement. Almost all the previous recent studies in the UK and the US 
seem to report negative performance of bidders, which contradict to other studies 
documented in Europe and Canada. Campa and Hernando (2006) studied 
shareholder value creation on announcement on European M&As. They found 
insignificant cumulative ARs for acquirers on post-acquisition. Their analysis 
revealed that mergers in heavily regulated industries returns are smaller than those 
within unregulated industries. A similar study carried out in Canada by Ben-Amar 
and Andre (2006) documented positive ARs for acquiring firm shareholders on post-
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acquisition performance. Their results were consistent with other European studies 
(Boehmer, 2000; Bigelli and Mengoli, 2004) who found positive ARs for shareholders 
on announcement. Theoretically speaking the differences in returns event window to 
acquirers in the US and the UK, on the one hand and Europe and Canada on other 
hand could be attributed to the different performance measures employed. Ben-
Amar and Andre (2006) noted that disparity in returns might be due to ownership 
concentration in Canada and Europe.  
 
The long-run post-acquisition performance studies seem to provide substantial 
evidence to suggest that long-run stock returns are negative to acquiring 
shareholder. Prior studies on post-acquisitions performance of bidders in the US 
documented that overall wealth effect to bidders’ shareholders returns are either 
insignificant or negative ARs in the long-run (see e.g. Loughran and VIjh, 1997; 
Barber and Lyon, 1997; Rosen, 2006). Despite the considerable variations and 
performance measures employed there were no significant differences in their 
findings and all these studies reported negative ARs for bidding firms in the long-run. 
The post-acquisition returns studies in the UK are consistent with the studies in the 
US findings. For example, Gregory (1997), Gregory and McCorriston (2005), 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) and Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) found negative 
ARs in their UK studies. Alexandridis et al. (2006) used the Fama-French three-
factor and CAPM models to examine UK successful takeovers. They reported 
negative ARs for both Fama-French three-factor and CAPM models. The study 
revealed that acquirers’ post-acquisition merger underperformance is attributed to 
low institutional investment. Limmack (2003, p. 344) reported that ‘’the negative long-
run post-acquisition performance exhibited by acquiring firms is at least partly 
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attributed to a more generally observed phenomena relating to over-extrapolation of 
prior (good) performance’’. The author noted that this phenomenon is within 
investment decision because the long-run negative returns are associated with stock 
financing but not cash. Nevertheless, the findings of these long-run studies in US 
and UK contradict with other study in Canada. Dutta and Jog (2009) found no 
significant negative ARs for Canadian acquirers. 
 
2.6 Resource Based Transfer 
Acquisitions and takeovers will result in a resource-based transfer from the target 
company to the acquiring firm. The strategic decision of the acquiring firm is to put 
the resources acquired from the target firm to meaningful use in order to reap the 
maximum benefit from the resources acquired. Ranft and Lord (2000) in their studies 
stated that in knowledge-intensive and innovation-driven industries, highly skilled 
human capital might be one of the most sought-after strategic resources in 
acquisition. A second study by the same authors (Ranft and Lord, 2002) proposed 
that ‘‘knowledge transfer- the acquisition and utilization of new sets of knowledge-
based resources … may be a key acquisition objective. Knowledge transfer is 
achieved when an acquirer appropriates technologies and capabilities in a target firm 
and applies them to commercial ends’’ (p. 420). They concluded that transfer of 
technologies and capabilities is neither easy nor quick owing to distinct acquisition 
implementation issues. Ranft and Lord (2002) acknowledged that knowledge transfer 
is very difficult because acquirer and acquired firms possess different philosophies 
and thus managers of acquirer firms need time to integrate the acquired firm’s 
technologies and capabilities into the acquiring firm’s knowledge-based resources.  
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Studies by Capron (1999) and Capron, Mitchell and Swaminathan (2001) have 
shown that asset divestiture and resource redevelopment contribute to acquisition 
performance and that redevelopment has a bigger influence on target asset 
divestiture than on acquirer asset divestiture.  Karim and Mitchell (2000) investigated 
change of business resources following acquisitions in the US. They found that there 
is more substantial change in both targets and acquiring firms than in non-acquired 
firms. Certainly, this will result in post-acquisition efficiency for acquired firms than 
non-acquired firms which results in large differences in business reconfiguration. 
Karim and Mitchell (2000) observed that acquirer firms were more likely to possess 
recent resource development than non-acquired firm. Their analysis revealed 
prominent evidence concerning resource deepening whereby acquiring firms use the 
acquired firms’ resources to build on their existing potentials to increase 
shareholders’ wealth. 
 
2.7 Merger and Tender Offer, and Method of Payment 
The significance of corporate acquisition has led most empirical research to focus 
the firm’s performance in relation to merger or tender offers. Merger normally takes 
place between the acquiring firm and target firm to come together under one 
umbrella of management. Managers of both firms undertake a due diligence process 
to ensure that the transaction is beneficial to both companies, which the 
shareholders vote on.  
 
The term tender offer, however, denote a type of takeover bid through public or open 
offer by an acquirer to all stockholders of a publicly traded corporation to tender their 
stock for sale at a particular price or time. Travlos (1987) suggested that mergers are 
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mostly common stock exchange offers whilst tender offers are typically cash offers. 
According to Walker (2000), tender offer signifies inefficient target management 
where the offer is made directly by the acquiring firm to shareholders of the target 
firm when the firm’s board of directors disagree with the acquisition. Walker (2000) 
reported that acquirer firm shareholders’ normally earn higher returns following 
tender offers and cash offers relative to stock offers and merger that generated lower 
returns. In order to persuade or induce the shareholders of the target firm to sell, 
acquirers normally offer a price that might include a premium which is above the 
current market price of the target firm’s shares. Bruner (2002) found that tender offer 
creates more value than merger for bidder firms’ shareholders as a result of 
negotiating with target shareholder directly by bypassing management. Empirical 
evidence has shown that in tender offer targets, shareholders’ wealth substantially 
increases (see e.g. Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Lang, Stulz and Walking 1989; 
Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993).   
 
Prior studies have suggested that there is a correlation between stock prices on 
announcement and method of payment. On announcement acquirers are more likely 
to finance acquisition with stock rather than cash when their shares are overvalued 
(see Tralos, 1987). It seems therefore that the empirical evidence maintains the view 
that acquirer’s firm is overvalued and that negative information or impression might 
have effect on the stock prices of acquirer, consequently leading to a decline on 
announcement period stock returns.  Loughran and Vijh (1997) found evidence in 
support of cash tender offers but not for stock mergers. In computing of ARs, 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) acknowledge the problem associated with benchmark 
selection when investigating long term returns. In following Fama-French (1992) and 
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applied matching procedure to adjust for size and book-to-market effect for ARs. 
They found that bidders in cash tender offers earn significant positive ARs but 
bidders in stock mergers suffer significant negative ARs. This happens because, the 
method of payment may indicate important information to the market, given the 
information asymmetry that managers of investment companies have more 
knowledge about the companies’ future prospects will finance the acquisition at the 
best interest of the shareholder. The issue of payment method is based on future 
expectations of acquirer, whether higher returns or lower returns are expected. They 
suggested that bidders are likely to finance with cash when their share are 
undervalued and pay by stocks if their share are overvalued; consistent with 
asymmetric information hypothesis and the market under reaction hypothesis.   
 
Financing methods in M&As play an important role in the takeover process. The 
existing studies have proposed various payment methods that must be used in the 
acquisition process. Some researchers have proposed mixed (cash and stock) 
payment, others are in favour of cash and some have opted for stock payment – 
these have all been advanced in the literature. Martin (1996) examined the motives 
behind the payment method of corporate acquisitions. The author employed binomial 
logistic regression methodology in his empirical studies. The study found that 
acquirers are more likely to use stock financing than cash when investment 
opportunities are high, and acquirers also tend to use stock financing as a means of 
reducing overpayment. However, Martin’s (1986) study contradicted other studies. 
Chang (1998) estimated ARs using the standard market model. Chang (1998) 
reported positive ARs for acquirers financing by stock based on Wilcoxon signed-
rank test while bidders paying cash experience zero ARs.  
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Acquisition is seen as a strategic game when financing is purely by cash. Studies 
have shown that bidder returns (see Travlos, 1987; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 
1990; Travlos and Waegelein, 1992; Goergen and Ronneboog, 2004; Conn et al., 
2005) are significantly higher when offered cash, than a bidder paying stock. Brown 
and Ryngaert (1991) developed a model to test the acquisition effect on taxes and 
asymmetric information. They used the market model methodology of least squares 
estimation to compute the ARs. The study shows that returns of cash payment are 
significantly higher than stock financing which yields abnormal negative returns. 
They claimed that acquirers belonging to the low valuation category, issued stocks to 
avoid capital gain tax penalty and indeed, higher bidders pay cash to avoid offering 
undervalued stock. Also, Heron and Lie (2002) and Megginson, Morgan and Nail 
(2004) using different methodologies arrived at the same conclusion that bidding firm  
financing acquisition by cash released higher returns, which has a significant positive 
impact on their long-term operating performance. Megginson at el. (2004) suggest 
that the positive effect does not translate into stockholder returns or firm value 
changes, and that the best post-merger performance is exhibited by cash-financed 
focus preserving or increasing (FPI) mergers and the worst by stock-financed focus-
decreasing (FD) mergers. 
 
 Schlingemann (2004) directly analysed the relationship between acquisition 
financing and bidder gains. The author employs market model residuals as a 
dependent variable. His independent variables include equity issue, repurchases and 
industry-adjusted equity, and his main variables of interest were equity and debt 
financing. Using multiple regression analysis, the study found a statistically 
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significant negative relation between cash flow and acquirer gains. This finding is 
consistent with other studies. The study indicated that a cash transaction conveys 
positive information about its equity (see Schwert, 2000). The study failed to show a 
significant relation between debt financing and bidder gains. Travlos (1987), 
Fishman (1989) and Sorbonne (2006) favoured cash payment in their studies 
arriving at different conclusions. Firms that have large amounts of cash or a high 
cash flow or enough debt capacity are more likely to use cash to finance their 
investment activity.  Financing acquisition payment by cash has the advantage of tax 
benefit to the acquiring firm and also leads to less chance of EPS dilution for the 
acquiring company. Payment in cash is considered to be dissuasive in the 
negotiation process, discouraging competition from other potential bidders, and 
signals good quality target firms. Sorbonne (2006) claimed that, other things equal, 
payment in cash provides positive information about the value of the target firm and 
future gains resulting from the acquisition.  
 
In line with these arguments, other studies have shown that bidders are likely to 
finance M&As with an average proportion of cash and stock (see e.g. Chang and 
Mais, 2000; Faccio and Masulis, 2005). In the context of acquisitions, the payment 
hypothesis implies that acquiring firms prefer to pay for their acquisition with stock 
when there is a positive return and cash in the case of an ARs. Based on these 
findings there is a strong evidence to suggest that cash acquisition is more appealing 
than stock payment? 
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2.8 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The efficient market hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between stock 
prices and information. Information, by classification, alters expectations. 
Consequently, information disclosure can trigger reactions in share prices which can 
be upward sloping or downward sloping. The efficient market hypothesis states that 
share prices speedily and unbiasedly react to information.  
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is traditionally divided into three forms.  
 
The weak form of the EMH argues that share prices completely display information 
included in past share price movements and patterns. The semi-strong form of the 
EMH says that existing share prices reveal not only chronological share price 
information but also current information of the firm to the degree that such 
information is available to the public. While the strong form of the EMH contends that 
existing share prices not only reflect what is publicly known, but all available 
information about the firm (see e.g. Sharpe, Alexander and Bailey, 1999). There is 
empirical evidence in favour of semi-strong form efficiency. The EMH exhibit a 
hierarchy or pecking order of the forms. When the stock market is semi-strong form 
efficient it also entails weak form. Likewise when stock  market is strong form 
efficient it consists of semi-strong and weak form efficient.   
 
However, the efficient market hypothesis literature is inconclusive due to the 
overreaction and return continuation which is based on momentum strategy. Hong 
and Stein (1999), Lee and Swaminathan (2000) Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001, 
2002), design a behavioural model to capture the momentum phenomenon and 
disprove the efficient market hypothesis. Nevertheless, Fama (1998) put a 
remarkable comment that under the efficient market hypothesis the expected value 
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of ARs is zero and that the market under reaction and over reaction occurs by 
chance. Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000) (cited in Joseph, 2008) indicate that stock 
index returns show return autocorrelations that create momentum profits from the 
certainty of the returns. 
 
Again, the following factors might render the stock market inefficient. These include: 
i) investors may behave irrationally. They do not use information as they should have 
used it. It is fully biases. They would not adhere to technical analysis data and they 
can also distort the market. ii) They may be overconfident in their ability. They 
believe their information is better. That is, it leads to overreaction and under pricing. 
They may also be biased in their interpretation of data. Momentarily price goes 
down. It is in short position, which is a short-term of about six months. iii) Transaction 
costs may avert prices completely adjusting to information.  
 
 
2.9 Market Anomalies 
 
M&As over the years have witnessed what is termed market anomalies. This 
phenomenon which is associated with the stock market transactions had been 
discussed extensively in the M&As literature. Evidence has shown that market 
anomalies, once they are present seem to contradict efficient market hypotheses. 
Some have argued that, once identified investors seek to exploit them to earn 
superior returns, nevertheless, if they are persistent investors may not realise the full 
potential benefit due to transaction cost.  
 
In the M&As spectrum, the market under reacts to announcement about the short-
term prospect of firms. In their empirical studies Lo and MacKinlay (1988) were able 
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to show that under reaction growth investment leads to positive serial correlation 
over weekly holding periods of coefficients of small capitalisation stocks. The random 
walk hypothesis was opposed by Lo and MacKinlay (1988), arguing that the 
stationary mean-reverting cannot explain the departures of weekly returns from the 
random walk. Their short-term positive serial correlation shows contrast to the 
negative serial correlation hypothesis identified by Fama-French (1987). Fama-
French (1987) found that under reaction for value investing leads to long-term 
negative serial correlation. They showed that stock prices over react to important 
news and therefore prices are subject to change. This means that long term returns 
is inevitable from past returns (mean reversion). In the case of medium term 
momentum, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) documented that medium-term 
momentum over 3 to 12 months generates significant positive returns for 
shareholders. They suggest that this might have happened because of portfolio best 
performance. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) also showed that on quarterly earnings 
announcement returns of stock in winner’ portfolios outperform stocks in loser 
portfolios. They proposed that profitability of momentum strategies is not attributed to 
their systematic risk factors.  
 
Some researchers have been able to link momentum with both autocorrelation in 
stock returns and the behavioural model. Theories of financial anomalies 
demonstrate that momentum in stock returns will be positively auto correlated; and 
also behavioural model could lead to momentum profitability because investors may 
behave irrationally, they do not use information as they should have used it and it is 
fully biased (see e.g. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999; 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001; Lewellen, 2002). 
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Firm specific anomalies attributed to seasonal patterns in returns have been 
observed in the stock market. There is enough circumstantial evidence to suggest 
that small stocks generate ARs to their shareholders during the month of January. 
Banz (1981) observed that small firms have higher returns but it all happens in the 
first two weeks of January. Haugen and Jorion (1996, p. 27) hypothesize that ‘’the 
January effect, perhaps, the best-known example of anomalies behaviour in security 
markets throughout the world’’. Some academic researchers have attributed the 
January effect to year-end tax loss selling and positive correlation for January (see 
e.g. Haugen and Jorion, 1996; Chen and Singal 2004). In the same vein, Lo and 
Mackinlay (1988) showed that weekly returns are positively autocorrelated, albeit 
portfolios of small stocks capitalisation.  Monday’s returns tend to be the worst day 
(Gibbons and Hess, 1981). 
 
Portfolios formed on size alone exhibit strong negative relation between size and 
average return and strong correlation between average return and beta (Banz, 1981; 
Fama-French, 1992). Fama-French (1992) have argued that size and book-to-
market effects as predictor of returns on cross-sectional stocks is more powerful than 
beta. This argument indicates that the cross-sectional variation in average returns is 
associated with relative distress, while theoretical analysis in the financial literature 
has suggested a positive link between averages returns and market beta. This notion 
of positive relation between average stock returns and market beta was rejected by 
Fama-French (1992) in their empirical analysis. 
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De bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) theoretically were able to uncover a relation 
between stock market reaction and investment strategy. They hypothesized reversal 
effect as losers rebound and winners’ return diminishes. According to Debondt and 
Thaler (1985), stock price overreacts to important news and therefore leads to 
contrarian strategy profitability. The empirical studies of, for example Jegadeesh 
(1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) have added 
further support to the reversal effect that the contrarian strategy tends to generate 
weekly and monthly returns in the short-term. An article by Conrad and Kaul (1998) 
showed that cross-sectional variations in expected returns are due to the profitability 
of momentum strategies as well as profits from price reversals to the contrarian 
strategy but not expected time-series variations in stock returns. They argued that 
contrarian strategies are associated with both short-term and long-term profitability 
whilst medium-term profitability is linked to the momentum strategy holding period. 
The literature suggests that recently there has been a shift from contrarian strategies 
to price continuations results in consistent ARs to momentum strategies. 
 
Fama-French three-factor model (1993) identified common risk factors to suggest 
that firm specific anomalies related to size BE/ME capture strong common variation 
in returns in the time series regression. As the evidence suggests size and book-to-
market equity seem to be proxies for sensitivity to common risk factors in stock 
returns. They showed that time series regression on size and book-to-market factors 
have explanatory power to distinguish between returns across stocks. However, they 
failed to find correlation between average return to beta once they are present and 
therefore rejected CAPM. 
 
51 
 
However, the empirical findings of, for example Jagannathan and Wang (1996) 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Gomes, Kogan and Zhang (2003) showed that firm 
characteristics such as size and book-to-market ratio are linked with the conditional 
CAPM market beta and as a result seem to predict stock returns. These studies 
concluded that size and book-to-market are dependable with a single-factor 
conditional CAPM model. Daniel and Titman (1997, p.3) were able to prove with 
some evidence that the returns on cross-sectional variation are due to the 
characteristics but not covariance of returns. Their result showed that  1) ‘’there is no 
discernible separate risk factor associated with high or low book-to-market firm and 
2) there is no return premium associated with any of the three factors identified by 
Fama-French (1993), suggesting that the high returns related to these portfolio 
cannot be viewed as compensation for factor risk’’. These findings suggest that in 
spite of the fact that high book-to-market stocks do co-vary, their co-variances were 
strong before the firms became distressed. In search of evidence as to whether 
expected returns are determined by characteristics or covariances with portfolio of 
similar characteristics, with different loadings on the Fama-French three-factor model 
(1993) different returns emerged. In a related study, Ferson and Harvey (1999) 
tested the Fama-French three-factor model. They use lagged economic variables as 
proxies for time variation in expected returns, leading to significant cross-sectional 
predictors of returns and therefore they rejected the Fama-French three-factor model 
as a conditional asset pricing model. These studies contradicted the Fama-French 
three-factor model that rejected CAPM.   
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2.10 Market Liquidity and Stock Returns 
Numerous studies have focused on the liquidity and expected stock returns relation 
to verify the extent to which liquidity is important to firms involved in M&As.  
Empirical evidence suggests that ARs of companies that announce acquisitions are 
expected to be higher due to their lower level of liquidity.  The studies of Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) 
employed various liquidity measures and reported that less liquid stock is associated 
with higher returns. These studies empirically advocate that trading volume acts as a 
proxy for liquidity of the market in the firm’s shares rather than priced risk factor. In 
their studies, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) were able to bring a 
relationship between liquidity and expected returns. They show that, stocks that are 
associated with high liquidity have lower expected returns. Their cross-sectional 
analysis demonstrated that, there is a correlation between stock returns and liquidity, 
using liquidity as proxy of measure trading activity.  
 
In search of clear evidence, the Fama-French three-factor model was used to 
investigate how the expected stock returns are related to cross-sectional sensitivities 
of returns to liquidity factors. This approach indicates that the average return on 
stocks with high sensitivities to liquidity exceeds that for stocks with low sensitivities 
(Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003), while the Fama-French three-factor model (1993) 
failed to capture the impact of turnover and past returns in the cross-section when 
the liquidity factors were included in the analysis (Avramov and Chordia, 2006). This 
evidence shows that the expected stock returns are not static but fluctuate due to 
market liquidity factors that have significant positive or negative effect on 
shareholders’ wealth. 
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 Chordia et al. (2001) and Jones (2002) were able to show that time series as a link 
between their measure of market liquidity and expected market returns. These 
studies showed that the presence of time-series behaviour of stock returns may be 
explained by the market liquidity as a variable that affects the cross-sectional 
returns, while the market liquidity variable may be related to other factors like 
momentum factors. On announcement day, daily changes in market liquidity are 
highly volatile and negatively serially dependent. Amihud (2002) reported that the 
expected market liquidity positively affects stock returns, signifying that there is a 
partial relation between expected stock excess return and liquidity premium. The 
study suggested that stock returns are negatively linked to simultaneous unexpected 
liquidity. Amihud (2002) contented that the time series variations of small firm stock 
premiums is attributed to the strong effect of liquidity on these small firm stocks. 
 
2.11 Conditional Volatility and Stock Returns 
Over the years both researchers and practitioners in the financial market have 
acknowledged the existence of volatility clustering in stock returns. This 
phenomenon is of great importance to shareholders in arriving at their returns. There 
was evidence to suggest the existence of long-term volatility perseverance in high 
rate returns. Previous researchers have put forward many explanations to account 
for the changes in stock market volatility. One set of relevant factors that are of great 
concern to shareholders or market participants are the information criteria. Empirical 
evidence has shown that price shocks will result in higher or low levels of volatility 
due to both bad news and good news. Nelson (1991) observed that future volatility 
leads to increase response to bad news and tends to fall in response to good news. 
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In other words, low returns are associated with bad news whereas higher returns are 
linked with good news. Nelson (1991, p.349) states that ‘’GARCH models, however, 
assume that only the magnitude and not the positivity or negativity of unanticipated 
excess returns determines feature conditional variance’’.  
Leverage effect had been suggested to account for stock returns volatility. Stock 
market volatility tends to rise with financial leverage and there is negative correlation 
between stock returns and volatility. Risk premium is linked with conditional volatility; 
bidding firms, in pursuing their investment strategy, required the risk premium 
connected with risk of future changes in the volatility regime (see for e.g. Schwert, 
1989; Mayfield, 2004; Bae, Kim and Nelson, 2007). Bae et al. (2007) explain the 
rationale between negative stock returns and volatility. They were of the view that 
constant volatility when priced, will lead to rises in volatility which raises the expected 
future volatility of the necessary stock returns, hence instant negative shock of the 
present price.  
Bekaert and Wu (2000) investigated the leverage effect and time-varying risk 
premium to explain asymmetric volatility at firm and market level. They used 
conditional CAPM with GARCH-in-mean to model the stock returns at firm level. 
They found that negative shocks raise conditional covariance considerably, while 
positive shocks have a varied impact on conditional covariance. They documented 
that leverage effect on volatility was small in contrast to asymmetry generated due to 
the shocks in the GARCH model and also documented the risk premium implications 
of their findings. Bekaert and Wu (2000) also found volatility feedback held back and 
that volatility feedback at firm level improved by strong asymmetries in conditional 
covariance. Clayton and Ravid (2002) documented that leverage effect as firms debt 
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levels increase, gives them a little ability of power to bids. This suggests that firms 
with debt cannot have the ability to acquire other firms. 
Using economic indicators, the two studies of, for example Campbell and Hentschel 
(1992) and Anderson and Bollerslev (1997) provide evidence to suggest that the 
existence of time-varying volatility dynamics is most observed with a high rate of 
intra-daily returns. While the fundamental trading strategy of Brock and LeBaron 
(2001) suggested that investors’ persistence of strategy time scale will result in 
positive autocorrelation in volatility and volume of trading process that leads the 
returns.  
The finance empirical literature has revealed that stock returns have a high mean, 
and, are excessively volatile which is significantly predictable in the time series. A 
weak forms correlation between stock return and consumption growth was observed. 
As a result of fluctuations in the value of financial wealth, market participants 
encounter loss aversion and this loss aversion depends on their investment 
strategies (see e.g. Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001; Cao, Coval and Hirshleifer, 
2002; McQueen and Vorkink, 2004).  
 
2.12 Stock Market Size Effect 
One of the essential stock market anomalies well-known in the M&As literature is the 
size effect. The size effect hypothesis has been under intense discussion in the 
finance community. A lot of theoretical explanations have been put forward in the 
literature to explain this anomaly. The empirical evidence proposed in the literature 
to explain this phenomenon is mixed. Moeller et al. (2004) examined firms’ size and 
gains from acquisitions on announcement for both target and bidding firms. Moeller 
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et al. (2004) found that small firms’ ARs are higher than ARs of large firms on 
announcement. Moeller et al. (2004) also observed that small firms gain substantially 
when they announced acquisition and that the size effect reversed hypothesis does 
not hold. The study suggests that large firms pay higher acquisition premiums 
relative to small firms on acquisition and also large firms enter acquisition with 
negative synergy gains.  
 
Fama-French (1992) tested this size effect hypothesis with other factors to find out 
which of the variables have an effect on the stock market returns. They found that 
size and book-to-market equity capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock 
returns associated with size and that there is a negative correlation between average 
returns and size. Other empirical studies have supported the notion that small firms’ 
stock returns on announcement exceed big firms. Dimson and Marsh (1999), 
Reinganum (1999), Van Dijk (2007) and Andrikopoulos, Daynes, Latimer and Pagas 
(2008) have concluded that small firms out performed large firms.  
 
However, some researchers have disproved the size effect hypothesis that small firm 
on acquisition outperform big firms, but rather attributed it to other factors. Wang 
(2000) was of the view that data truncation and volatility might have caused size 
effect. Lo and Makinglay (1990) suggested that the small size effect might happen 
due to methodological and data snooping. The size effect hypothesis is evidently 
attributed to risk factor by some researchers. It has been suggested that most small 
firms are fundamentally riskier than most big firms and therefore will generate higher 
returns compared to relatively big firms (Berk, 1995).   
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2.13 Critical Review of Previous Studies  
In the literature several theoretically and empirical arguments have been advocated 
to account for the strength and weakness of various model specifications in the 
realm of M&As. Despite comprehensive discussions and empirical work the literature 
has not be able to provide a meaningful basis to analyse M&As and what proper 
procedure should be followed. These studies show that, there are some unresolved 
issues, a challenge that remains for the finance academics and which need to be 
discussed.  
 
There is no consensuses about which of the specific model that best to be applied. 
The literature review had revealed that a significant number of researches employed 
the statistical methodology of market model (see for e.g. Frank and Mayer, 1996; 
Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; Akhigbe and Madura, 2001; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004 
), in their event studies. In spite of the criticisms levelled against the market model of 
the event study methodology, most studies applied it as one of the most successful 
methodologies in examining the share returns of bidder firm and target firm in the 
M&As industry. Compare to a smaller number of researches who used the Fama-
French three-factor model (see for e.g. Faff, 2004; Pham, 2007). These opposing 
ideas or findings are somewhat worrying as to how could be resolved. Potential 
implications of these arguments are that other factors might have contributed to their 
difference in findings. The two different models might produce different results 
leading to different conclusions. The difference between the two approaches makes 
comparison impossible. 
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The apparent contradiction in results reported by these researchers could be 
attributed to dissimilarities in the underlying samples selected. Where the data set is 
extremely small, this could easily impact the results. Some studies have relative 
small sample size, for example Evi and Cecilio’s (2004) sample of a 50-pair 
observation may be insufficient to test accurately for the financial ratios of cross-
sectional data of the statistical methodologies.  
 
Furthermore, most of the studies on M&As activities focus on relatively short time 
periods of five or ten years, with the exception of a few researchers who have 
extended their analysis above ten years. Becher (2000), Moeller et al. (2004) and 
Powell and Yawson (2005) have extended their analysis for a period of 17, 20 and 
14 years, respectively. Given the short term and long term studies, comparisons 
between the two will be cumbersome.  
 
Certain criticisms have been levelled against the long-run cumulative ARs (CARs) 
and buy-and hold (BHARs) methods. Although, both CARs and BHARs approaches 
have been used extensively in the financial economics the two methods exhibit 
significant biases in test statistics which are opposite to each other. The long-run 
CARs are linked with positive biases while the long-run BHARs are associated with 
negative biases (see Barber and Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997). Given the 
circumstances surrounding the positive and negative biases, the literature has not 
been able to categorically say which of the two approaches best suit the interest of 
shareholders. However, Fama (1998) emphatically said that in spite of the problems 
associated with the CARs approach, nevertheless encounter fewer statistical 
inferences problems when compare to the BHAR approach. 
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Other stock market anomalies that need to be commented on are the characteristics 
of size and book-to-market. For example, Fama-French three-factor model (1993) 
failed to find correlation between average return to beta and were authoritatively 
rejected CAPM, since the CAPM cannot explained the average stock returns. In 
contrast, studies are able to link the size and book-to-market as the dependable with 
the CAPM market beta to predict stock returns (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001). The 
difference in average returns between the two approaches might have suggested 
that the Fama-French three-factor model applies separate size and book-to-market 
factors which were totally different from the CAPM factors.  
 
One important issue that need to be commented on is announcement of M&As to 
give effect to ARs. ARs on announcement are inconclusive. Earlier studies have 
either document positive or negative ARs for acquirer firms after the announcement. 
For example studies in UK and US showed that returns to acquirers’ firm 
shareholders are either zero or negative (see e.g. Higson and Elliott, 1998; 
Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). However, studies in Europe and Canada 
documented positive returns to bidder firm shareholders on post-acquisition 
announcement (see e.g. Ben-Amar and Andre, 2006; Bigelli and Mengoli, 2004). The 
differences in returns might be attributed to different performance measures used. 
 
2.14 Conclusion 
This chapter was designed to critically review of the empirical existing literature in 
the area of shareholders wealth associated with M&As. The review was structured in 
such a way that it covered those important areas under M&As. The in-depth 
empirical literature had also reviewed that despite prior researches using different 
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approaches, a comparative analysis revealed that their findings are not qualitatively 
or quantitatively different. The review has also shown that previous studies have not 
yet able to document consistent results concerning ARs for acquirer firm 
shareholders after the announcement. One important conclusion from this reviewed 
was that the literature generally had not been able to say which methodology is the 
best to be used to examine the wealth effect of M&As. However it can be concluded 
that Fama-French three-factor model is capable of capturing the risk factors 
associated with stock market returns which are important to investors. Despite these 
compressive discussions, there are still unanswered issues in terms of the best 
technique to use in estimating shareholders’ wealth and why M&As activities differ 
over time these will challenge the financial academics. Based on these questions the 
present study aims to examine the wealth effects of M&As using the standard 
CAPM, Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor model. The standard 
CAPM only captures the riskiness of a firm, relative to overall market. As such the 
Fama-French three-factor model will be better specified. The same argument holds 
for the Carhart four-factor model. The use of different specifications of the pricing 
model is useful because by estimating ARs using three pricing models we are not 
trying to measure our results to earlier researchers but also avoid predicaments 
which are specific to any one technique. Again, in order to access the effects of 
different estimation methods on the ARs, we estimated all the models using the 
standard OLS and the (asymmetric) GJR-GARCH methods. The use of the GJR-
GARCH method leads to greater estimation efficiency compare to the OLS method 
especially in daily data where ACRH effects and asymmetry are more pronounced 
relative to weekly or monthly data. Finally, the use of different models and estimation 
methods might provide explanations about ARs on announcement of M&As.                                       
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                                                    CHAPTER THREE 
                           
                                Data, Methodology and Descriptive Statistics 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the data and event study methodologies used in the present 
study. The empirical approach is based on the theories and evidence reviewed in the 
previous chapter. The data employed in this quantitative analysis is the time series 
data of US companies that were involved M&As activities over a 20 years period. 
That is, from 1st January 1988 to 31st December 2008. Based on this data set, the 
three important empirical models are estimated to generate the ARs. These are the 
standard CAPM; Fama-French three-factor (1993); and Carhart four-factor (1997). 
This chapter begins with the hypothesis development, a brief review of the event 
study framework, research design and parameter estimation. Given these 
considerations, it then proceeds to the estimation method. Specifically, the models 
are estimated under both OLS and the asymmetric GJR-GARCH methods. The 
hypotheses to be tested are also specified below. These issues are covered in sub-
sections 3.0 to 3.9 
 
3.1 Hypothesis Development 
 
This empirical study will test the following hypotheses. 
 
3.1.1 Information Effect Hypothesis 
The information effect hypothesis is of the view that investors react to the information 
that comes into the market. According to this hypothesis when good news comes 
into the market the stock prices will rise (i.e. a positive shock) and negative news will 
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lead to a fall in the stock prices (a negative shock). Studies have examined the 
effects of acquisition on stock prices and found that on the announcement of an 
acquisition (see Conn et al., 2005) shareholders experience significant ARs. 
However, Doukas and Travlos (1988) showed that on acquisition announcements 
there are insignificant effects on firms’ common stock prices. Of course, a negative 
ARs can arise if investors perceive that the proposed M&As is inappropriate for the 
associated firms and/or if the market had already impounded that information into the 
stock prices. Therefore the question to be examined here is whether good news will 
lead to increases in share prices and hence whether shareholders’ wealth of the 
acquiring firm increases when good acquisitions are announced, that is, 
 
H1,a: The announcements of M&As generate significant ARs for both sets of firms 
thereby increasing the wealth of shareholders.  
H1b: The alternative hypothesis is that M&As announcements generate no significant 
ARs. 
This hypothesis will be tested using both the standard CAPM model, the Fama-
French three-factor and Carhart four-factor pricing factors over the event window. 
Since the specification of the model is likely to impact on the magnitude of the ARs, 
the following hypothesis is also tested: 
  
3.1.2 Signal Hypothesis generating similar ARs 
H2,a: The magnitude of the ARs are similar under both the standard CAPM, Fama-
French and Carhart models. The significance of the ARs will be tested using both the 
standard student t statistic and the nonparametric Wilcoxon-signed rank test for 
related samples.  
 
63 
 
3.1.3 Liquidity Hypothesis 
The liquidity hypothesis suggests that small liquidity stocks generate higher ARs 
than large liquidity stocks on announcement of acquisition. Moeller et al. (2004) 
found that small liquidity firms’ ARs are higher than ARs of large liquid firms on 
announcement. Financial theory suggests that, less liquidity firms with a lower 
market value should be compensated with higher ARs than those firms which are 
more liquid. Since it is expected that large stocks are more liquid than small stocks, 
the degree of liquidity is proxy by the market capitalization value. Amihud (2002) 
takes the view that higher returns can increase illiquidity and expected illiquidity can 
sequentially increase stock expected returns and lower stock prices. He therefore 
documented strong illiquidity effects in favour for small firms stock. Empirical studies 
have focused on the liquidity and expected stock returns relation to verify the extent 
to which liquidity can affect ARs. The studies of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) employed various liquidity measures and reported that less liquid stocks are 
associated with higher returns. In other words, higher volume liquidity stocks are 
associated with lower ARs. Our results show that small liquidity stocks are more 
lucrative than large liquidity stock, hence confirming the liquidity hypothesis. 
Empirical evidence has shown that small liquid firms are by definition less liquid than 
large liquidity firms and therefore will have higher ARs than its counterpart large 
firms that should have lower ARs. The hypotheses tested are: 
H4a: Small liquid firms that announce acquisitions, i.e., acquiring firms, are expected 
to create higher ARs due to their size. 
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H4b:  There are no differences between the ARs of large and small liquid firms. This 
hypothesis will be tested using the standard capitalisation and trading volume 
measures to classify the ARs for firms that have big, medium and small capital. 
 
3.1.4 Method of Payment Hypothesis 
Advocates of this hypothesis proposed that financing methods in M&As play an 
important role in the takeover process. Studies have shown that bidder returns (see 
e.g. Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990; Travlos and Waegelein, 1992; Goergen and 
Ronneboog, 2004; Conn et al., 2005) are significantly higher when offered cash, 
than a bidder paying stock. Acquisition is deemed liquid if the bidding firm paying by 
cash can quickly buy the target firm due to availability of cash to finance the deal. 
The ARs of the bidding firm will be positive relative to the bidder paying by stock. 
The question is whether the acquiring firm shareholder wealth will increases because 
of financing the acquisition with cash. To examine this issue the following hypothesis 
has been formulated. 
H5a: High ARs for M&As that are finance with cash. 
H5b: Equal ARs for both types of M&As. 
 
3.2 Event Study Framework    
The event study framework in finance research is the analysis of financial data to 
estimate the return impact of a specific event on the share prices of M&As. 
Information, by classification, alters expectation. As observed by MacKinlay (1997), 
the estimation of the event’s economic impact can be measured by using the share 
prices in the short run relative to productivity measure in the long run. Indeed, the 
share price movements is used to measure the performance of stock in M&As. 
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Share prices that portray an upward movement curve are deemed to benefit 
shareholders of the merging companies, while a downward sloping curve depicts a 
negative returns impact on merging firms’ shareholders. 
 
 The event date can be used as the centring point to predict share price effects. 
Evidence has shown that the ARs are the focal point of the event studies. MacKinlay 
(1997) observed that wealth effects of M&As of event studies are mostly concerned 
with the ARs around the date of first announcement. The event study framework 
relates to the efficient market hypothesis which state that information is readily and 
unbiasedly impounded in the share prices (see e.g. Serra, 2002) and therefore such 
an information set cannot be used to earn ARs.  
 
 
 The ARs is the measure of the relationship between actual return and expected 
returns. Using the event study methodology of market model, Binder (1998) showed 
that the ARs as measured by the firm alpha is equal to zero. Glenn and John (2001) 
employed the event study methodology of the market model in estimating the 
expected returns. The study showed that the use of the market model to measure 
the event study leads to biased estimates of expected returns. This misspecification 
of the model can lead to biased estimates of the ARs. To deal with this threat, the 
use of the Fama-French three-factor model might be capable of explaining 
differences in cross-sectional returns.  
 
Ahern (2008) employed an event study methodology of the market model, Fama-
French three-factor model and Carhart four-factor models to estimate ARs. The 
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study was limited to a short-term event study method, precisely a one-day event 
window. The study compares the predictable model-test statistics as to which 
method has the explanatory power to detect ARs. Ahern (2008) showed that both the 
Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models were superior to the 
market model in terms of predictive power and also produce ARs with reduced 
skewness. In terms of statistical significance of ARs, these two multifactor models 
were superior. However, the Fama-French three-factor model was classified as the 
best among the models when tested with sign statistic. Our study is considerably 
different from Ahern (2008), even though he used both Fama-French three-factor 
and Carhart four-factor models, he did not consider M&As. 
 
Although the focuses of the event study framework of the current study is the 
estimation of wealth effect of M&As in the long-run, the study uses daily share price 
return data rather than weekly or monthly data. The use of daily data is more 
predominant in the literature to estimate the ARs on the announcement effects. This 
because daily data is likely to retain more of the information about the M&As 
compared with weekly or monthly data. To some extent, the majority of recent 
research has potentially used daily data as a tool in measuring ARs. Using the daily 
data the estimation of ARs is deemed to be uncomplicated and unproblematic 
(Kothari and Warner, 2006). However, daily data is likely to contain much more 
noise, ARCH and asymmetric effects than weekly or monthly data. Commenting on 
daily data, Binder (1998, p.121) revisited the work of Brown and Warner (1985) and 
noted that ‘’the potential problems with daily returns are unimportant or easily 
corrected in the standard event study and, when the event date is known, tests with 
daily data have a greater signal to noise ratio than those with monthly data’’. 
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Accordingly, Fama (1998) observed that model misspecification has little effect on 
the estimation of ARs when short return windows are used in event studies. 
 
For a successful event study, the choice of the event day must be seen as the focal 
point of the study. Both the first public announcement date of the mergers and the 
actual completion dates were identified. Using the actual completion date will 
suggest that all issues concerning the mergers outcome are acceptable but this 
might have substantial consequences on the ARs between the time of the first public 
announcement date and the actual completion date. However, using the first public 
announcement date will give the researcher the opportunity to capture the ARs 
associated with the announcement date. For this reason, this current study has 
chosen the first public announcement date as the event date. The ARs otherwise 
known as the wealth effect is the variation between actual return and expected 
return. 
 
3.3 Research Design   
3.3.1 Data 
The analysis is based on a sample of U.S. listed firm that undertook M&As activity 
and encompasses acquisition data over a twenty year period, 01 January 1988 to 31 
December 2008.There were 1,079 M&As events that took place within the stipulated 
time of study. The data set provides information on 800 firms and events that were 
involved in M&As during the period. Based on the criteria outlined below, 401 
observation firms finally satisfied the criteria and were selected for this study. These 
represent the number of M&As events used in the present study. In other words, the 
401 observation firms are equal to the number of M&As events chosen in the present 
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study. These 401 observation firms are the sum of target and acquiring firms. That 
is, 198 firms are target and 203 are the bidding firms. The data includes information 
concerning all U.S. nonfinancial firms in Thomson Financial Reuters database. 
Thomson Financial database contains all the M&As announcements that took place 
during the stipulated time as well as all quoted public companies. Centre for 
Research Security Price’s (CRSP) database was used to obtain the share prices, 
trading volume as well as the market capitalisation values of all firms included in this 
study. The values for excess market return (Mtk), small stocks minus big stocks 
(SMB), high book-to-market minus low book-to-market (HML) and price momentum 
in stock return (MOM) were also obtained from the Kenneth French website. The risk 
free rate used is the daily three month annualised U.S. Treasury bill rate, which was 
converted to one day Treasury bill rate and was acquired from the U.S. Treasury 
Department website. The Rf (risk free rate) from Kenneth French website was not 
included in arriving at our excess market returns. This is because there was no 
variation of the one month Rf. As a result, the excess market return from the 
Kenneth French website was adjusted to get the full market return. Then using our 
de-annualised U.S. Treasury bill rate a (new) excess market return was computed. 
 
3.3.2 Sample Selection 
The research is based on sampling theory which is an integral part of statistical 
practice concerned with the selection of individual firms that took part in M&As in the 
U.S. Using an appropriate sampling technique, one can be confident that the result 
of the firms that took part in acquisition can be generalized to entire firms involved in 
the acquisition process. The building of the data set is crucial as the factor of 
acquisitions activity is designed to learn primarily about a particular subset but not all 
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individual firms that took acquisition activities or in the population. If all companies in 
the U.S. were involved in acquisition activities the development of the sample would 
have been easy. Considering the number of companies engaged in acquisition, 
usually referred to as the target population with respect to the total population, this is 
significantly low. However, this small number of firms is usually overrepresented in 
the sample, which is of significant interest in this study.  
 
To solidify some of the intuitive thoughts presented above it will be appropriate to 
find a suitable method of selecting a sample under a particular situation since some 
approaches are not conducive or favourable. The sampling theory concept is based 
on the development of the data set which enables a critical examination of some 
features of the population from which the sample will be selected. The sample 
should be free of bias to give accuracy to the analysis of the characteristics. At this 
point, one should appreciate that there are some major differences between both 
target and acquirer companies and those firms that do not take part in the acquisition 
process.  
 
In this regard, sampling theory might arrest the vulnerability of some of the data 
selection biases. Hence, using standard CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor and 
Carhart four-factor models and the variables for the study, we can demonstrate that 
there are some momentous differences between both target and acquirer firms and 
those companies that did not take part in the acquisition process. 
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3.3.3 Criteria for sample selection 
a) Firms’ information should be obtained from Thompson Financial Reuters 
database.  
b) The firms must have actually executed the M&As to be included in the analysis.  
c) Both the target and acquirer should be incorporated in the US. That is, the M&As 
are entirely domestic not foreign. 
d) The first public announcement date of the takeover offer can be verified. 
e) Financial firms were not included due to high leverage that might signify distress 
(Fama-French, 1992), momentarily selling below its true economic value because of 
uncertain future earnings.  
  
3.4 Parameter Estimation and Event Period  
Parameter estimation is of interest to a researcher in event studies surrounding the 
announcement date. Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) indicated that one would 
accept unconditionally that markets are efficient if the event study to estimate the 
wealth effects of M&As take into account only a few days or returns surrounding the 
announcement date, given that returns following the event are uncared for. However, 
information by classification is leaked into the market prior to the first public official 
announcement date. This suggests that if the estimation period is limited to only a 
few days around the announcement date it will not capture the full stock price impact 
of M&As. Therefore, acquiring firm and target firm shareholder wealth will be 
estimated using a long period of analysis. The event window, observing the actual 
stock returns stretching from ±250 days prior to and after the bid announcement for 
both acquired and bidding companies. A long period is chosen to ensure statistical 
reliability for the estimation method. Carletti al et 2008 used ±250 days as their 
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estimation period before and after the event. Using the same method, the expected 
return for each company was calculated for ±250 days prior to and after the bid 
announcement for both acquired and bidding companies. This long period is also 
useful to avoid the small sampling problem and to ensure the statistical reliability of 
the estimates. In order to compare before and after acquisition to ascertain whether 
or not acquisition actually creates shareholder wealth beyond organic growth, we 
calculated ARs of either side of the event date for the announcement date for both 
target and bidding firms. 
 
The daily excess returns or stock return of each firm was calculated as logarithmic 
of:  
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where: 
itR  return of the share on day t 
itP  price of the share on day t 
1itP  price of the share on previous day 
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LN   was also use to generate the excess market return given the adjustment 
to the market return obtain from the Kenneth French website. 
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3.5 Model Specifications 
Essentially, the future potential of M&As is important to how the market reacts to 
acquisition announcements. There are several specifications of CAPM that can be 
used to estimate the ARs. Here we use the standard CAPM, the Fama-French three-
factor model and the Carhart four-factor models. Most financial academics have 
suggested that the Fama-French three-factor models and the four-factor models may 
be better than the standard CAPM in explaining cross-sectional returns. The 
standard CAPM is well-known to be capturing the riskiness of firm, relative to the 
overall market. Hence the Fama-French three-factor model will be better specified, 
since the three-factor model capable of capturing cross-sectional variation in returns. 
The same reason holds for the Carhart four-factor models.  
 
Empirical studies of Gharghori, Chan and Faff (2007) suggested that Fama-French 
three-factor models are vastly superior to CAPM in explaining equity returns. 
Gharghori et al. (2007) were of the view that the performance of the four-factor 
model and the Fama-French model is comparable or akin with the four-factor model 
is trivial at best.  They also found that CAPM drastically understates the returns on 
the portfolio. Note: the justification of each model is extensively discussed in section 
3.7 
 
3.5.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Copeland, Weston and Shastri (2005, pp147 & 148) gave a summary of the CAPM 
assumptions about investors and the opportunity. And these are outlined below. 
CAPM is an economic model that uses a single factor, beta  , to measure the 
appropriate required rate of risk and expected return of an asset. The model 
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assumed that the expected return to investors is equal to the rate of a risk-free 
security plus a risk premium. The model accounts for the systematic risk or the 
market risk as measured by the beta. Intuitively, investors would expect higher return 
in substitute for a higher risk. This implies that the expected return should be higher. 
Because investors are risk-averse, this will suggest that they expect higher return for 
holding risky assets (see e.g. Copeland et al., 2005). It is therefore imperative that 
the CAPM is consistent with intuition; investors demand a higher return for holding 
riskier assets. Based on the CAPM, the following regression is estimated: 
titftmiitfti RRRR ,..,, )(                                                                              (1a) 
 
where: 
itR   is the return on stock i ; ftR  is the risk free rate; mtR  is the return on the all-share 
market index; t,i is the conditional error based on the information set at 1t . 
 
3.5.2 Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
Whilst some financial economists assume that there is a positive relation between 
average stock returns and market beta  , Fama-French (1992) disproves the notion 
that market beta   has no predictive power in explaining the cross-sectional 
variations returns on NYSE stocks. Fama-French (1992) employed the cross-section 
regression method and found that size, earning price ratio, leverage and book-to-
market equity ratio have significant explanatory power to stock average returns. 
However, the market beta   to stock average returns poses a strong challenge 
because beta has no capability in explaining cross-sectional variation in stock 
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returns. They contended that size and book-to-market equity variables had more 
explanatory power relative to earning price ratio and leverage and that size and 
book-to-market equity proxy for risk factors in returns. 
 
 Based on the evidence in their prior study, Fama-French (1993) developed a three-
factor model: market, size and book-to market to explain the common variation in 
stock returns. They added two factors to their original cross-sectional regression to 
capture portfolio’s risk factors associated with size and book-to-market equity. Fama-
French (1993) used the time series testing approach to explain cross-sectional 
variation in stock returns and made the same conclusion that market beta   has no 
explanatory power in cross-sectional variation in stock returns. As before, they 
concluded that market factor as well as the risk factors related to size and book-to-
market equity well brilliant in explaining the cross-section of average returns.  
 
Interestingly, on the stock market factor, Fama-French (1993) argued that firms with 
high book-to market equity (a low stock price relative to book value) on average have 
low earnings and low book-to-market equity (a high stock price relative to book 
value) have high earnings. In other words, high returns are associated with taking on 
high risk which implies if returns increase with book-to-price, subsequently stocks 
with book-to-price on average must be more risky. Based on the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model the following regression is estimated: 
      (1b)                                                        )( ,,,,, titititftmiitfti HMLSMBRRRR  
 
where: 
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itR  is the return on stock i ; ftR  is the risk free rate; mtR  is the return on the all-share 
market index; tSMB  is the return on a portfolio of small stock minus the return on a 
portfolio of large stocks; tHML  is the return on a portfolio high book-to-market less a 
the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market; t,i is the conditional error based on 
the information set at 1t . 
 
3.5.3 Carhart Four-Factor Model  
Carhart four-factor model is an extension of the three-factor model developed by 
Fama-French (1993) with an additional factor incorporated to capture the momentum 
of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The model is based on common variation of stock 
returns with factors, market, size, book-to-market and momentum. The momentum 
parameter was developed by ranking firms in each month t in ascending order using 
the returns from past months. He then compared all the top 50 percent firms and the 
50 bottom firms, the top 50 firms being the winner portfolio and the 50 bottom firms 
represented loser portfolio. This approach implies that winner portfolios are kept, 
whilst loser ones are sold. This gives the momentum factor for the month t as the 
average return on the winner portfolio minus the average return on the loser portfolio 
over the period. Carhart (1997) indicates that the four-factor model is in harmony 
with a model of equilibrium with four risk factors. We use the Carhart four-factor 
model (1997) to estimate the following regression: 
   (1c)                                       )( ,,, .. tititititftmiitfti MOMHMLSMBRRRR  
 
where: 
itR  is the return on stock i ; ftR  is the risk free rate; mtR  is the return on the all-share 
market index; tSMB  is the return on a portfolio of small stock minus the return on a 
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portfolio of large stocks; tHML  is the return on a portfolio high book-to-market less a 
the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market; and tMOM  is the price momentum in 
stock return; all at time t . t,i is the conditional error based on the information set at 
1t . 
 
As indicated earlier, the ARs will be generated from the three models above. These 
models will be estimated using OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods. In order 
to estimate the ARs, a time series regression analysis in which dependent variable is 
the daily excess return on event firms’ stock and independent variables are daily 
factor returns was adopted. The ARs is estimated from the difference between actual 
return and expected return for firm i, during the event widow. This denotes residual 
return, also known as ARs. The ARs are respectively computed from equation (1a),  
(1b) and (1c) as follow: 
(2a)                                                                     )(()( .,,,,, tftmiitftititi RRRRAR  
 
(2b)                                        )(()( ,,,,,, tititftmiitftititi HMLSMBRRRRAR  
 
titititftmiitftititi MOMHMLSMBRRRRAR   )(()( ,,,,,,                    (2c) 
where: 
itR  is the return on stock i ; ftR  is the risk free rate; mtR  is the return on the all-share 
market index; tSMB  is the return on a portfolio of small stock minus the return on a 
portfolio of large stocks; tHML  is the return on a portfolio high book-to-market less a 
the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market; and tMOM  is the price momentum in 
stock return; all at time t . t,i is the conditional error based on the information set at 
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1t . itAR  is the abnormal return of firm i  during the event period;   and   are 
estimated values for intercept and slope coefficient,    being the systematic risk. 
 
The ARs will be computed for each stock i over a window W of ±250 days. The 
average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) were also 
computed. The AAR were computed using:  
 
N
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                                                                                                         (3)                                                         
 
 
where N is the number of firms. 
CAR1 was computed as day-one AR implies, AR1, CAR2= CAR1 + AR2, CAR3 = CAR2 
+AR3 in that order. These measures are accumulated across all firms over a ±20 day 
window. 
 The CARs for stock i for each of Eqs. (2a), (2b) and (2c) are computed as: 
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The average CAR over the window W day and centred on day zero across N stocks 
is computed as: 
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The statistical significance of tCAR  is determined using the standard t-statistic. In 
other words, the student testt   was used to investigate whether the CAR was 
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significantly different from zero, over the window of -20 days to +20 days. The 
statistict  is: 
nCAR
CAR
t
t
/)(
                                                                                                    (4c) 
where tCAR  is the sample mean and )( tCAR is the cross-sectional sample standard 
deviation of the ARs. Since we also estimate the GJR-GARCH-M, we show the 
specification of this model in Section 3.6. 
 
3.6 GJR-GARCH Estimation Method 
To specify the GJR-GARCH-in-mean (GJR-GARCH-M), we need to write both the 
mean and variance equations for Eqs. (1a), (1b) and (1c) and include the in-mean 
variable as an additional parameter to be estimated. The specification is the same 
for all the three pricing models, of course with the in-mean parameter added. As 
such, we only specify the GJR-GARCH-M for Eq. (1c) – the Cahart model, thus 
  (5)                             )( ,
2
,,,,, titiititititftmiitfti hMOMHMLSMBRRRR  
   
Eq. (5) is the mean equation. The first five coefficients have a similar interpretation 
as before. However, the coefficient i  captures relation between the risk and excess 
returns as in Merton (1973) intertemporal pricing model. 
The variance equation for Eq. (5) can be written as: 
(6)                                                                )( 2 1,1,
2
1,
2
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2
,1,   titiitiitiiititti KhhΩVar 
                           
In eq. (6), i  denotes the permanent component; i is the coefficient for prior period 
news; i is the coefficient for prior period (lagged) conditional volatility and i is the 
coefficient for asymmetry – the leverage effect. That is; 1t,iK is an indicator dummy 
79 
 
variable that takes on a value of one if 1t,i  is negative; zero otherwise. Nam, Pyun 
and Kim (2003) shows however, that because the digit one taken on the 2 1it  
at full 
weight, this can in turn introduce conditional GARCH effects into the estimates 
where present.  
 
In practice, the GJR-GARCH estimation method is widely used and generates 
superior estimates to GARCH-family models (see, Engle and Ng, 1993). In general, 
GARCH estimation methods lead to improvements in estimation efficiency (see 
Engle, 2001). Indeed, Corhay and Rad (1996) show that for the GARCH, the 
conditional variance in the data causes the standard OLS method to overestimate 
(underestimate) the regression parameters following positive (negative) shocks 
relative to the GARCH approach. In GJR-GARCH specification, the conditional 
variance is a linear function of both the past shock (news) and the past conditional 
volatilities and conditional asymmetry. These parameters seek to explain the current 
conditional variance.  So we would expect the GJR-GARCH method to improve the 
estimation efficiency of the parameters over the OLS method. This is particularly 
important since our estimates are based on daily data where GARCH effects will be 
more pronounced relative to (say) weekly or monthly data. 
 
3.7 Perspectives on CAPM and Fama-French Three-Factors 
The CAPM model is well known for its theoretical establishment in the world of 
finance. The proponents of the single factor are of the view that the general 
application of the CAPM survives because ‘‘the theory behind the CAPM has an 
intuitive appeal that other models lack’’ (Jagannathan and Wang, 1996, p. 4) and 
simplicity of the CAPM than its alternative, the complexity of the Fama-French three-
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factor model (Pham, 2007). Despite its wide use in practice, the model has comes 
under severe criticism due to its empirical performance.  
 
According to the opponent, because of the validity of the restrictions imposed by the 
CAPM, the use of the CAPM has almost ceased (Mackinlay, 1997, p.19). Another 
possible deficiency of CAPM is that, it has no explanatory power to explain the 
cross-section of average returns on assets size and book-to-market ratio. (Fama-
French,1992,1993). Equally, the CAPM fails to consider the time-varying of 
investors’ interest in estimating the risk of asset due to the static nature of the model 
(Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001). 
 
The Fama-French (1993) three-factor model was chosen for this study based on the 
following reasons. The empirical literature has shown that the most recently used 
methodology is the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model to address security 
characteristics on expected returns that are being studied. The proponents of this 
particular model (see e.g. Faff, 2001; 2003; 2004; Chiao and Hueng, 2005; Hu, 
2007) among others have employed the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model in 
their studies. Evidence shows that the Fama-French three-factor model is capable of 
capturing the risk factors associated with stock market returns which are of interest 
to investment participants and hence the model performance cannot be 
underestimated. The benefit of using the three-factor model is that the model does 
not need size or book-to-market data for sample firms (Barber and Lyon, 1997) and 
also the variance of ARs are reduced through in depth explanation of the difference 
in the normal return (MacKinlay, 1997).  
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However the Fama-French three-factor model is no universal remedy. The opponent 
of the multifactor model, Fama-French three-factor model have cast doubts of 
theoretical background and therefore considered the three-factor model as not a 
universal remedy from asset pricing theory (Bornholt, 2006). According to 
opponents, the Fama-French three-factor model construct on size and book-to-
market factors is driven and ad-hoc and also the application is limited in practice by 
estimation inconvenience (Bornholt, 2006). 
 
3.8 Statistical Problems on Long-Run Event Study 
Financial economists have identified a lot of problems associated with statistical 
methodology on long-term event studies than its alternative, the short-run studies. 
Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) distinguished between short-run and long-run event 
studies. Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) described short-run as the days or months 
around the announcement of the bit, whilst long-run denotes to as periods of month 
or years. A lot of criticisms have been levelled against the efficiency of the CAR 
approach to measure the abnormal performance in the long run. Scores of studies 
have pointed out numerous conceptual and statistical deficiencies of the CAR in 
estimating the abnormal performance in the long run. These studies show that the 
long-term performance returns are associated with risk adjustments and biases that 
affect the test statistics (Kothari and Waner, 1997; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). 
Barber and Lyon (1997) argued heavily about the testing problems associated with 
the CAR and pointed out that those methods of estimating CAR are essential 
conceptual flaws and biased. They suggested, however, that, the control firm 
approach was superior to the sampling approach in estimating the CAR but favoured 
buy-and hold abnormal returns (BHARs). 
82 
 
 
Fama (1998) authoritatively said that all methods of estimating CAR are associated 
with statistical model problems. However, Fama (1998) pointed out that in spite of 
the deficiencies associated with the CAR methodology, its statistical problems are 
still better than BHARs. Brav (1998) revisited the works of Kothari and Warner 
(1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) to test abnormal performance that is associated 
with misspecifications and biases in long-term event studies that are at war with the 
test of Efficient Market Hypothesis. Brav (1998) employed Bayesian methodology to 
tackle non-normality and cross-sectional dependence in ARs. Brav (1998, pp. 2) 
noted that the misspecification in long-term studies is the fault of the researcher who 
‘’maintains the standard assumptions that ARs are independent and normally 
distributed although these assumptions fail to hold even approximately at long 
horizons’’. He solidifies the intuitions behind these arguments that samples of long-
term ARs are never independently and normally distributed due to sample firms 
overlapping in calendar time and skewed-right by cumulating of single-period return. 
The latter part of this statement, ‘skewed-right’ was incompatible with the earlier 
studies of Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997).  
 
Two pioneers (Kothari and Warner, 2006), who are well known in the literature on 
long-term methodological issues have resurfaced again in their recent article and are 
discussed extensively in terms of these long horizon methods. They suggested two 
possible solutions to the long-term bias in methodology. First, the use of the Jensen-
alpha method which is resistant to bias arising from cross-correlation or ARs, and 
secondly, bootstrap and pseudo portfolio-based statistical tests which might explain 
the cross-correlations and lead to precise inferences. To circumvent some of those 
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problems, we use a relative long sample period for estimating the ARs before 
focusing on the window that is of interest. Next we, conduct bootstrapping simulation 
to evaluate the reliability of our CARs estimates. 
 
3.9 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation  
The descriptive statistics and the correlations for the explanatory variables over a 
twenty year period, 01 January 1988 to 31 December 2008 are shown in Tables 3.1 
and Table 3.2 respectively. These numbers are the average daily returns of the 
variables computed over a twenty year period. The sample variables are those used 
in the three methodologies analyses. To understand the statistical properties 
underlying the univariate series, we first perform some descriptive statistics and 
correlation tests. This will help us determine that nature of the multivariate tests that 
will be more appropriate for the estimation of the CARs. Table 3.1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. The mean returns of market’s 
excess returns, SMB, HML and MOM are predictably positives. The variance returns 
of all variables are also positive. The HML has the smallest standard deviation 
indicating that it is not as variable compared to market’s excess returns which has 
the highest standard deviation. All variables are negatively skewed except HML. A 
negative distribution is one in which a disproportionate number of observations are 
contained in the left-hand side of the distribution. The negative skewness can be 
associated with negative asymmetry- a feature we attempt to capture under the 
GJR-GARCH estimation method. That is, the tendency for negative news to have a 
disproportionately larger impact of share prices than positive news –the leverage 
effect. The measures for skewness suggest that the returns are normally distributed. 
MOM has the highest excess kurtosis, whilst the lowest excess kurtosis was 
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recorded for SMA. Overall, both the measures for kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are 
always positive. As expected, the Jarque-Bera statistics demonstrate that the returns 
for market excess returns, SMB, HML and MOM are not normally distributed. The 
skewness, excess kurtosis and Jarque-Bera  for all the varables are statistically 
significant. As such, the OLS estimation is likely to lead to inefficient parameter 
estimates. In turn, the use of the GJR-GARCH is likely to lead to an improvement in 
estimation efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OVER 01 JAN 1988 to 31 DEC 2008  
Variables Mean Variance Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Market 
Excess 
Returns 
 0.022 1.172 11.510 -9.000  1.080 -0.198
a 
13.837
a 
25951.980
a 
SMB 0.002  0.324  4.370 -4.510  0.567 -0.367
a 
 7.862
a 
  5334.838
a 
HML  0.016  0.317  3.960 -4.900  0.559  0.150
a 
10.723
a 
13180.580
a 
M0M  0.044  0.616  5.120 -7.290  0.782 -1.032
a 
14.191
a 
28577.270
a 
Note:Market Excess Returns; SMB, HML and MOM as above. a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. The statistical significance estimated using student t-statistics. 
 
 
Table 3.2 shows the correlation coefficients for the explanatory variable used in the 
analyses of the three methodologies. Multicollinearity which is associated with 
econometric analysis is a statistical phenomenon in which intercorrelations are 
among the independent variables. As can be seen, none of the variables are highly 
correlated. If there were highly correlated variables one should have been removed 
in the analysis to avert the problem of multicollinearity arising in the results or that 
may not give a valid result. 
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Table 3.2: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OVER 01 JAN 1988 TO 31 DEC 2008 
 Market 
Excess 
Returns 
 
SMB 
 
HML 
 
MOM 
Market 
Excess 
Returns 
 
    1 
   
 
SMB 
 
-0.173 
 
   1 
  
 
HML 
 
-0.372 
 
 -0.137 
 
  1 
 
 
MOM 
 
-0.177 
 
0.089 
 
-0.165 
 
  1 
Note: Market Excess Returns; SMB, HML and MOM as above. 
 
 
 
3.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the methodologies that have been adopted in the 
present study. The development of the research hypotheses to be tested, data set 
and the sample size for the study have been identified. The discussion also 
attempted to justify why the standard CAPM, the three-factor model and four-factor 
model are chosen as the model specification as well as why both the OLS and GJR-
GARCH methods will be estimated. It has been observed that due to the presence of 
conditional heteroskedasticity applying OLS method may not be appropriate (Li, Ling 
and Wong, 2001); as this would lead to estimation inefficiency. The GARCH results 
are more efficient compare to the OLS results. The statistical problems on the long-
run event study were also observed. The descriptive statistics for the explanatory 
variables are correlated whilst the univariate series are non-normally distributed. The 
non-normality of the explanatory variables will affect estimation efficiency under the 
OLS method.                                                                                                 
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                                          CHAPTER FOUR 
  
Estimates of Abnormal Returns Using OLS and GJR-GARCH Estimation 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Over the years, financial researchers have advocated diverse theories to explain the 
motives behind M&As activities based on the unprecedented rise in the acquisition 
market. Several acquisition hypotheses predict that mergers will bring economic 
benefits to shareholder. This economic benefit can be measured by wealth effect 
which is captured in the ARs. Empirical researchers have adopted several models to 
estimate the ARs as well as test the statistical significance. ARs, as the name 
suggests, following corporate event could be positive or negative depending on the 
outcome of the deal or the economic conditions prevailing at the time of the 
announcement.  
 
To briefly summarize our results, our initial empirical investigation revealed that the 
ARs exhibited both positive and negative returns under the three models and OLS 
and GJR-GARCH estimation methods. We were not able to establish quantitatively 
significant differences in the results between the two estimation methods. 
Nevertheless, the CARs under the GJR-GARCH estimation were larger for target 
firms after the announcement compared to the OLS estimates. The larger CARs 
under the GJR-GARCH method might be the outcome of improved estimation 
efficiency relative to the OLS method.  
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This chapter is specifically designed to serve three main purposes. First, the 
empirical results for CAR using three specifications of the CAPM. Specifically, 
estimates are generated for the cross-sectional standard CAPM, Fama-French 
three-factor and Carhart four-factor models. These estimates are based on 
maximum of ±250 days pre- and post announcement date for the sample estimation. 
Secondly, we investigate how the acquiring firm’s method of payment affects the 
ARs. Thirdly, we run the Wilcoxon signed-rank statistic to test for the difference in 
the magnitude of the CARs under the two estimation methods for similar models as 
well as the standard t-statistic. Note that, the full sample estimates is for ±250 days, 
but to save a space we only reported ±20 days prior to and after the announcement 
date. 
 
 4.1 CARs under Standard CAPM using OLS and GJR-GARCH 
In this section, we present the results for the standard CAPM using the OLS and 
GJR-GARCH estimation methods. To save space we show the results for ±20 days 
pre- and post announcement date unless otherwise indicated.  The results reported 
in Table 4.1 shows the estimated ARs and CARs only for the ±20 days for both 
target and acquirer firms under the OLS and GJR-GARCH. Recall, that the full 
sample estimates is for ±250 days. The results are for the target (acquired) and 
acquirer (bidder) firms. 
 
Take first the results for the target firms. Table 4.1 indicates that under the OLS 
method, the day t=0 generates a positive CAR of 4.000 percent which is significant 
at 1% level. Under the GJR-GARCH, t=0 also generates a CAR of 3.986 percent 
which is also significant at the 1% level. This might suggest that the market did not 
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anticipate the announcement. The results presented here correspond to the literature 
that the share prices of the target firms normally increases at announcement of a 
takeover. Again, these CARs on the event day t=0 support the preposition that 
acquired firm shareholders significantly gain on the announcement day. This result is 
in line with the findings of Campa and Hernando (2006) and Martynova and 
Renneboog (2006). Following the announcement, both the ARs and CARs under the 
OLS estimation are statistically significant up to nine successive days. ARs and 
CARs under the GJR-GARCH estimation also exhibit a similar pattern; however, 
they are statistically significant up to seven subsequent days. Thus the significance 
of the CARs lasts much longer under the OLS method and the effects of the 
announcement last somewhat shorter under the GJR-GARCH. Notice that the CARs 
are not significant prior to the announcement date suggesting that the market is 
efficient. That is the market did not anticipate the announcement. 
 
The results for the acquirer firm’s are also shown in Table 4.1. The CARs are not 
statistically significant on day t=0 under either estimation method. Furthermore, 
similarly, the post- and pre-event date CARs are not significant immediately following 
the event date. The significant CARs are for day t-2 and earlier but only in respect of 
the OLS method. Thus it appears that the market does not respond significantly to 
the announcement from acquirers’ perspective. This might be consistent with 
Grossman and Hart (1980) view that the bidder firm might have to pay most of the 
expected increase in profits following the merger, to the target’s shareholders such 
that the increase in value is not in respect of the acquirer’s value.  The GJR-GARCH 
results contrasts substantially with those of the OLS for pre-event CARs. These 
results are also confirmed by the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
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                            Table 4.1  ARs and CARs Estimate for Standard CAPM under OLS and GJR-GARCH ESTIMATION  
                                 TARGET  FIRMS                                                                  ACQUIRER FIRMS 
                                OLS  EST                           GJR-GARCH EST                                                                              OLS  EST                          GJR-GARCH EST 
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
ARs% 
 
-0.183 
-0.001 
 0.019 
-0.133 
 0.044 
 0.206 
-0.285
 
-0.352 
 0.209
c 
 0.273
c 
-0.285 
-0.019
c 
-0.037
c 
 0.302
c 
-0.080 
 0.142 
 0.121 
-0.004 
 0.324 
 0.122 
 4.000
a 
 1.109
a 
 0.064
b 
 0.092
a 
 0.009
b 
-0.190
c 
 0.321
a 
CARs% 
 
 0.383 
 0.566 
 0.567 
 0.548 
 0.681 
 0.637 
 0.431
 
 0.716 
 1.068
c 
 0.859
c 
 0.586 
 0.871
c 
 0.890
c 
 0.927
c
  
 0.625 
 0.705 
 0.563 
 0.442 
 0.446 
 0.122 
 4.000
a 
 1.109
a 
 1.173
b 
 1.265
a 
 1.274
b 
 1.084
c 
 1.405
a 
ARs% 
 
-0.147 
 0.010 
-0.001 
-0.137 
 0.039 
 0.201 
-0.247 
-0.321 
 0.216 
 0.295 
-0.270 
-0.017 
-0.016 
 0.317
 
-0.081 
 0.153 
 0.100 
-0.032 
 0.207 
 0.066 
 3.986
a 
 1.101
a 
 0.045
b 
 0.102
b 
 0.010
b 
-0.184
c 
 0.348
b 
CARs% 
 
 0.335
 
 0.482 
 0.472 
 0.473 
 0.610      
0.571 
 0.370 
 0.617 
 0.938 
 0.722 
 0.427 
 0.697 
 0.714 
 0.730
 
 0.413 
 0.494 
 0.341 
 0.241 
 0.273 
 0.066 
 3.986
a 
 1.101
a 
 1.146
b 
 1.248
b 
 1.258
b 
 1.074
c 
 1.422
b 
WILCO 
 
>-3.055
a 
>-2.936
a 
>-2.879
a 
>-2.894
a 
>-2.999
a 
>-3.100
a 
>-3.233
a 
>-3.241
a 
>-3.230
a 
>-3.266
a 
>-3.232
a 
>-3.081
a 
>-3.090
a 
>-2.770
a 
>-2.617
a 
>-2.416
b 
>-2.752
a 
>-2.676
a 
>-3.125
a 
>-3.370
a 
>-3.658
a 
>-1.730
c 
>-1.977
b 
>-2.384
a 
>-2.764
a 
>-2.817
a 
>-2.903
a 
T-STA 
 
-0.053
 
-0.096
 
-0.114
 
-0.095 
-0.094
 
-0.093
 
-0.091
 
-0.159 
-0.225 
-0.257 
-0.324 
-0.388 
-0.432 
-0.537 
-0.650 
-0.728 
-0.874 
-0.933 
-0.958 
-0.741 
-0.234 
-0.154 
-0.273 
-0.119 
-0.083 
-0.040 
 0.061 
ARs% 
 
 0.072
a 
-0.146
b 
-0.001
a 
 0.068
a 
-0.216
a 
 0.057
a 
 0.170
a 
-0.091
a 
 0.273
a 
-0.109
a 
 0.414
a 
-0.005
b 
 0.098
a 
 0.162
a 
 0.033
a 
 0.164
a 
 0.091
a 
 0.309
a 
 0.344
b 
 0.135 
 0.247 
 0.353 
-0.039 
-0.308
 
-0.214 
 0.019 
 0.160 
CARs% 
 
 1.822
a 
 1.750
b 
 1.896
a 
 1.897
a 
 1.829
a 
 2.045
a 
 1.988
a 
 1.818
a 
 1.909
a 
 1.636
a 
 1.745
a 
 1.331
b 
 1.336
a 
 1.238
a 
 1.076
a 
 1.043
a 
 0.879
a 
 0.788
a 
 0.479
b 
 0.135 
 0.247 
 0.353 
 0.314 
 0.006
 
-0.208 
-0.189 
-0.029 
ARs% 
 
-0.036 
-0.239 
-0.107 
-0.050 
-0.305
 
-0.045 
 0.065 
-0.190 
 0.168 
-0.211 
 0.297 
-0.080 
 0.011 
 0.061 
-0.081 
 0.054 
-0.007 
 0.208 
 0.232 
 0.009 
 0.125 
 0.198 
-0.142 
-0.384
 
-0.293 
-0.095 
 0.083 
CARs% 
 
-0.246 
-0.210 
 0.029 
 0.136 
 0.186
 
 0.491 
 0.536 
 0.471 
 0.661 
 0.493 
 0.704 
 0.407 
 0.487 
 0.476 
 0.415 
 0.496 
 0.442 
 0.449 
 0.241 
 0.009 
 0.125 
 0.198 
 0.056 
-0.328
 
-0.621 
-0.716 
-0.633 
WILCO 
 
<-1.700c 
>-1.798c 
>-1.729c 
>-1.629 
>-1.688c 
>-1.528 
>-1.506 
<-1.500 
>-1.587 
>-1.585 
>-1.541 
>-1.575 
>-1.182 
<-1.078 
>-1.178 
<-1.271 
<-1.333 
<-1.434 
<-1.394 
>-0.534 
>-0.096 
>-0.617 
>-0.281 
>-0.461 
>-0.735 
>-0.645 
>-0.934 
T-STA 
 
-0.887
 
-0.885 
-0.890 
-0.889 
-0.881 
-0.889 
-0.890 
-0.889 
-0.892 
-0.890 
-0.890 
-0.877 
-0.907 
-0.932 
-0.943 
-0.937 
-0.936 
-0.968 
-1.013 
-1.077 
-1.041 
-1.220 
-1.077 
-0.941 
-0.878 
-0.899 
-0.860 
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Table 4.1 Cont’d. 
                                 TARGET  FIRMS                                                                  ACQUIRER FIRMS 
                                      OLS  EST                         GJR-GARCH EST                                                                   OLS  EST                                GJR-GARCH EST 
DAYS 
 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
ARs% 
 
-0.119
b 
-0.137
c 
 0.045
c 
-0.167 
-0.153 
-0.235 
-0.275
c 
-0.085 
 0.027 
-0.103 
 0.027 
-0.142 
-0.161 
-0.099 
CARs% 
 
1.286
b 
 1.149
c
 
 1.194
c 
 1.027 
 0.874 
 0.639 
 0.364
 
 0.279 
 0.306 
 0.203 
 0.230 
 0.088 
-0.073 
-0.172 
ARs% 
 
-0.109
c 
-0.138  
 0.065 
-0.149 
-0.132 
-0.222 
-0.271 
-0.068 
-0.029 
-0.071 
 0.013 
-0.106 
-0.110 
-0.049 
CARs% 
 
1.313
c 
 1.175 
 1.240 
 1.091 
 0.959 
 0.737 
 0.466 
 0.398 
 0.369 
 0.298 
 0.311 
 0.205 
 0.095 
 0.046 
WILCO 
 
>-2.789
a 
<-2.576
b 
<-2.799
a 
<-2.997
a 
>-2.998
a 
>-3.155
a 
>-3.186
a 
>-3.284
a 
>-3.208
a 
>-3.284
a 
<-3.268
a 
<-3.338
a 
<-3.476
a 
<-3.590
a
 
T-STA 
 
0.083 
 0.072 
 0.112 
 0.140 
 0.168 
 0.179 
 0.173 
 0.188 
 0.094 
 0.132 
 0.106 
 0.146 
 0.197 
 0.243 
ARs% 
 
0.160 
-0.127 
 0.060 
-0.088 
 0.033 
 0.025 
 0.266 
 0.263
 
-0.057 
-0.056 
-0.209 
-0.187 
-0.039 
 0.048 
CARs% 
 
0.131 
 0.004 
 0.064 
-0.024 
 0.009 
 0.034 
 0.300 
 0.563
 
 0.506 
 0.450 
 0.241 
 0.054 
 0.015 
 0.063 
ARs% 
 
0.059 
-0.238 
-0.051 
-0.172 
-0.075 
-0.078 
 0.213 
 0.140 
-0.156 
-0.148 
-0.263 
-0.260 
-0.121 
-0.062 
CARs% 
 
-0.574 
-0.812 
-0.863 
-1.035 
-1.110 
-1.188 
-0.975 
-0.835 
-0.991 
-1.139 
-1.402 
-1.662 
-1.783 
-1.845 
WILCO 
 
<-1.058 
>-0.961 
<-0.691 
<-0.920 
<-0.914 
<-0.914 
<-1.328 
<-1.254 
<-1.339 
<-1.539 
<-1.712c 
<-1.738c 
<-1.843c 
<-1.751c 
T-STA 
 
-0.863 
-0.875 
-0.884 
-0.868 
-0.874 
-0.874 
-0.842 
-0.858 
-0.858 
-0.853 
-0.831 
-0.819 
-0.813 
-0.820 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs estimated using student t-statistics. WILCO and T-STA donate Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test and T-Statistics. 
>donates OLS larger than GJR-GARCH  
<donates OLS less than GJR- GARCH 
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The results suggest persuasively that acquirer firm’s shareholders returns on the 
announcement are significantly lower compared to the target shareholders. These 
present findings are similar to prior studies on post acquisition performance of 
bidders in the U.S. and Australia who documented that overall wealth effect to 
bidder’s shareholders’ returns were either insignificant or negative abnormal returns 
in the long-run (see. e.g. Loughran and Vlih, 1997; Barber and Lyon, 19997; Rosen, 
2006; Le and Schultz, 2007). 
 
To compare the CAR between the target firms and acquirer firms, the daily mean 
differences are obtained by subtracting corresponding CAR. There are significant 
differences between the two CARs on the announcement day. Under the OLS, when 
the event window is t=0, the daily mean difference of CAR between the target and 
acquirer firms is 3.753 percent, which is statistically significant at 1% the level. 
Basically, when the event window is t=0, the daily mean difference of CAR under the 
GJR-GARCH estimate between target and bidder firms is 3.861 percent, which is 
also statistically significant at 1% level (see also Travlos, 1987). Overall, there 
appears to be some variations in the magnitude of the average CARs, given the 
estimation methods for both the target and the acquirer firms. However, the 
predictive performances of the two methods are the same. 
 
 
4.2. CARs under Fama-French Model using OLS and GJR-GARCH 
 
Table 4.2 presents the daily ARs and CARs for the target firms and acquirer firms 
under the Fama-French three-factor model. The table shows both the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimates.  
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The CARs at the announcement date (t=0) for the target firms are positive and 
significantly for both estimation methods. Specifically, for t=0, as expected, there 
were strong positive increases on the announcement day CAR of 4.044 percent and 
3.992 percent under the OLS and GJR-GARCH respectively, which are both 
significant at the 1% level. The magnitudes of those CARs do not appear to be 
statistically different with those of the standard CAPM. This evidence demonstrates  
that target firms exhibit substantial positive returns on the announcement day. 
Interestingly, CARs for target firms under the OLS estimation repeatedly displayed 
statistically significant positive returns over the window of seven days (t=+1 to t=+7). 
In contrast to target firms under the GJR-GARCH estimation, CARs simultaneously 
showed statistically significant positive returns over the window of four days (t=+1 to 
t=+4). Indeed, on the announcement day, CAR under the OLS estimation was 
significantly higher than the GJR-GARCH estimation. Based on the results obtained, 
it could be logically inferred that shareholders of target firms enjoy higher rate of 
returns on announcement day. The evidence thus shows that the wealth effect of the 
shareholders of target firms increased is indicated by the positive stock price 
reactions by the takeover announcement.  This finding is consistent with that of 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) who found a significant positive announcement 
return for the target firms although they did not use the GJR-GARCH estimation 
method.  
 
The results obtained for acquirer firms under the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates 
are also reported in Table 4.2. The announcement day CAR for the acquirer under 
the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimate were 0.278 percent and 0.198 percent 
respectively and statistically insignificant. There was an interesting revelation prior to 
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                      Table 4.2: ARs and CARs Estimate for FAMA- FRENCH under OLS and GJR-GARCH ESTIMATION  
                         TARGET  FIRMS                                                                          ACQUIRER FIRMS 
                                      OLS  EST                        GJR-GARCH EST                                                                        OLS  EST                         GJR-GARCH EST 
DAYS 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
AR% 
-0.224 
-0.044 
-0.023 
-0.153 
-0.006 
 0.202 
-0.335
 
-0.351 
 0.214 
 0.237 
-0.299 
 0.017 
-0.102 
 0.312
c 
-0.114 
 0.086 
 0.142 
-0.075 
 0.371
 
 0.086 
 4.044
a 
 1.071
a 
 0.064
b 
 0.133
a 
 0.011
b 
-0.280
c 
 0.280
b 
CAR% 
-0.059 
 0.165 
 0.209 
 0.232 
 0.385 
 0.391 
 0.189
 
 0.524 
 0.875 
 0.661 
 0.424 
 0.723 
 0.706 
 0.808
c 
 0.496 
 0.610 
 0.524 
 0.382 
 0.457
 
 0.086 
 4.044
a 
 1.071
a 
 1.135
b
 
 1.268
a 
 1.279
b 
 0.999
c 
 1.279
b 
ARs% 
-0.224 
-0.053 
-0.024 
-0.195 
-0.004 
 0.166 
-0.306
 
-0.358 
 0.210 
 0.234 
-0.304 
 0.002 
-0.073 
 0.290
 
-0.125 
 0.107 
 0.088 
-0.066 
 0.251 
 0.015 
 3.992
a 
 1.082
b 
 0.011
b 
 0.120
b 
-0.002
c 
-0.253
 
 0.312
c 
CARs% 
-0.369 
-0.145 
-0.092 
-0.068 
 0.127 
 0.131 
-0.035
 
 0.271 
 0.629 
 0.419 
 0.185 
 0.489 
 0.487 
 0.560
 
 0.270 
 0.395 
 0.288 
 0.200 
 0.266 
 0.015 
 3.992
a 
 1.082
b 
 1.093
b 
 1.213
b 
 1.211
c 
 0.958
 
 1.270
c 
WILCO 
>-3.907
a 
<-3.891
a 
<-3.710
a 
>-3.633
a 
<-3.639
a
 
<-3.711
a 
<-3.902
a 
<-3.984
a 
>-4.031
a 
>-3.930
a 
<-3.967
a 
>-3.869
a 
>-4.050
a 
>-3.759
a 
<-3.652
a 
<-3.294
a 
>-3.339
a 
<-3.832
a 
<-3.660
a 
<-3.267
a 
<-4.698
a 
<-2.824
a 
>-2.106
b 
<-2.341
b 
>-2.679
a 
>-3.269
a 
>-3.644 
T-STA 
-0.328 
-0.346 
-0.352 
-0.371 
-0.338 
-0.362 
-0.333 
-0.404 
-0.422 
-0.448 
-0.479
 
-0.513 
-0.530 
-0.670 
-0.682 
-0.731 
-0.917 
-0.829 
-1.025 
-0.903 
-0.483 
-0.192 
-0.386 
-0.358 
-0.340 
-0.165 
-0.030 
AR% 
 0.078
b 
-0.139
b 
-0.037
b 
 0.022
a 
-0.178
a 
 0.086
a 
 0.160
a 
-0.107
b 
 0.233
a 
-0.108
a 
 0.417
a 
 0.005
b 
 0.038
b 
 0.130
b 
 0.014
b 
 0.138
a 
 0.084
b 
 0.300
a 
 0.309
c 
 0.145 
 0.278 
 0.307 
-0.041 
-0.327
 
-0.176 
-0.043 
 0.108 
CAR% 
 1.590
b 
 1.512
b 
 1.651
b 
 1.688
a 
 1.666
a 
 1.844
a 
 1.758
a 
 1.598
b 
 1.705
a 
 1.472
a 
 1.580
a 
 1.163
b 
 1.158
b 
 1.120
b 
 0.990
b 
 0.976
a 
 0.838
b 
 0.754
a 
 0.454
c 
 0.145 
 0.278 
 0.307 
 0.266 
-0.061
 
-0.237 
-0.280 
-0.172 
ARs% 
-0.001 
-0.181 
-0.090 
-0.037 
-0.226 
 0.061 
 0.100 
-0.152 
 0.178 
-0.166 
 0.349
 
-0.017 
 0.044 
 0.103 
-0.026 
 0.102 
 0.053 
 0.264 
 0.248
 
 0.091 
 0.198 
 0.246 
-0.098 
-0.348
 
-0.202 
-0.100 
 0.111 
CARs% 
 0.697 
 0.698 
 0.879 
 0.969 
 1.006 
 1.232 
 1.171 
 1.071 
 1.223 
 1.045 
 1.211
 
 0.862 
 0.879 
 0.835 
 0.732 
 0.758 
 0.656 
 0.603 
 0.339 
 0.091 
 0.198 
 0.246 
 0.148 
-0.200
 
-0.402 
-0.502 
-0.391 
WILCO 
<-3.159
a 
<-3.172
a 
<-3.256
a 
<-3.169
a 
<-3.220
a 
<-2.997
a 
<-2.694
a 
<-2.708
a 
<-2.562
b 
<-2.588
b 
<-2.851
a 
<-2.946
a 
<-2.566
b 
<-2.419
b 
<-2.103
b 
>-2.002
b 
<-2.017
b 
>-1.980
b 
<-1.854
c 
<-1.612 
>-0.068 
<-0.977 
<-0.931 
<-1.509
 
>-1.836
c 
<-1.751
c 
<-1.765
c 
T-STA 
-0.496 
-0.477 
-0.477 
-0.471 
-0.460 
-0.455 
-0.466 
-0.450 
-0.446 
-0.431 
-0.411 
-0.372 
-0.388 
-0.452 
-0.476 
-0.482 
-0.503 
-0.556 
-0.637 
-0.592 
-0.864 
-0.618 
-0.626 
-0.499 
-0.449 
-0.483 
-0.398 
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Table 4.2 Cont’d. 
 
                                    TARGET  FIRMS                                                                        ACQUIRER FIRMS 
                    OLS  EST              GJR-GARCH EST                                                                                         OLS  EST                            GJR-GARCH EST 
DAYS 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
ARs% 
-0.181
c 
-0.147 
 0.025 
-0.143 
-0.137 
-0.259 
-0.204 
-0.089 
 0.024 
-0.122 
-0.033 
-0.195 
-0.210 
-0.075 
 
CARs% 
1.098
c 
 0.951 
 0.976 
 0.833 
 0.696 
 0.437 
 0.233 
 0.144 
 0.168 
 0.046 
 0.013 
-0.182 
-0.392 
-0.467       
ARs% 
-0.154 
-0.172 
 0.042 
-0.131 
-0.148 
-0.232 
-0.223 
-0.072 
-0.036 
-0.067 
-0.037 
-0.179 
-0.159 
-0.054 
CARs% 
1.116 
 0.944 
 0.986 
 0.855 
 0.707 
 0.475 
 0.252 
 0.180 
 0.144 
 0.077 
 0.040 
-0.139 
-0.298 
-0.352 
WILCO 
<-3.987
a 
<-3.704
a 
<-3.824
a 
<-3.871
a 
<-3.807
a 
<-4.015
a 
<-3.954
a 
<-4.107
a 
<-4.044
a 
<-4.305
a 
<-4.571
a 
<-4.638
a 
<-4.846
a 
<-4.876
a 
 
T-STA 
0.055 
-0.016 
 0.025 
 0.045 
 0.019 
 0.062 
 0.024 
 0.049 
-0.040 
 0.036 
 0.029 
 0.045 
 0.099 
 0.116 
 
ARs% 
0.084 
-0.125 
 0.040 
-0.107 
 0.042 
 0.033 
 0.267 
 0.234 
-0.028 
-0.062 
-0.151 
-0.158 
-0.022 
 0.046 
CARs% 
-0.088 
-0.213 
-0.173 
-0.280 
-0.238 
-0.205 
 0.062 
 0.296 
 0.268 
 0.206 
 0.055 
-0.103 
-0.125 
-0.079 
 
ARs% 
0.057 
-0.183 
-0.018 
-0.118 
-0.020 
-0.028 
 0.267 
 0.200 
-0.079 
-0.098 
-0.137 
-0.211 
-0.066 
 0.001 
CARs% 
-0.334 
-0.517 
-0.535 
-0.653 
-0.673 
-0.701 
-0.434 
-0.234 
-0.313 
-0.411 
-0.548 
-0.759 
-0.825 
-0.824 
WILCO 
<-1.778
c 
<-1.801
c 
<-1.796
c 
<-2.150
b 
<-2.069
b 
<-1.987
b 
<-2.338
b 
<-2.309
b 
<-2.325
b 
<-2.483
b 
<-2.698
a 
<-2.581
b 
<-2.613
a 
<-2.452
b
 
T-STA 
-0.384 
-0.416 
-0.441 
-0.409 
-0.434 
-0.454 
-0.419 
-0.416 
-0.426 
-0.424 
-0.390 
-0.400 
-0.405 
-0.409 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs estimated using student t-statistics. WILCO and T-STA donate Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test and T-Statistics. 
>donates OLS larger than GJR-GARCH  
<donates OLS less than GJR- GARCH 
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the pre-announcement date t=-2 to t=-20 CARs for the acquiring firms show 
statistically significant positive returns only under the OLS estimate. However, no 
statistically significant differences in returns under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH 
are observed in post announcement periods and therefore had no effect for firm 
value. These results are also confirmed by the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank 
test.  
 
In relation to earlier studies, this result is consistent with the general perception that 
acquirer firms exhibit substantial negative returns on post-announcement but the 
CARs are not statistically significant. For example, UK studies found negative ARs 
for shareholder of acquiring firms (see. Gregory, 1997; Gregory and McCorriston, 
2005; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2006; Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). Note that, there 
were disparity post-announcement of CARs being significant or insignificant reported 
by these researchers. Both Gregory (1997) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) 
found significant negative CARs following acquisitions. However, Tuch and 
O’Sullivan (2007) reported that post-announcement CARs are insignificant negative, 
whiles Gregory and McCorriston (2005) documented both significant and 
insignificant CARs following acquisitions.  
 
 
We compare the CARs between the target firms and the acquirer firms, the daily 
mean differences are realised by subtracting the CAR of acquirer firms from the 
target firms under the OLS and GJR-GARCH. There are significant disparities 
between the two CARs on the announcement day. Under the OLS when the event 
day is t=0, the daily mean difference of CARs is 3.766 percent, which is statistically 
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significant at the 1% level. In the case of the GJR-GARCH, the daily mean difference 
of CARs on the event day is 3.794 percent and statistically significant.  
 
4.3 CARs under Carhart Model using OLS and GJR-GARCH 
Table 4.3 shows the estimated daily ARs and CARs for the target firms and acquirer 
firms using the Carhart four-factor model. The same estimation methods are used.   
 
 The announcement day CARs for the target firms under the OLS and GJR-GARCH 
estimates are 3.957 percent and 3.956 percent respectively, which are both 
significant at the 1% level. These findings imply that there is a correlation between 
mergers and shareholders wealth. As can be seen, the GJR-GARCH results are 
different from the OLS for the pre-event CARs. Here the return continuations under 
the GJR-GARCH estimate were notably higher than the OLS estimation in terms of 
predicting CARs for target shareholders. Target firm shareholders continued to enjoy 
CARs which are statistically significant positive for seven continually days under both 
the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods. Despite variations in the generated 
CARs, these results convincingly showed that target firms on announcement 
potentially gain. 
 
The acquirer firm’s ARs and CARs are also depicted in Table 4.3. On the 
announcement day the CAR for the acquiring firms under the OLS estimate is 0.250 
percent which is insignificant. Equally, under the GJR-GARCH estimate, the day t=0 
generate a substantial CAR of 0.405 percent which is also insignificant.   The CARs 
are not significant after the day zero, under both estimation methods, hence, market 
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                            Table 4.3: ARs and CARs Estimate for CARHART under OLS and GJR-GARCH ESTIMATION  
                                 TARGET  FIRMS                                                                       ACQUIRER FIRMS 
                                    OLS  EST                               GJR-GARCH EST                                                                   OLS   EST                           GJR-GARCH EST 
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
ARs% 
 
-0.208 
-0.029 
 0.009 
-0.156 
 0.017 
 0.176 
-0.357
 
-0.339 
 0.187 
 0.263 
-0.285 
 0.053 
-0.069 
 0.322
 
-0.108 
 0.076 
 0.113 
-0.059 
 0.329 
 0.091 
 3.957
a 
 1.077
a 
 0.063
b 
 0.126
a 
 0.004
b 
-0.276
c 
 0.283
b 
CARs% 
 
 0.026 
 0.234 
 0.263 
 0.254 
 0.410 
 0.393 
 0.217
 
 0.574 
 0.913 
 0.726 
 0.463 
 0.748 
 0.695 
 0.764
 
 0.442 
 0.550 
 0.474 
 0.361 
 0.420 
 0.091 
 3.957
a 
 1.077
a 
 1.140
b 
 1.266
a 
 1.270
b 
 0.994
c 
 1.277
b 
ARs% 
-0.204 
-0.052 
 0.012 
-0.234 
-0.035 
 0.137 
-0.331
 
-0.345 
 0.204 
 0.193 
-0.281 
-0.018 
-0.031 
 0.291
 
-0.047 
 0.061 
 0.092 
-0.048 
 0.227 
 0.031 
 3.956
a 
 1.099
a 
 0.033
b 
 0.185
b 
 0.072
b 
-0.246
c 
 0.249
b 
CARs% 
-0.378 
-0.174 
-0.122 
-0.134 
 0.100 
 0.135 
-0.002
 
 0.329 
 0.674 
 0.470 
 0.277 
 0.558 
 0.576 
 0.607
 
 0.316 
 0.363 
 0.302 
 0.210 
 0.258 
 0.031 
 3.956
a 
 1.099
a 
 1.132
b 
 1.317
b 
 1.389
b 
 1.143
c 
 1.392
b 
WILCO 
 
<-4.214a 
<-4.088a 
<-4.005a 
<-3.940a 
<-3.891a 
<-3.949a 
<-3.981a 
<-3.980a 
<-3.967a 
<-3.920a 
<-4.082a 
<-3.984a 
<-4.247a 
<-4.320a 
<-4.343a 
<-4.014a 
<-3.803a 
<-3.957a 
<-3.626a 
<-3.101a 
<-4.476a 
>-2.291b 
>-1.855c 
>-2.473b 
>-3.042a 
>-3.587a 
>-3.922
a 
T-STA 
 
-0.420 
-0.445 
-0.443 
-0.470 
-0.397 
-0.353 
-0.321 
-0.387 
-0.404 
-0.471 
-0.372 
-0.417 
-0.286 
-0.423 
-0.376 
-0.645 
-0.674 
-0.709 
-0.939 
-0.799 
-0.017 
  0.349 
-0.072 
  0.267 
  0.440 
  0.491 
 0.348 
AR% 
 
 0.047
b 
-0.167
b 
-0.057
b 
-0.010
b 
-0.189
a 
 0.088
a 
 0.185
a 
-0.114
b 
 0.250
a 
-0.103
b 
 0.399
a 
-0.003
b 
 0.024
b 
 0.133
b 
 0.004
b 
 0.128
a 
 0.076
a 
 0.310
a 
 0.334
b 
 0.135 
 0.250 
 0.314 
-0.017 
-0.321
 
-0.203 
-0.049 
 0.087 
CAR% 
 
 1.470
b 
 1.423
b 
 1.590
b 
 1.647
b 
 1.657
a 
 1.846
a 
 1.758
a 
 1.573
b 
 1.687
a 
 1.437
b 
 1.540
a 
 1.141
b 
 1.144
b 
 1.120
b 
 0.987
b 
 0.983
a 
 0.855
a 
 0.779
a 
 0.469
b 
 0.135 
 0.250 
 0.314 
 0.297 
-0.024
 
-0.227 
-0.276 
-0.189 
ARs% 
 0.214 
 0.013 
 0.176 
 0.128 
 0.029
c 
 0.318
c 
 0.339
c 
 0.067
c 
 0.430
c 
 0.084
c 
 0.561
c 
 0.237
c 
 0.260
c 
 0.337
c 
 0.184
c 
 0.326
b 
 0.294
b 
 0.516
b 
 0.474
c 
 0.316 
 0.405 
 0.510 
 0.167 
-0.098 
-0.028 
 0.126 
 0.295 
CARs% 
 5.303 
 5.089 
 5.076 
 4.900 
 4.772
c 
 4.743
c 
 4.425
c 
 4.086
c 
 4.019
c 
 3.589
c 
 3.505
c 
 2.944
c 
 2.707
c 
 2.447
c 
 2.110
c 
 1.926
b 
 1.600
b 
 1.306
b 
 0.790
c 
 0.316
 
 0.405 
 0.510 
 0.677 
 0.579 
 0.551 
 0.677 
 0.972 
WILCO 
 
<-2.866a 
<-2.823a 
<-2.891a 
<-2.645a 
<-2.965a 
<-2.643a 
<-2.517b 
<-2.492b 
>-2.546b 
<-2.628a 
<-2.737a 
<-2.940a 
<-2.582b 
>-2.015b 
<-1.925b 
<-1.840c 
<-2.036b 
<-2.020b 
<-1.786c 
<-2.092b 
>-0.274 
<-0.948 
>-0.875 
>-1.050 
<-1.439 
<-1.457 
<-1.384 
T-STA 
 
1.120 
1.127 
1.131 
1.117 
1.137 
1.128 
1.113 
1.129 
1.134 
1.141 
1.146 
1.169 
1.141 
1.108 
1.094 
1.103 
1.089 
1.025 
0.935 
1.054 
0.884 
1.128 
1.104 
1.171 
1.136 
1.115 
1.133 
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Table 4.3 Cont’d.  
                                 TARGET  FIRMS                                                                      ACQUIRER FIRMS 
                                       OLS  EST                        GJR-GARCH EST                                                                        OLS   EST                    GJR-GARCH EST 
DAYS 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
ARs% 
-0.201
c 
-0.165 
 0.051 
-0.158 
-0.131 
-0.223 
-0.193 
-0.072 
 0.024 
-0.129 
-0.031 
-0.156 
-0.231
 
-0.090 
 
CARs% 
1.076
c 
 0.911 
 0.962 
 0.804 
 0.673 
 0.450 
 0.257 
 0.185 
 0.209 
 0.080 
 0.049 
-0.107 
-0.338
 
-0.428 
ARs% 
-0.178
c 
-0.165 
 0.003 
-0.147 
-0.098 
-0.206 
-0.244 
-0.037 
-0.069 
-0.123 
 0.038 
-0.085 
-0.074 
-0.114   
CARs% 
1.214
c 
 1.049 
 1.052 
 0.905 
 0.807 
 0.601 
 0.357 
 0.320 
 0.251 
 0.128 
 0.166 
 0.081 
 0.007 
-0.107 
WILCO 
<-4.050a 
<-4.085a 
<-3.889a 
<-3.953a 
<-4.187a 
<-4.272a 
<-4.187a 
<-4.303a 
<-4.434a 
<-4.423a 
>-4.660a 
>-4.745a 
<-4.926a 
<-4.975a 
 
T-STA             
  0.362 
  0.323 
  0.196 
  0.196 
  0.235 
  0.242 
  0.146 
  0.186 
  0.052 
  0.055 
  0.134 
  0.205 
  0.351 
  0.316 
ARs% 
 0.085 
-0.141 
 0.036 
-0.110 
 0.041 
 0.028 
 0.242 
 0.240 
-0.041 
-0.064 
-0.178 
-0.174 
-0.003 
 0.046 
 
CARs% 
-0.104 
-0.245 
-0.209 
-0.319 
-0.278 
-0.250 
-0.008 
 0.232 
 0.191 
 0.127 
-0.051 
-0.225 
-0.228 
-0.182    
ARs% 
 0.292 
 0.044 
 0.206 
 0.120 
 0.191 
 0.198 
 0.463
 
 0.413
 
 0.159 
 0.108 
 0.048 
 0.031 
 0.170 
 0.195 
 
CARs% 
1.264
 
 1.308
 
 1.514
 
 1.634
 
 1.825
 
 2.023
 
 2.486
 
 2.899
 
 3.058
 
 3.166
 
 3.214
 
 3.245
 
 3.415
 
 3.610 
WILCO 
<-1.730c 
<-1.754c 
<-1.723c 
<-2.175b 
<-2.153b 
<-1.877c 
<-2.356b 
<-2.398b 
<-2.405b 
<-2.584b 
<-2.916a 
<-2.849a 
<-2.811a 
<-2.703a 
T-STA 
1.143 
1.135 
1.119 
1.142 
1.118 
1.107 
1.122 
1.114 
1.118 
1.111 
1.124 
1.128 
1.122 
1.109 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs estimated using student t-statistics. WILCO and T-STA donate Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank Test and T-Statistics. 
>donates OLS larger than GJR-GARCH  
<donates OLS less than GJR- GARCH 
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efficiency is strongly recommended. These present findings under the OLS estimate 
are similar to studies in the UK or U.S. (see e.g. Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; Higson and 
Elliott, 1998; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003) who documented either zero or 
negative returns for bidder firm shareholders on post-acquisition performance. 
However, under the GJR-GARCH estimate, this finding is compatible with, for 
example Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) who reported positive ARs for acquiring firm’s 
shareholders on post-acquisition performance although they did not use GJR-
GARCH estimation method.  
 
The pre-announcement period witnessed larger positive CARs under the two 
estimation methods. That is, the pre-announcement CARs over the window of 
nineteen days (t=-2 to t=-20) are significant under the OLS and whilst CARs under 
the GJR-GARCH estimates are statistically significantly up to fifteen days (t=-2 to t=-
16). However, these significant CARs would appear to be unrelated to the event date 
since they arise before the event date. Here the return continuations were 
substantially higher under the GJR-GARCH estimates whilst the OLS estimates 
exhibited moderate returns.  
 
In order to evaluate CARs between the target and acquirer firms, the daily mean 
differences are achieved by subtracting equivalent CAR under the GJR-GARCH 
from OLS estimate.  On the announcement day, t=0, the daily mean difference of 
CAR under the OLS is 3.707 percent, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
When the event date is t=0, the daily mean difference of CAR under the GJR-
GARCH is 3.551 percent, which is significant at the 1% level. 
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4.4 ACQUIRER’S METHOD OF PAYMENT.  
 
 
We also analyse acquirer’s method of payment on the announcement day. We do 
not have the actual date when the offer was made. However, we are anticipating 
how the offer was made in relation to the announcement date. We want to test how 
the payment offer affects the ARs. This is a weak analysis. The method of payment 
was extracted from Thomson Financial Database at the announcement of each 
proposed takeover. The overall payment of 203 samples, acquisition financed by 
cash exhibits 129, 37 stocks and 37 were a combination of cash, stock and others 
not disclosed. The cash offers were the most popular form of payments. 
Nevertheless, our analysis was limited to cash and stock financing. The means of 
payment in an offer has a substantial impact on the share prices and is normally 
regarded to be an important signal of the excellence of the target firm. From the 
perspective of takeovers, acquirers will finance acquisition by issuing stock when 
their stock is regarded as overvalued (see e.g. Limmack, 2003) and offer cash when 
their stock is expected to be undervalued for the interests of their shareholders. The 
payment offer is an elusive phenomenon. In order to verify this observable fact, 
estimated CARs were grouped according to the cash and stock payments. However, 
the combination of cash and stock is out of the scope of this thesis. The results are 
presented in the following subsections. 
 
4.4.1 Acquirer Method of Payment under Standard CAPM 
Table 4.4 presents the ARs and CARs for the acquirer using cash or stock as a 
method of payment under the standard CAPM model. The model was estimated by 
using the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods. 
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The CARs at the announcement date, t=0 of all cash offers are not statistically 
significant for both estimation methods. In particular, Table 4.4 indicates that under 
the OLS estimate, the day t=0 generates a positive CAR of 0.070 percent. However, 
under the GJR-GARCH estimate, day t=0 exhibited negative CAR of -0.153 percent. 
Both CARs are not statistically significant different from zero. Our empirical results 
demonstrate that bidder of all cash payments under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH 
estimates result in significant negative long-run returns. This present finding 
contradicted with Loughran and Vijh (1997) who found that cash offers earn 
significant positive excess returns of 61.7 percent on merger announcements. 
 
In contrast with all stock offers shown in Table 4.4, the announcement day CARs for 
bidding firms under the OLS and GJR- GARCH estimates are 0.726 percent and 
0.766 percent respectively and both are not significant. Before the announcement 
date CARs are not significant instantaneously following the event date. Rather the 
significance CARs are for day t=-6 to t=-20 under the OLS estimate whilst under the 
GJR-GARCH estimate shown a different pattern of t=-2 up to t=-20.  These results 
however seem unrelated to the event date. The magnitudes of the CARs realised 
under the GJR-GARCH differ significantly from the OLS for pre and post 
announcement date. Our results are in line with the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. We still observed higher CARs under the GJR-GARCH estimate than its 
counterpart the OLS estimate after the announcement. Post-event CARs of acquiring 
firms paying cash or stocks under both the OLS and GJR- GARCH estimates are 
statistically zero, even though they are not numerically so. For all cash and all stock 
payments were compared under both OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates and the  
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     Table 4.4:Standard CAPM for Acquirer: CARs Estimate under the OLS and GJR-GARCH ESTIMATION 
                                CASH OFFER                                                                     STOCK  OFFER                                       
                        OLS  EST.               GJR-GARCH                                                    OLS  EST.                   GJR-GARCH                    
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
ARs% 
 
-0.061 
-0.192 
 0.185 
-0.044 
-0.162 
 0.097 
 0.188 
-0.217 
 0.340
 
 0.037 
 0.251
c 
-0.021 
-0.042 
-0.021 
-0.090 
 0.241
c 
-0.054 
 0.584
c 
 0.225 
-0.012 
 0.070 
 0.388 
 0.027 
-0.275 
-0.246 
 0.173 
-0.116 
 0.090 
-0.268
 
-0.116 
-0.078 
 0.119 
 0.075 
 0.051 
 0.303 
-0.043 
-0.281 
-0.311 
-0.258 
 0.066 
 0.049 
CARs% 
 
 1.232 
 1.293 
 1.485 
 1.300 
 1.344 
 1.506 
 1.409 
 1.221 
 1.438
 
 1.098 
 1.061
 
 0.810 
 0.831 
 0.873 
 0.894 
 0.984
c 
 0.743 
 0.797
c 
 0.213 
-0.012 
 0.070 
 0.388 
 0.415 
 0.140 
-0.106 
 0.067 
-0.049 
 0.041 
-0.227
 
-0.343 
-0.421 
-0.302 
-0.227 
-0.176 
 0.127 
 0.084 
-0.197 
-0.508 
-0.766 
-0.700 
-0.651 
ARs% 
 
-0.285 
-0.371 
 0.004 
-0.256 
-0.332 
-0.116 
-0.004 
-0.422 
 0.133 
-0.175 
 0.022 
-0.170 
-0.205 
-0.195 
-0.274 
 0.019 
-0.262 
 0.389 
 0.014 
-0.235 
-0.153 
 0.210 
-0.179 
-0.452
 
-0.427
 
-0.023 
-0.278 
-0.111 
-0.486
 
-0.309 
-0.237 
-0.077 
-0.109 
-0.086 
 0.116 
-0.231 
-0.467
 
-0.458 
-0.422 
-0.093 
-0.143 
CARs% 
 
-2.721 
-2.436 
-2.065 
-2.069 
-1.813 
-1.481 
-1.365 
-1.361 
-0.939 
-1.072 
-0.897 
-0.919 
-0.749 
-0.544 
-0.349 
-0.075 
-0.094 
 0.168 
-0.221 
-0.235 
-0.153 
 0.210 
 0.031 
-0.421
 
-0.848
 
-0.871 
-1.149 
-1.260 
-1.746
 
-2.055 
-2.292 
-2.369 
-2.478 
-2.564 
-2.448 
-2.679 
-3.146
 
-3.604 
-4.026 
-4.119 
-4.262 
WILCO 
 
>-1.320 
>-1.182 
>-1.278 
>-1.484 
>-1.479
 
>-1.703
c 
>-1.678
c 
>-1.638 
>-1.452 
>-1.362 
>-1.309 
>-1.040 
>-1.412 
>-1.509 
>-1.574 
>-1.571 
<-1.242 
>-1.122 
>-0.978 
>-1.480 
>-1.628 
<-0.903 
>-1.294 
>-0.921 
>-0.712 
>-0.907 
>-0.666 
>-0.755 
>-1.000 
>-1.182 
>-1.062 
>-1.181 
>-1.240 
<-0.943 
>-0.870 
>-0.911 
>-0.787 
>-0.658 
>-0.608 
>-0.462 
>-0.610 
T-STA 
 
-1.083 
-1.075 
-1.081 
-1.086 
-1.081 
-1.091
 
-1.085 
-1.088 
-1.085 
-1.080 
-1.072 
-1.051 
-1.081 
-1.108 
-1.033 
-1.159 
-1.146 
-1.148 
-1.181 
-1.217 
-1.211 
-0.956 
-1.042 
-1.017 
-1.012 
-1.024 
-1.001 
-1.015 
-1.038 
-1.040 
-1.023 
-1.028 
-1.026 
-1.005 
-1.006 
-1.008 
-1.009 
-0.997 
-0.991 
-0.985 
-0.988 
 ARs% 
 
  0.088
b 
  0.260
b 
 -0.380
c 
  0.137
b 
 -0.060
b 
  0.766
a 
 -0.053
b 
 -0.580
b 
  0.639
b 
 -0.500
c 
  0.510
b 
 -0.030
b 
  0.321
a 
  0.916
b 
  0.398
c 
  0.190  
  0.111 
 -0.252 
  0.988
b 
  0.151 
  0.726 
  0.228 
 -0.119 
 -0.244 
 -0.623 
 -0.301 
  0.704
 
  0.535
 
 -0.392 
  0.314 
  0.003 
  0.046 
 -0.190 
  0.863 
  0.396 
 -0.128 
  0.370 
 -0.161 
 -0.203 
 -0.319 
  0.361 
CARs% 
 
 3.620
b 
 3.532
b 
 3.272
c 
 3.652
b 
 3.515
b 
 3.575
a 
 2.809
b 
 2.862
b 
 3.442
b 
 2.803
c 
 3.303
b 
 2.793
b 
 2.823
a 
 2.502
b 
 1.586
c 
 1.188 
 0.998  
 0.887 
 1.139
b 
 0.151 
 0.726 
 0.228 
 0.109 
-0.135 
-0.758
 
-1.059 
-0.355
 
 0.180
 
-0.212 
 0.102 
 0.105 
 0.151 
-0.039 
 0.824 
 1.220 
 1.092 
 1.462 
 1.301 
 1.098 
 0.779 
 1.140 
ARs% 
 
 0.187
a 
 0.361
a 
-0.322
a 
 0.208
a 
-0.002
a 
 0.862
a 
 0.011
a 
-0.488
a 
 0.730
a 
-0.325
a 
 0.605
a 
 0.075
a 
 0.443
a 
 0.983
a 
 0.440
b 
 0.300
b 
 0.212
b 
-0.196
c 
 1.074
b 
 0.226 
 0.766 
 0.006 
 0.002 
-0.211 
-0.486 
-0.245 
 0.804
 
 0.624
 
-0.302 
 0.367 
 0.033 
 0.134 
-0.099 
 0.932 
 0.459
c 
-0.039
c 
 0.453
c 
-0.062
c 
-0.108 
-0.307 
 0.418 
CARs% 
 
 5.384
a 
 5.197
a 
 4.836
a 
 5.158
a 
 4.950
a 
 4.952
a 
 4.090
a 
 4.079
a 
 4.567
a 
 3.837
a 
 4.162
a 
 3.557
a 
 3.482
a 
 3.039
a 
 2.056
b 
 1.616
b 
 1.316
b 
 1.104
c 
 1.300
b 
 0.226 
 0.766 
 0.006 
 0.008 
-0.203 
-0.689 
-0.934 
-0.130
 
 0.494
 
 0.192 
 0.559 
 0.592 
 0.726 
 0.627 
 1.559 
 2.018
c 
 1.979
c 
 2.432
c 
 2.370
c 
 2.262 
 1.955 
 2.373 
WILCO 
 
<-3.833
a 
<-3.771
a 
<-3.676
a 
<-3.676
a 
<-3.676
a 
<-3.645
a 
<-3.645
a 
<-3.645
a 
<-3.739
a 
<-3.629
a 
<-3.496
a 
<-3.441
a 
<-3.425
a 
<-3.441
a 
<-3.629
a 
<-3.943
a 
<-3.488
a 
<-3.024
a 
<-3.134
a 
<-2.357
b 
<-2.074
b 
<-0.450 
<-1.257 
<-1.170 
<-1.587 
>-1.728
c 
<-1.901
b 
<-2.231
b 
<-2.364
b 
<-2.027
b 
<-2.168
b 
<-2.372
b 
<-2.529
b 
<-2.624
a 
<-2.577
b 
<-2.702
a 
<-2.875
a 
<-3.016
a 
<-2.875
a 
<-2.718
a 
<-2.797
a 
T-STA 
 
 3.448
a 
 3.386
a 
 3.353
a 
 3.347
a 
 3.377
a 
 3.360
a 
 3.401
a 
 3.532
a 
 3.624
a 
 3.693
a 
 3.422
a 
 3.416
a 
 3.452
a 
 3.318
a 
 3.445
a 
 3.798
a 
 3.350
a 
 3.051
a 
 3.257
a 
 2.746
a 
 0.993 
-0.851 
-0.370 
-0.239 
 0.238 
 0.424 
 0.756  
 1.055 
 1.326 
 1.419 
 1.396 
 1.606 
 1.790
c 
 1.922
c 
 1.951
b 
 2.091
b 
 2.212
b 
 2.378
b 
 2.453
b 
 2.354
b
 
 2.380
b 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. WILCO and T-STA donate Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test and T-Statistics. 
>donates OLS larger than GJR-GARCH  
<donates OLS less than GJR- GARCH 
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findings reported in Table 4.4 showed that all stock payments bidding firms generate 
substantially higher CARs than all cash payments. For all cash offers acquirers 
normally earned substantial negative CARs especially under the GJR-GARCH 
estimate. This result is similar to Chang (1998) who reported positive ARs for 
acquirers financing by stock while bidders paying cash experience zero ARs. 
However, it contradicts with the findings of, for example, Schlingemann (2004) and 
Sorbonne (2006). 
 
 
4.4.2 Acquirer Method of Payment under the Fama-French Model 
Table 4.5 illustrated ARs and CARs for the acquirer firm’s method of payments under 
the Fama-French three-factor model by estimating the model under the OLS and 
GJR-GARCH method.  
 
On the announcement day CARs for all cash acquirers under the OLS and GJR-
GARCH are 0.084 percent and -0.056 percent respectively and both of which are 
statistically insignificant. Prior to the announcement, the CARs earned by all cash 
acquirers under OLS estimate were consistently positive returns from t=-1 to t=-20 
days period. Whilst in the same period, CARs under the GJR-GARCH generated 
smaller and more negative CARs and were not statistically significant. The post- 
announcement CARs under the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates were statistically 
insignificant. Indeed, post-announcement CARs under the OLS and GJR-GARCH 
estimates mostly generated negative CARs which are not different from zero. In this 
period, all cash acquirers earned negative rate of returns. The CARs under the two 
estimation methods are significantly different with the GJR-GARCH estimate 
generating larger negative CARs especially after the announcement date. This  
 
104 
 
         Table 4.5:Fama French for Acquirer: CARs Estimate under the OLS and GJR-GARCH ESTIMATION 
                                CASH OFFER                                                                       STOCK OFFER     
                    OLS EST.      GJR-GARCH EST.                            OLS EST.            GJR-GARCH EST. 
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
 
ARs% 
 
-0.054 
-0.181 
 0.171 
-0.091 
-0.167 
 0.162 
 0.130 
-0.237 
 0.334
 
 0.038 
 0.291
 
-0.024 
-0.055 
-0.014 
-0.078 
 0.245
c 
-0.066 
 0.575
c 
 0.200 
 0.023 
 0.084 
 0.306 
 0.020 
-0.323 
-0.229 
 0.104 
-0.142 
 0.009 
-0.297
 
-0.106 
-0.087 
 0.137 
 0.126 
 0.078 
 0.268 
-0.037 
-0.315 
-0.260 
-0.236 
 0.069 
-0.003 
CARs% 
 
 1.202 
 1.256 
 1.437 
 1.266 
 1.357 
 1.524 
 1.362 
 1.232 
 1.469
 
 1.135 
 1.097
 
 0.806 
 0.830 
 0.885 
 0.899 
 0.977
c 
 0.732 
 0.798
c 
 0.223 
 0.023 
 0.084 
 0.306 
 0.326 
 0.003 
-0.226 
-0.122 
-0.264 
-0.255 
-0.552
 
-0.658 
-0.745 
-0.608 
-0.482 
-0404 
-0.136 
-0.173 
-0.488 
-0.748 
-0.984 
-0.915 
-0.918 
ARs% 
 
-0.212 
-0.271 
 0.067 
-0.218 
-0.253 
 0.032 
 0.023 
-0.349 
 0.212 
-0.082
 
 0.137 
-0.083 
-0.108 
-0.090 
-0.181 
 0.133 
-0.164 
 0.467 
 0.082 
-0.104 
-0.056 
 0.214 
-0.115 
-0.417
 
-0.329 
-0.018 
-0.192 
-0.096 
-0.430
 
-0.216 
-0.142 
-0.001 
 0.001 
 0.022 
 0.187 
-0.162 
-0.422
 
-0.281 
-0.351 
-0.039 
-0.094 
CARs% 
 
-0.962 
-0.750 
-0.479 
-0.546 
-0.328 
-0.075 
-0.107 
-0.130
 
 0.219 
 0.007 
 0.089 
-0.048 
 0.035 
 0.143 
 0.233 
 0.414 
 0.281 
 0.445 
-0.022 
-0.104 
-0.056 
 0.214 
 0.099 
-0.318
 
-0.647 
-0.665 
-0.857 
-0.953 
-1.383
 
-1.599 
-1.741 
-1.742 
-1.741 
-1.719 
-1.532 
-1.694 
-2.116
 
-2.397 
-2.748 
-2.787 
-2.881 
WILCO 
 
>-0.603 
>-0.608 
<-0.545 
>-0.485 
>-0.547 
>-0.315 
<-0.194 
>-0.264 
>-0.348 
>-0.386 
>-0.670 
>-0.944 
<-0.543 
>-0.390 
>-0.145 
>-0.157 
<-0.235 
>-0.109 
>-0.176 
>-0.145 
>-0.547 
>-0.678 
>-0.194 
>-0.334 
>-0.467 
<-0.310 
<-0.250 
<-0.164 
>-0.039 
<-0.065 
<-0.075 
>-0.068 
>-0.213 
<-0.060 
<-0.201 
<-0.046 
<-0.110 
<-0.294 
<-0.262 
<-0.344 
<-0.210 
T-STA 
 
-0.766 
-0.747 
-0.753 
-0.754 
-0.744 
-0.753 
-0.741 
-0.739 
-0.735 
-0.723 
-0.710 
-0.669 
-0.701 
-0.747 
-0.781 
-0.794 
-0.796 
-0.830 
-0.864 
-0.890 
-0.972 
-0.625 
-0.783 
-0.745 
-0.736 
-0.760 
-0.694 
-0.701 
-0.730 
-0.735 
-0.701 
-0.726 
-0.739 
-0.712 
-0.702 
-0.714 
-0.717 
-0.682 
-0.689 
-0.693 
-0.690
 
ARs% 
 
-0.017
c 
 0.222
c 
-0.479
 
 0.118
c 
-0.008
c 
 0.874
b 
-0.039 
-0.482 
 0.489
c 
-0.567 
 0.448
c 
-0.064 
 0.098
c 
 0.699
c 
 0.338 
 0.114 
 0.090 
-0.288 
 0.847
 
 0.099 
 0.730 
 0.126 
-0.128 
-0.214 
-0.446 
-0.399 
 0.486 
 0.329 
-0.310 
 0.197 
-0.108 
 0.052 
-0.235 
 0.859 
 0.438 
-0.128 
 0.428 
 0.032 
-0.151 
-0.300 
 0.398 
 
CARs% 
 
 2.492
c 
 2.509
c 
 2.287
 
 2.766
c 
 2.648
c 
 2.656
b 
 1.782 
 1.821 
 2.303
c 
 1.814 
 2.381
c 
 1.933 
 1.997
c 
 1.899
c 
 1.200 
 0.862 
 0.748 
 0.658 
 0.946
 
 0.099 
 0.730 
 0.126 
-0.002 
-0.216 
-0.662 
-1.061 
-0.575 
-0.246 
-0.556 
-0.359 
-0.467 
-0.415 
-0.650 
 0.209 
 0.647 
 0.519 
 0.947 
 0.979 
 0.828 
 0.528 
 0.926 
 
ARs% 
 
 0.065
a 
 0.298
a 
-0.388
a 
 0.227
a 
 0.040
a 
 0.969
a 
-0.002
a 
-0.417
a 
 0.642
a 
-0.393
b 
 0.538
a 
 0.051
b 
 0.229
a 
 0.856
b 
 0.438
b 
 0.255
c 
 0.251 
-0.201 
 0.932
c 
 0.206 
 0.772 
 0.118 
 0.028 
-0.162 
-0.319 
-0.333 
 0.602 
 0.501 
-0.196 
 0.245 
-0.038 
 0.140 
-0.125 
 0.935 
 0.520
c 
-0.036
c 
 0.557
c 
 0.094
c 
-0.065 
-0.266 
 0.483
c 
CARs% 
 
 4.596
a 
 4.531
a 
 4.233
a 
 4.621
a 
 4.394
a 
 4.354
a 
 3.385
a 
 3.387
a 
 3.804
a 
 3.162
b 
 3.555
a 
 3.017
b 
 2.966
a 
 2.737
b 
 1.881
b 
 1.443
c 
 1.188 
 0.937 
 1.138
c 
 0.206 
 0.772 
 0.118 
 0.146 
-0.016 
-0.335 
-0.668 
-0.066 
 0.435 
 0.239 
 0.484 
 0.446 
 0.586 
 0.461 
 1.396 
 1.916
c 
 1.880
c 
 2.437
c 
 2.531
c 
 2.466 
 2.200 
 2.683
c 
WILCO 
 
<-4.126
a 
<-4.081
a 
<-4.126
a 
<-4.051
a 
<-4.066
a 
<-4.005
a 
<-3.975
a 
<-4.020
a 
<-3.990
a 
<-3.930
a 
<-3.870
a 
<-3.877
a 
<-3.809
a 
<-3.975
a 
<-4.126
a 
<-4.171
a 
<-3.591
a 
<-3.606
a 
<-3.244
a 
<-2.746
a 
>-1.343 
<-1.750
c 
<-1.871
c 
<-1.320 
=-2.150
b 
<-2.240
b 
<-2.331
b 
<-2.527
b 
<-2.799
a 
<-2.648
a 
<-2.829
a 
<-2.904
a 
<-3.085
a 
<-3.145
a 
<-3.010
a 
<-3.100
a 
<-3.259
a 
<-3.266
a 
<-3.236
a 
<-3.115
a 
<-3.130
a 
T-STA 
 
 3.830
a 
 3.871
a 
 4.087
a 
 4.165
a 
 4.228
a 
 4.091
a 
 4.183
a 
 4.125
a 
 4.053
a 
 4.074
a 
 3.981
a 
 3.850
a 
 3.595
a 
 3.637
a 
 3.820
a 
 3.922
a 
 3.600
a 
 3.805
a 
 3.680
a 
 2.954
a 
 0.654 
-0.052 
 0.718 
 0.873 
 1.410 
 1.616 
 1.935 
 2.494
b 
 2.800
a 
 2.597
b 
 2.625
b 
 2.828
a 
 2.972
a 
 3.033
a 
 2.779
a 
 2.808
a 
 2.963
a 
 3.034
a 
 2.987
a 
 2.902
a 
 2.925
a 
  Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. WILCO and T-STA donate Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test and T-Statistics. 
>donates OLS larger than GJR-GARCH  
<donates OLS less than GJR- GARCH 
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finding contradicts with empirical results of Heron and Lie (2002) who documented 
significantly higher returns for target shareholders who received cash payment than 
shareholders received stock financing. 
 
Table 4.5 reveals that, the announcement day CAR for all stock bidders under the 
OLS estimate was 0.730 percent which is statistically insignificant. Whilst the CAR of 
0.772 percent under GJR-GARCH estimate is higher than that of the OLS estimate 
and is also statistically insignificant. As one would expect, for twenty days estimation 
period, the returns continuations under the GJR-GARCH and OLS estimates were 
significant different with the GJR-GARCH estimate generating higher CARs 
especially before the announcement. Indeed, these results under the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimates suggested that OLS estimates performed better for all cash 
acquirers than their counterpart GJR-GARCH estimates. However, the magnitude of 
CARs under the GJR-GARCH estimates was stronger for all stock payments than 
the OLS estimates. The market supports market efficiency for both cash and stock 
financing under both estimation methods since CARs are not significant after day 
zero. Kohers (2004) documented positive wealth gain for acquirers in both stock and 
cash financing. This result of stock offer provides evidence to support Kohers’s 
(2004) findings but contradicts with his cash offers. 
 
4.4.3 Acquirer Method of Payment under the Carhart Model 
Table 4.6 showed ARs and cumulative CARs across (±20) event windows estimated 
by Carhart four-factor models under the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates.  
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As indicated in Table 4.6, day t=0 CAR for the all cash financed under the OLS 
estimate of 0.051 percent was considerably smaller than the GJR-GARCH estimate 
CAR of 0.274 percent and both are statistically insignificant. Surprisingly, the CARs 
under the two estimation methods are statistically zero, and therefore do not yield 
expected results. The differences in pre-announcement CARs levels are statistically 
insignificant under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods. The post event date 
under the OLS estimate primarily exhibited negative CARs and is insignificant. Under 
the GJR-GARCH estimate post event CARs generated continuous positive returns 
and are not significant either. This result under the GJR-GARCH estimate is in line  
with, for example, Schwert (2000); Heron and Lie (2002); and Megginson, Morgan 
and Nail (2004) who documented positive ARs for acquiring firms paying by cash 
using the OLS method. The magnitudes of returns under the GJR-GARCH estimates 
were much stronger than the OLS estimates on the same period but were lower than 
the pre-announcement CARs under the GJR-GARCH estimate.  
 
Table 4.6 also reports all stock bidders. The event date CARs are not significant 
under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods. Nevertheless, pre-
announcement CARs for all stock payments under the GJR-GARCH estimate 
generated simultaneous positive higher returns (t=-5 up to t=-20) and are statistically 
significant. The post-event date CARs are not statistically significant under the OLS 
and GJR-GARCH methods, imply CARs had no impact on the announcement. 
Results of all stock offers confirmed that the GJR-GARCH estimate performed better 
than the OLS estimate in terms of predicting CARs. This is consistent with Allen and 
Simans (1987) who found that acquirers experienced positive returns if 
predominantly financed by stock. 
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          Table 4.6: CARHART for Acquirer: CARs Estimate under the OLS and GJR-GARCH ESTIMATION 
                                CASH OFFER                                                                    STOCK OFFER                                         
                        OLS EST.                  GJR-GARCH                                                  OLS EST.                     GJR-GARCH                 
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
ARs% 
 
-0.073 
-0.233 
 0.166 
-0.107 
-0.153 
 0.169 
 0.146 
-0.240 
 0.359
 
 0.049 
 0.278
 
-0.037 
-0.068 
-0.015 
-0.094 
 0.233
c 
-0.070 
 0.592
c 
 0.218 
 0.009 
 0.051 
 0.299 
 0.033 
-0.315 
-0.254 
 0.111 
-0.175 
 0.039 
-0.294
 
-0.105 
-0.089 
 0.134 
 0.129 
 0.063 
 0.280 
-0.044 
-0.308 
-0.298 
-0.246 
 0.090 
 0.029 
CARs% 
 
 1.129 
 1.202 
 1.435 
 1.269 
 1.376 
 1.529 
 1.360 
 1.214 
 1.454
 
 1.095 
 1.046
 
 0.768 
 0.805 
 0.873 
 0.888 
 0.982
c 
 0.749  
 0.819
c 
 0.227 
 0.009 
 0.051 
 0.299 
 0.332 
 0.017 
-0.237 
-0.126 
-0.301 
-0.262 
-0.556
 
-0.661 
-0.750 
-0.616 
-0.487 
-0.424 
-0.144 
-0.188 
-0.496 
-0.794 
-1.040 
-0.950 
-0.921 
ARs% 
 
 0.124 
 0.029 
 0.421 
 0.121 
 0.104 
 0.406 
 0.386 
-0.037
 
 0.566
c 
 0.281 
 0.466 
 0.262 
 0.221 
 0.245 
 0.137 
 0.469 
 0.172 
 0.827
c 
 0.440 
 0.232 
 0.274 
 0.569 
 0.255 
-0.060 
-0.020 
 0.353 
 0.104 
 0.267 
-0.084 
 0.118 
 0.202 
 0.338 
 0.363 
 0.351 
 0.521 
 0.208 
-0.082 
-0.003 
-0.017 
 0.334 
 0.266 
CARs% 
 
 5.872 
 5.748 
 5.719 
 5.298 
 5.177 
 5.073 
 4.667 
 4.281 
 4.318
 
 3.752
 
 3.471 
 3.005 
 2.743 
 2.522 
 2.277 
 2.140 
 1.671 
 1.499
 
 0.672 
 0.232 
 0.274 
 0.569 
 0.824 
 0.764 
 0.744 
 1.097 
 1.201 
 1.468 
 1.384 
 1.502 
 1.704 
 2.042 
 2.405 
 2.756 
 3.277 
 3.485 
 3.403 
 3.400 
 3.383 
 3.717 
 3.983 
WILCO 
 
>-0.357 
>-0.379 
>-0.290 
>-0.180 
>-0.291 
>-0.140 
>-0.234 
>-0.116 
>-0.516 
>-0.623 
>-0.586 
>-0.858 
>-0.485 
>-0.106 
>-0.167 
>-0.042 
<-0.413 
<-0.224 
>-0.503 
>-0.404 
>-0.889 
<-0.356 
>-0.188 
>-0.360 
>-0.203 
<-0.284 
<-0.160 
<-0.310 
<-0.163 
<-0.001 
<-0.405 
<-0.237 
<-0.043 
<-0.430 
<-0.611 
<-0.532 
<-0.461 
<-0.871 
<-0.849 
<-0.948 
<-0.981 
T-STA 
 
0.884 
0.892 
0.887 
0.883 
0.886 
0.881 
0.881 
0.880 
0.890 
0.901 
0.903 
0.926 
0.903 
0.879 
0.863 
0.864 
0.859 
0.845 
0.829 
0.831 
0.817 
0.995 
0.914 
0.927 
0.913 
0.911 
0.934 
0.922 
0.904 
0.896 
0..915 
0.901 
0.898 
0.912 
0.911 
0.913 
0.909 
0.920 
0.916 
0.916 
0.914 
ARs% 
 
-0.113 
 0.246 
-0.527
 
 0.007
c 
-0.107
b 
 0.865
b 
 0.050 
-0.462 
 0.525
c 
-0.568 
 0.452
c 
-0.077 
 0.107
c 
 0.749
c 
 0.306 
 0.096 
 0.077  
-0.294 
 0.890
 
 0.083 
 0.743 
 0.148 
-0.072 
-0.239 
-0.488 
-0.438 
 0.445 
 0.274 
-0.381 
 0.149 
-0.152 
 0.066 
-0.252 
 0.832 
 0.436 
-0.185 
 0.337 
-0.030 
-0.138 
-0.307 
 0.328 
CARs% 
 
 2.305 
 2.418 
 2.172
 
 2.699
c 
 2.692
b 
 2.799
b 
 1.934 
 1.884 
 2.346
c 
 1.821 
 2.389
c 
 1.937 
 2.014
c 
 1.907
c 
 1.158 
 0.852 
 0.756 
 0.679 
 0.973
 
 0.083 
 0.743 
 0.148 
 0.076 
-0.163 
-0.651 
-1.089 
-0.644 
-0.370 
-0.751 
-0.602 
-0.754 
-0.688 
-0.940 
-0.108 
 0.328 
 0.143 
 0.480 
 0.450 
 0.312 
 0.005 
 0.333 
ARs% 
 
-0.050
a 
 0.295
a 
-0.430
b 
 0.105
a 
-0.025
a 
 0.956
a 
 0.028
a 
-0.415
a 
 0.642
a 
-0.420
b 
 0.506
a 
 0.021
b 
 0.195
a 
 0.879
a 
 0.403
b 
 0.224
c 
 0.249 
-0.191 
 0.952
c 
 0.198 
 0.784 
 0.221 
 0.072 
-0.198 
-0.381 
-0.411 
 0.579 
 0.427 
-0.268 
 0.203 
-0.044 
 0.131 
-0.153 
 0.912 
 0.525 
-0.086 
 0.486 
 0.058 
-0.081 
-0.279 
 0.391 
CARs% 
 
 4.122
a 
 4.172
a 
 3.877
b 
 4.307
a 
 4.202
a 
 4.227
a 
 3.271
a 
 3.243
a 
 3.658
a 
 3.016
b 
 3.436
a 
 2.930
b 
 2.909
a 
 2.714
b 
 1.835
b 
 1.432
c 
 1.208 
 0.959 
 1.150
c 
 0.198  
 0.784 
 0.221 
 0.293 
 0.095 
-0.286 
-0.697 
-0.118 
 0.309 
 0.041 
 0.244 
 0.200 
 0.331 
 0.178 
 1.090 
 1.615 
 1.529 
 2.015 
 2.073 
 1.992 
 1.713 
 2.104 
WILCO 
 
<-3.764
a 
<-3.764
a 
<-3.824
a 
<-3.794
a 
<-3.734
a 
<-3.643
a 
<-3.704
a 
<-3.749
a 
<-3.870
a 
<-3.764
a 
<-3.523
a 
<-3.598
a 
<-3.568
a 
<-3.833
a 
<-3.907
a 
<-3.900
a 
<-3.296
a 
<-3.312
a 
<-3.949
a 
<-3.002
a 
>-1.184 
<-1.893
c 
<-1.607 
<-0.883 
<-1.546 
<-1.618 
<-2.037
b 
<-2.452
b 
<-2.693
a 
<-2.527
b 
<-2.633
a 
<-2.738
a 
<-2.829
a 
<-2.874
a 
<-2.768
a 
<-2.889
a 
<-3.266
a 
<-3.281
a 
<-3.115
a 
<-2.904
a 
<-2.889
a 
T-STA 
 
3.656
a 
3.649
a 
3.814
a 
3.824
a 
3.782
a 
3.716
a 
3.891
a 
3.873
a 
3.789
a 
3.798
a 
3.602
a 
3.504
a 
3.259
a 
3.205
a 
3.273
a 
3.603
a 
3.322
a 
3.581
a 
3.165
a 
3.798
a 
0.706 
0.755 
1.313 
1.227 
1.653 
1.614 
2.017
b 
2.439
b 
2.612
b 
2.422
b 
2.559
b 
2.660
b 
2.803
a 
2.854
a 
2.532
b 
2.563
b 
2.740
a 
2.771
a 
2.694
b 
2.596
b 
2.580
b 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. WILCO and T-STA donate Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test and T-Statistics. 
>donates OLS larger than GJR-GARCH  
<d0nates OLS less than GJR- GARCH 
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The difference between the two CARs under the estimation methods cannot be 
efficiently measured or say which of the estimation method generate bigger CARs. In 
this regard, it is sensible to measure the difference between the two statistically by 
applying non-parametric test to the CARs. Non-parametric test has the tendency, 
and is more powerful, to identify a false null hypothesis of no ARs. Therefore we use 
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test and t-statistic to test the differences in the 
magnitude of the two CARs.  
 
As depicted in Table 4.1 using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and t-statistic, for the 
target firms, the CARs for the two estimation methods are not statistically different 
and therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected while the t-statistics were 
rejected in favour of the alternative hypotheses. In contrast to the acquiring firms for 
CARs are statistically different, hence we rejected the null hypothesis. 
 
As presented in Table 4.2, under the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, for target firms the 
null hypothesis is rejected. However, for bidding firms the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. The t-statistic for both target and acquiring firms consequently rejected in 
favour of the alternative hypotheses.  
 
As seen in Table 4.3, using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and their respective t-
statistic, CARs for the target and acquiring firm shareholders are similar to those 
reported in Table 4.2. Shareholders of the target firms enjoyed CARs which were 
statistically significant for the full period; as a result, the null hypotheses cannot be 
rejected. Nevertheless, the t-statistics were rejected in favour of the alternative 
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hypotheses. For the acquiring firms, the bulk of CARs are significant whilst the t-
statistics for the full period were rejected in favour of the alternative hypotheses.  
 
We also used Wilcoxon signed-rank test and t-statistic to determine the statistical 
significance of the CARs for cash and stock acquirers. These were presented in 
Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. As observed in the three tables, there was no statistical 
significance of CARs reported for cash acquirers under the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test and the t-statistics hence the null hypotheses were rejected in favour of the 
alternative hypotheses. However for the stock acquirers, CARs under the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test and t-statistics for the most part were statistically significant and 
therefore the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. As observed in the three tables, 
Table 4.5 CARs for stock acquirers under Wilcoxon signed-rank test generated the 
most statistical significance with the least being recorded in Table 4.6. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the empirical results for both the target and acquiring firm 
shareholders. We estimated the CARs using the standard CAPM, Fama-French 
three-factor (1993) and Carhart four-factor (1997) models under the OLS and GJR-
GARCH method. The results presented in this chapter are consistent across the 
three methodologies applied for target and acquirer firms. Overall, there appears to 
be some variations in the magnitude of the average CARs, given the estimation 
methods for both the target and the bidding firms. The CARs realised for target 
shareholders under the two estimation methods were not statistically different. In 
other words, the results are not materially different under the OLS and GJR-GARCH 
estimation methods. However, CARs generated for acquiring shareholders showed 
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significant different using the three models. Obviously, using the Carhart four-factor 
models, the magnitude of the returns continuation or CARs for acquiring firms under 
the GJR-GARCH were normally higher compared to the OLS estimates. From the 
acquirers’ point of view, it appears the market does not respond significantly to the 
announcement across all the methodologies that were applied in this study. This 
present study shows that when managers issued only stock, acquirer earned positive 
CARs or wealth gain increases, however, CAR results in negative wealth effect when 
offered cash. 
 
We found no evidence of market efficiency and overreaction for target firms; 
however, we found consistently strong support for market efficiency and overreaction 
for acquiring firms under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH models. 
 
Some researchers have argued that the standard CAPM is misspecified in explaining 
the significance of CARs (see e.g. Mazouz, Joseph and Joulmer, 2009). However, 
when the multifactor models were used they were not able to reduce the 
misspecification associated with the CARs. In other words, CARs generated under 
the multifactor model were not absolutely different compared to the standard model. 
 
The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to compare the CARs from the two estimation 
methods for both target and acquirer firms across all the methodologies that were 
used.  
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                                                       CHAPTER FIVE 
        
 
                       ABNORMAL RETURNS and MARKET LIQUIDITY 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The term market liquidity has several different meanings. Market liquidity could be 
defined as the ease with which financial assets can be bought or sold such that the 
more liquid the asset, the narrower the bid-ask spread. The magnitude of the bid-ask 
spread can therefore depend on the size of the market in which assets in general are 
traded, but there can also be a lot of variation in the bid-ask spread for a particular 
asset. That is, even if a stock market is deep, different stocks will have bid-ask 
spreads of different magnitudes. A liquid stock market will therefore exhibit relatively 
low transaction cost. This allows investors to easily liquidate their stocks which in 
turn, lead to an increase in trading volume. Moreover, the usefulness of speculators 
and market makers cannot be underestimated in their role of providing market 
liquidity. Indeed, there are times when the market liquidity tends to increase price 
volatility to a certain degree, unequalled by the economic conditions prevailing at that 
time.  
 
This chapter evaluates the impacts of market liquidity-measured by trade volume 
and market capitalization-on the magnitude of CARs for stocks that are associated 
with M&As. Several factors can affect the magnitude of the ARs. Theses can include 
the spread of ownership, the liquidity of the stock, amongst others. Amihud (2002, 
pp. 32) argued theoretically that, ‘‘unexpected market illiquidity lowers 
contemporaneous stock prices’’. Amihud (2002) takes the view that higher returns 
can increase illiquidity and expected illiquidity can sequentially increase stock 
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expected returns and lower stock prices. He therefore concluded that illiquidity 
effects are in favour for small firms stock. Empirical studies have focused on the 
liquidity and expected stock returns relation to verify the extent to which liquidity can 
affect ARs. The studies of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) and Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) employed 
various liquidity measures and reported that less liquid stocks are associated with 
higher returns. In other words, higher volume liquidity stocks are associated with 
lower ARs. In their studies, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) also found a 
relationship between liquidity and expected returns. They show that stocks with high 
liquidity have lower expected returns. Their cross-sectional analysis demonstrated 
that, there is a correlation between stock returns and liquidity, using liquidity as proxy 
to measure trading activity. We document strong return continuations in favour of 
medium liquidity stocks based on our capitalization measure. 
 
For this study, we need to identify a measure of proxy for liquidity and to determine 
the effect of this proxy variable on the ARs. To do this, we rely on Cox and Peterson, 
(1994) and Mazous et al. (2009) and therefore us the market capitalization value to 
proxy for liquidity. The market capitalization value is the share price time the number 
of shares outstanding. The figure obtained represents the total value of the company 
at a given point in time. Firm liquidity plays a significant and sizeable role in 
explaining both the value and the market capitalization stocks to invest in. Using 
market capitalization as a measure of liquidity highlights the significant variations in 
the size of capitalization can have on the ARs. The importance of this is that portfolio 
managers and investor could use it as a yard stick for investment purposes. Large 
firms are normally considered as more liquid. One manner in which this phenomenon 
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is explained is that as the value of a firm grows their stock will become more liquid. 
That is, the big the firm the more liquid it becomes. However, large market 
capitalization does not necessarily lead to more liquid stocks. That is, because as 
the stock price increases, more money needs to be made available to acquire the 
stock, very large capitalization value can in turn reduce liquidity.  
 
In this study, we measure the relationship between volume and capitalization. 
Specifically, volume is used to measure capitalization as well as liquidity. If large 
stocks are less liquid, then the use of volume will help identify whether this is an 
issue since high capitalization stocks are likely to have less volume if indeed high 
capitalization leads to less liquidity. The chapter specifically focus on stock market 
liquidity rather than firm size. Trading volume could be defined as the total number of 
shares traded during a defined period of time. The market capitalization value is the 
share price time the number of shares outstanding-is one measure of firm size. It is 
generally assume that as the value of a firm grows, their stock will be more liquid. 
That is, the bigger of the size of the firm, the more liquid it becomes. Nevertheless, 
large firm does not necessarily bring more liquidity based on the explanation given 
earlier on in this chapter. Firm size is used to measure liquidity. The liquidity 
hypothesis says that large firms are more liquid than small stocks which are less 
liquid. Based on this hypothesis, we can say that there is a relationship between firm 
size and liquidity. Empirical evidence has shown that small stocks which are less 
liquid generate high ARs than large stocks (see e.g. Amihud, 2002). Our liquidity 
hypothesis will explain the relationship between firm size and stock market liquidity. 
Specifically, whether the magnitude of these ARs are related to the firm size and if 
there is a relationship between size and market capitalization might be explained by 
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our liquidity measures. We predict a positive association between the CARs and 
stock liquidity (see e.g. Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996). In order to verify this, 
we use the CARs of target and acquirer firms’ market capitalization and trading 
volume as a measure of liquidity. The firms are categorised into small, medium and 
large market capitalization and trade volume firms and the associated CARs are 
grouped accordingly. This is the first study to relate the CARs to the liquidity 
measures by using both market capitalization and trading volume value measures, 
classifying them into small, medium and large stocks. Our study is different from 
previous studies because all prior studies on liquidity measures either used market 
capitalization or trading volume.  
 
 
5.1 Market Capitalization for Target Firms and Standard CAPM 
 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the CARs under the standard CAPM for each 
category of small, medium and large market capitalisation stocks for target. The ARs 
were estimated under the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods. The CARs are generated 
by a simple arithmetic process after obtaining the ARs. 
 
Table 5.1 shows the results for the target firms under the OLS method. On the 
announcement day CARs under the OLS for small, medium and large market 
capitalisation stocks were 5.113 percent, 3.851 percent and 3.035 percent, 
respectively and all are significant at the 1% level. Here small liquid stocks 
outperformed both the medium and large liquid stocks. This suggests that 
shareholders of small stock enjoy higher rate of returns which is above both medium 
and large stocks. This finding is in line with Amihud’s (2002) results where the 
excess returns are shown to be more positive in small stocks compared to larger 
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Table 5.1:CARs Grouped by Market Capitalization Value for Target Firms under Standard CAPM 
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                         SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE           
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CARs% 
-0.096 
-0.012 
-0.527 
-0.946 
-0.288 
-0.521 
-0.857 
-0.169 
 1.281 
 1.161 
 0.465 
 0.652 
 0.275 
 0.939 
 0.313 
 0.764 
 0.582 
 0.588 
-0.261 
-0.357 
 5.113
a 
 1.978
c 
 1.527 
 1.386 
 1.466 
 1.106 
 1.261 
 1.532 
 1.182 
 1.172 
 1.124 
 1.076 
 0.439 
-0.291 
-0.506 
 0.123 
-0.413 
-0.613 
-0.678 
-1.138 
-1.371 
CARs% 
1.675
b 
1.578
b 
1.493
c 
1.846
b 
1.519
c 
1.397
c 
1.172 
1.476
c 
1.292 
1.093 
1.203 
1.183 
1.149
c 
0.779 
0.893 
0.367 
0.219 
0.241 
0.767
a 
0.309 
3.851
a 
1.699
b 
2.397
a 
2.680
a 
2.148
b 
2.148
b 
2.631
a 
2.525
b 
2.425
b 
2.120
c 
1.768 
1.636 
1.578 
1.337 
1.639 
1.118 
1.285 
1.342 
1.158 
1.226 
1.357 
CARs% 
-0.432 
 0.130 
 0.734 
 0.744 
 0.810 
 1.032 
 0.976 
 0.837 
 0.628 
 0.320 
 0.089 
 0.776 
 1.245 
 1.063 
 0.668 
 0.984 
 0.888 
 0.496 
 0.831 
 0.414 
 3.035
a 
-0.349 
-0.404 
-0.269 
 0.208 
-0.003 
 0.322 
-0.198 
-0.160 
 0.289 
 0.188 
-0.090 
-0.100 
 0.045 
-0.295 
-0.323 
-0.263 
-0.039 
-0.216 
-0.308 
-0.504 
K-W   
1.941 
1.596 
1.170 
3.048 
1.334 
2.613 
2.323 
2.174 
0.690 
1.084 
2.595 
2.303 
1.873 
0.908 
1.319 
0.041 
0.171 
0.388 
2.703 
1.719 
0.734 
3.064 
7.184
b 
6.891
b 
2.699 
3.460 
4.43 
4.234 
3.333 
1.765 
1.845 
1.183 
1.615 
1.926 
1.645 
0.677 
1.143 
1.231 
0.629 
1.266 
2.257 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Smallest 
Rank 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
L 
S 
L 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
S 
L 
S 
S 
CARs% 
-1.273 
-1.241 
-1.769 
-2.109 
-0.385 
-1.575 
-1.864 
-1.136 
 0.344 
 0.275 
-0.426 
-0.209 
-0.515 
 0.141 
-0.447 
 0.067 
-0.134 
-0.081 
-0.845 
-0.573 
 4.993
a 
 1.933
c 
 1.437 
 1.304 
 1.363 
 0.953 
 1.072 
 1.318 
 0.931 
 0.862 
 0.791 
 0.684 
-0.011 
-0.788 
-1.081 
-0.680 
-1.188 
-1.518 
-1.606 
-2.067 
-2.243 
CARs% 
3.717
a 
3.493
a 
3.311
a 
3.561
a 
3.097
a 
2.857
a 
2.536
a 
2.605
a 
2.274
a 
1.971
a 
1.972
a 
1.858
a 
1.711
a 
1.226
b 
1.225
b 
0.618 
0.374 
0.396 
0.892
a 
0.389
c 
3.970
a 
1.700
b 
2.426
a 
2.752
a 
2.277
b 
2.346
b 
2.934
a 
2.922
a 
2.897
a 
2.700
b 
2.423
b 
2.408
b 
2.433
b 
2.288
c 
2.705
b 
2.274
c 
2.523
c 
2.675
b 
2.611
c 
2.813
b 
3.049
b 
CARs% 
-1.444 
-0.811 
-0.130 
-0.036 
 0.115 
 0.429 
 0.437 
 0.379 
 0.193 
-0.083 
-0.265 
 0.443 
 0.946 
 0.822 
 0.460 
 0.795 
 0.781 
 0.406 
 0.769 
 0.380 
 2.996
a 
-0.331 
-0.425 
-0.312 
 0.135 
-0.076 
 0.260 
-0.300 
-0.302 
 0.159 
 0.059 
-0.214 
-0.209 
-0.099 
-0.426 
-0.483 
-0.438 
-0.221 
-0.383 
-0.456 
-0.662 
K-W    
6.282
b 
5.636
c 
4.222 
5.980
b 
4.266 
4.256 
4.478 
4.192 
2.138 
2.354 
4.651 
4.154 
3.944 
1.102 
2.346 
0.331 
0.679 
0.461 
4.516 
3.424 
0.819 
2.581 
5.859
b 
5.666
c 
2.355 
3.069 
3.856 
5.002
c 
4.154 
2.554 
2.319 
2.253 
2.797 
2.536 
3.652 
2.283 
3.092 
3.054 
2.172 
2.778 
3.649       
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Smallest 
Rank 
L 
L 
L 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
L 
S 
L 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
L 
L 
L 
S 
L 
L 
L 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms 
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stocks. Moeller et al. (2004) hypothesis that, on announcement of M&As, CARs for 
small liquid stocks is significantly higher than large liquidity stocks. Note that other 
studies have adopted our approach and this approach is not unique except for the 
GJR-GARCH. This suggests that the market capitalization as a liquidity measure has 
a significant impact on the size effect. The CARs for small market capitalisation are 
significant up to one day. For medium market capitalisation, CARs are significant up 
to nine continuous days and all were positive. There is also some significant (t=-15 to 
t=-20) pre announcement CARs only in medium capitalization stocks. The result 
might suggest that ownership structure for medium stocks are less dispersed 
compared to small and large stocks thereby leading to that effect. The return 
continuations were higher in medium capitalisation stocks while the least return was 
generated in large capitalisation stocks. This finding is somewhat in line with Mazouz 
et al.’s (2009) study where return continuations are shown to be more predominant 
in medium capitalisation stocks. 
 
 To our best of knowledge, we should have expected higher return continuations and 
more positive returns in the small capitalisation stocks than the medium 
capitalisation stocks. It is perfectly understandable that due to large prevalence of 
firm ownership in small firms (see. e.g. Moeller et al. 2004; Mazouz et al. 2009) 
return continuations in small liquid stocks should have been stronger compared to 
medium liquid stocks. Large market capitalisation stocks performed badly. This is not 
surprising as news is propagating quickly in large firms resulting in low returns. The 
post-announcement CARs for large market capitalisation stocks were mostly 
negative and none are significant. There was evidence of market efficiency in both 
small and large market capitalisation stocks incorporating information by the 
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takeover announcement in stock prices. These results are consistent with Chopra, 
Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) who documented overreaction effect for small firms, 
whilst Disssanaike (1997) reported overreaction phenomena for large UK firms. 
 
The results under the GJR-GARCH are also shown in Table 5.1. On announcement 
day, t=0, CARs for small, medium and large liquid stocks under the GJR-GARCH 
estimation showed that all are statistically significant at the 1% level. Again, the pre-
event CARs are not significant instantly following the event date in both small and 
large capitalization stocks. There was enormous change in the result for medium 
market capitalisation compared to the OLS results; however, the results achieved for 
small and large market capitalisation were not materially different. For medium 
market capitalisation CARs were statistically significantly positive for a period of t=-2 
up to t=+20. The results suggested that there was high frequency evidence of market 
speculation for acquisition announcement for medium market capitalization stocks. In 
addition, investors might have had interest and therefore continued to buy the shares 
for twenty consecutive days after the announcement. It should be noted that the 
significance of the CARs persists much longer under the GJR-GARCH method only 
in the medium stocks. For small market capitalisation stocks, the CARs are 
significant up to one day and positive up to eleven days. In contrast to large market 
capitalisation, the CARs after the announcement date exhibited predominantly 
negative returns and are insignificant at conventional levels. 
 
Here shareholders enjoyed normal rate of returns for small and zero rates of returns 
for large market capitalisation stocks whilst realised higher rate of returns for medium 
market capitalisation stocks. As indicated earlier, we do not know why return 
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continuations are more positively and significantly predominantly in medium market 
capitalisation instead of small market capitalisation stocks.  
 
 
5.2 Market Capitalization for Target Firms and Fama-French Model 
 
In Table 5.2, we report the CARs for target firms for each of the small, medium and 
large market capitalization stocks using the Fama-French three-factor model. Here  
the ARs are estimated using OLS and GJR-GARCH methods. 
 
As indicated in Table 5.2, on the announcement day, CARs for the target firms for 
small, medium and large liquidity stocks are highly significantly positive under the 
OLS model. Specifically, CARs for small, medium and large liquidity stocks were 
5.074 percent, 4.039 percent and 3.019 percent respectively which are highly 
significant at the 1% level. The pre-event day (t=-1) CARs are insignificant across all 
firm sizes. As expected, CARs for small liquidity stocks generated the highest returns 
on the announcement day and are significant up to one day. Another remarkable 
finding is the total returns were actually positive only in small firms. For medium 
liquidity stocks CARs were positive and statistically significant up to nine 
uninterrupted days, whilst the CARs for large liquidity stocks mainly showed negative 
returns and are insignificant for the twenty days. This is not surprising as it was 
indicated by the literature that large stocks are highly liquid and therefore generated 
low returns. Moreover, pre-announcement CARs for medium liquidity stocks are 
statistically significant at conventional levels for the period t=-6 to t=-20. We also 
observed some sort of market efficiency in both small and large liquidity stocks. 
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Table 5.2: CARs Grouped by Market Capitalization Value for Target Firms under Fama-French 
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CARs%- 
-1.176 
-1.025 
-1.496 
-1.718 
-1.039 
-1.257 
-1.580 
-0.838 
 0.649 
 0.572 
-0.114 
 0.143 
-0.160 
 0.515 
-0.111 
 0.426 
 0.333 
 0.438 
-0.258 
-0.420 
 5.074
a 
 2.002
c 
 1.594 
 1.600 
 1.714 
 1.254 
 1.359 
 1.541 
 1.127 
 1.103 
 1.102 
 1.077  
 0.443 
-0.265 
-0.467 
 0.210 
-0.458 
-0.690 
-0.682 
-1.113 
-1.344 
CARs% 
1.871
b 
1.835
b 
1.794
b 
2.125
a 
1.770
b
 
1.752
b 
1.461
c 
1.810
a 
1.592
b 
1.272
c 
1.396
c 
1.332
b 
1.192
b 
1.019
c 
1.045
c 
0.509 
0.420 
0.265 
0.827
a 
0.329 
4.039
a 
1.599
b 
2.240
b 
2.534
a 
2.056
b 
1.987
b 
2.455
a 
2.326
b 
2.280
b 
1.999
c 
1.643 
1.511 
1.430 
1.317 
1.550 
1.022 
1.244 
1.200 
0.955 
0.914 
1.114 
CARs 
-0.867 
-0.311 
 0.333 
 0.292 
 0.425 
 0.679 
 0.688 
 0.602 
 0.387 
 0.141 
-0.008 
 0.694 
 1.088 
 0.892 
 0.556 
 0.897 
 0.821 
 0.444 
 0.802 
 0.349 
 3.019
a 
-0.389 
-0.430 
-0.331 
 0.066 
-0.245 
 0.024 
-0.572 
-0.553 
-0.174 
-0.241 
-0.493 
-0.550 
-0.339 
-0.636 
-0.713 
-0.632 
-0.455 
-0.800 
-0.954 
-1.042 
K-W 
4.978
c 
5.110
c 
4.646
c 
7.141
b 
4.337 
5.390
c 
5.190
c 
5.222
c 
2.206 
2.105 
4.537 
3.246 
3.470 
0.809 
3.321 
0.622 
1.126 
0.288 
3.944 
1.930 
0.664 
2.975 
5.073
c 
5.540
c 
2.125 
3.018 
4.324 
4.270 
4.336 
2.337 
1.824 
1.609 
1.793 
1.688 
1.595 
0.816 
1.824 
1.305 
0.874 
1.010 
2.150 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Smallest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
S 
L 
L 
S 
CARs% 
-1.688 
-1.596 
-2.038 
-2.312 
-1.608 
-1.814 
-2.082 
-1.315 
 0.235 
 0.142 
-0.487 
-0.244 
-0.534 
 0.068 
-0.548 
-0.014 
-0.146 
-0.052 
-0.760 
-0.611
c 
 5.092
a 
 1.942
c 
 1.474 
 1.440  
 1.527 
 1.073 
 1.208 
 1.424 
 1.037 
 0.964 
 0.887 
 0.748 
 0.062 
-0.708 
-0.981 
-0.499 
-0.992 
-1.316 
-1.393 
-1.839 
-2.062 
CARs% 
2.971
a 
2.849
a 
2.696
a 
2.973
a 
2.632
a 
2.503
a 
2.185
a 
2.304
a 
2.026
a 
1.681
a 
1.705
a 
1.606
a 
1.431
a 
1.117
a 
1.124
a 
0.590 
0.400 
0.380 
0.876
a 
0.362
c 
3.886
a 
1.681
b 
2.331
b 
2.653
a 
2.194
b 
2.194
b 
2.742
a 
2.733
b 
2.653
b 
2.487
b 
2.253
c
 
2.247
c 
2.290
c 
2.251
c 
2.625
b 
2.176
c 
2.435
c 
  2.493
c 
  2.384
c 
  2.512
c 
  2.804
b 
CARs% 
-2.393 
-1.690 
-0.937 
-0.867 
-0.647 
-0.301 
-0.212 
-0.179 
-0.376 
-0.566 
-0.663 
 0.106 
 0.566 
 0.495 
 0.237 
 0.611 
 0.611 
 0.272 
 0.683 
 0.294 
 2.999
a 
-0.377 
-0.524 
-0.453 
-0.086 
-0.392 
-0.138 
-0.807 
-0.856 
-0.491 
-0.573 
-0.871 
-0.925 
-0.785 
-1.101 
-1.242 
-1.209 
-1.053 
-1.406 
-1.564 
-1.796 
K-W 
6.649
b 
5.527
c 
4.196 
5.549
c 
3.923 
3.889 
4.466 
3.709 
2.445 
2.113 
3.152 
1.809 
1.727 
0.650 
1.970 
0.392 
0.477 
0.449 
3.171 
2.560 
1.100 
2.889 
4.557 
4.404 
1.985 
3.629 
4.510 
5.864
b 
4.425 
3.123 
3.133 
3.421 
2.988 
2.444 
3.307 
2.977 
4.290 
3.189 
3.262 
3.779 
5.163
c 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Smallest 
Rank 
L 
L 
L 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
L 
S 
L 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
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We also reported CARs for target firms for small, medium and large market 
capitalization stocks under the GJR-GARCH in Table 5.2. On the announcement 
day, CARs for small, medium and large market capitalization stocks were 5.092 
percent, 3.886 percent and 2.999 percent respectively and all are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. For large market capitalization stocks CARs were 
negative and were not significant for the entire twenty days, whilst small market 
capitalization stocks were positive up to twelve days and significant within the period 
of t=-1 to t=+1. However, medium market capitalization stocks CARs for a period of 
t=-2 up to t=+20 display a steady movement of positive returns and are significant. 
This results under the GJR-GARCH estimate are different from the one obtained 
under the OLS estimate. In addition, pre-announcement CARs for fifteen consecutive 
days (t=-6 up to t=-20) are significant at conventional levels. This might have 
happened because of market rumour. Notice also that investors have strong and 
enduring interest in the wealth of the share prices of companies which announced 
M&As.  
 
 Both set of results under the Fama-French three-factor for medium and large firms 
are similar to those of the standard CAPM model. Nevertheless, the significance of 
the CARs for small firms contrasts with those under the standard CAPM only in 
terms of the GJR-GARCH. We constantly observed stronger return continuations in 
the medium liquidity stocks than both the small and large liquidity stocks with weaker 
return continuations being realised in large liquidity stocks. These results are also 
confirmed by the Kruskal-Willis test.  
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5.3 Market Capitalization for Target Firms and Carhart Model 
 
Table 5.3 shows the Carhart four-factor model time series returns estimate. In this 
table we presented the CARs for target firms grouped to small, medium and large 
market capitalization stocks under the same estimation method. 
 
Table 5.3 indicates that under the OLS method, announcement day (t=0) CAR of 
5.054 percent was reported for small market capitalization stocks under the OLS 
estimate which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This finding implies 
that shareholders of small firms receive large significant wealth gain. In contrast, the 
CARs for target firms for medium and large market capitalization stocks under the 
OLS estimate were 3.850 percent and 3.022 percent in that order which are also 
significant at the 1% level. In particular, the results achieved under the Carhart 
model are not quantitatively different from under both the CAPM and Fama-French 
models only in the OLS. For day one (t=+1) and centre on the announcement day, 
CAR for small liquid stocks under the OLS estimation is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. The CARs were also positive up to day twelve. 
For medium market capitalization stocks CARs were positive and significant up to 
nine continuous days. Before the announcement, our liquidity measure also captured 
CARs which are significant for the period t=-9 up to t=-20 only for medium market 
capitalization stocks. The intuition is somewhat apparent. The significant of these 
CARs might have happened due to information leakage. Whilst CARs for large 
market capitalization stocks were predominantly negative. The pre- and post-
announcement CARs directly following the announcement are insignificant under 
both OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates for large market capitalization stocks. We 
perceived market efficiency only in terms of large market capitalization stocks under  
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Table 5.3: CARs Group by Market Capitalization Value for Target Firms under CARHART Model 
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CARs% 
-1.039 
-0.881 
-1.281 
-1.513 
-0.823 
-1.072 
-1.427 
-0.683 
 0.815 
 0.727 
-0.014 
 0.221 
-0.124 
 0.472 
-0.158 
 0.353 
 0.267 
 0.421 
-0.256 
-0.405 
 5.054
a 
 2.012
c 
 1.604 
 1.567 
 1.632 
 1.172 
 1.235 
 1.357 
 0.928 
 0.876 
 0.835 
 0.852 
 0.282 
-0.400 
-0.618 
 0.074 
-0.614 
-0.851 
-0.819 
-1.305 
-1.551 
CARs% 
1.926
a 
1.851
b 
1.744
b 
2.051
a 
1.646
c 
1.516
c 
1.275 
1.682
b 
1.438
c 
1.169
c 
1.320
c 
1.208
c 
0.997 
0.797 
0.856 
0.317 
0.217 
0.208 
0.715
a 
0.309 
3.850
a 
1.713
b 
2.205
b 
2.484
a 
2.020
b 
1.886
c 
2.355
a 
2.209
b 
2.097
b 
1.883
c 
1.552 
1.312 
1.322 
1.224 
1.526 
0.922 
1.187 
1.160 
0.927 
0.792 
1.004 
CARs% 
-0.636 
-0.117 
 0.488 
 0.386 
 0.537 
 0.807 
 0.899 
 0.846 
 0.615 
 0.405 
 0.270 
 0.955 
 1.300 
 1.075 
 0.699 
 1.003 
 0.951 
 0.496 
 0.814 
 0.375 
 3.022
a 
-0.436 
-0.467 
-0.358 
 0.096 
-0.178 
 0.120 
-0.495 
-0.446 
-0.020 
-0.114 
-0.339 
-0.412 
-0.182 
-0.492 
-0.550 
-0.485 
-0.318 
-0.580 
-0.758 
-0.958 
K-W 
4.937
c 
4.436 
3.745 
6.987
b 
4.111 
4.764
c 
5.026
c 
4.219 
1.376 
1.301 
3.737 
2.663 
2.994 
0.435 
2.603 
0.353 
0.733 
0.131 
3.046 
1.646 
0.654 
3.969 
5.346
c 
5.369
c 
1.933 
2.756 
3.996 
4.200 
3.594 
1.935 
1.261 
0.976 
1.614 
2.052 
1.782 
0.517 
1.479 
1.744 
0.760 
1.078 
2.544 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Smallest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
CARs% 
-2.225 
-2.083 
-2.451 
-2.717 
-1.927 
-2.033 
-2.237 
-1.374 
 0.168 
 0.114 
-0.393 
-0.166 
-0.347 
 0.175 
-0.384 
-0.053 
-0.050 
 0.038 
-0.740 
-0.539 
 4.964
a 
 1.968
c 
 1.570 
 1.736 
 1.944 
 1.444 
 1.434 
 1.584 
 1.157 
 0.941 
 0.838 
 0.828 
 0.244 
-0.555 
-0.746 
-0.349 
-0.951 
-1.079 
-0.934 
-1.164 
-1.525 
CARs% 
3.476
a 
3.297
a 
3.111
a 
3.302
a 
2.935
a 
2.766
a 
2.397
a 
2.473
a 
2.179
a 
1.804
a 
1.809
a 
1.665
b 
1.461
b 
1.113
c 
1.105
c 
0.582 
0.372 
0.352 
0.847
a 
0.341 
3.909
a 
1.717
b 
2.378
b 
2.685
a 
2.291
b 
2.365
b 
2.872
a 
2.880
a 
2.805
a 
2.648
b 
2.426
b 
2.419
b 
2.464
b 
2.410
b 
2.835
b 
2.399
c 
2.643
c 
2.759
b 
2.664
b 
2.849
b 
3.128
a 
CARs% 
-2.389 
-1.741 
-1.030 
-0.991 
-0.711 
-0.331 
-0.168 
-0.113 
-0.326 
-0.510 
-0.586 
 0.174 
 0.613 
 0.533 
 0.227 
 0.560 
 0.583 
 0.238 
 0.666 
 0.289 
 2.994
a 
-0.388 
-0.553 
-0.471 
-0.068 
-0.381 
-0.130 
-0.824 
-0.817 
-0.436 
-0.552 
-0.828 
-0.907 
-0.788 
-1.131 
-1.298 
-1.311 
-1.186 
-1.489 
-1.666 
-1.925 
K-W 
7.579
b 
5.305
c 
4.218 
6.580
b 
4.773
c 
4.870
c 
5.451
c 
4.317 
2.364 
2.157 
4.021 
2.925 
1.890 
0.655 
1.878 
0.414 
0.399 
0.875 
3.298 
2.030 
1.015 
3.040 
5.181 
4.559 
2.197 
3.626 
4.140 
5.223
c 
4.440 
2.847 
3.229 
2.995 
3.038 
2.603 
3.794 
3.101 
4.635
c 
4.071 
3.718 
4.767
c 
5.922
b 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
M 
M 
S 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Smallest 
Rank 
L 
L 
L 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, donate Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
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the two estimation methods. This might suggest that the market did not anticipate the 
announcement.  
 
 In Table 5.3, we also reported CARs for target firms for each of the categories of 
small, medium and large liquidity stocks under the GJR-GARCH estimation. On 
announcement day, CARs for small, medium and large liquidity stocks were 4.964 
percent, 3.909 percent and 2.994 percent respectively and all are significant at the 
1% level. Moreover, the magnitudes of these CARs generated on day t=0 are 
different from those under the OLS method. It can be seen from the table that 
medium liquidity stocks were positive and statistically significant for conventional 
levels for twenty days. The significant of the CARs lasts much longer under the GJR-
GARCH relative to the OLS estimate only in the medium capitalization stocks. As 
indicated earlier, investors might have developed interest in buying medium liquidity 
stocks after the announcement leading to unprecedented returns. Also CARs (t=-6 
up to t=-20) for medium liquidity stocks prior to the announcement date are 
significant. In contrast, CARs for small liquidity stocks was significant up to one day, 
whilst large liquidity stocks were negative and insignificant at conventional levels for 
continuous twenty days. 
 
The most striking fact that emerges from this result is that medium liquidity stocks 
portray higher return continuations compared to small liquidity stocks. According to 
the literature, small liquidity stocks are riskier and therefore should have higher 
return continuations, but this is not what we found, unexplained.  
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5.4 Market Capitalization for Acquirer Firms and Standard CAPM 
 
Table 5.4 reports CARs for acquirer firms classified as small, medium and large 
market capitalisation stocks under the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates. The 
Standard CAPM was used for time series returns. 
 
The results in Table 5.4 indicated that, on announcement day, CAR realised by 
acquirer firms for small market capitalization stocks under the OLS was 1.632 
percent and is significant at the 5% level. As can be seen, the result indicate here 
shows that small stocks obtained higher returns relative to both medium and larger 
stocks, which is robust to what the literature has confirmed. Also, consistent with 
earlier studies, the generated returns to medium and large firm shareholders at the 
announcement under both OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates were either small or 
negative returns. The CARs for small market capitalization stocks were also 
significant up to day one and were positive for the full period. Pre-announcement 
also saw CARs for period t=-3 up to t=-20 were positive and statistically significant 
for only small market capitalisation stocks. This result provides evidence that rumour 
might have resulted in unmatched increases in the share prices of small market 
capitalizations. For medium market capitalization stocks the CAR for acquisition 
announcement is 0.191 percent and insignificant. Note that the CAR under the OLS 
estimate on the day before the announcement day for medium firms is 0.490 percent 
and is 10% significant level. Large market capitalization stocks generated a CAR of -
1.060 percent and are significant at the 10% level. 
 
As noted and expected, the return continuations were stronger for small market 
capitalization stocks relative to both medium and large market capitalization stocks.  
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Table 5.4: CARs Grouped by Market Capitalization Value for Acquirer Firms under CAPM 
                   OLS ESTIMATES                                                     GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CARs% 
 4.880
a 
 4.896
a 
 5.297
a 
 5.006
a 
 4.932
a 
 4.904
a 
 5.070
a 
 4.691
a 
 4.823
a 
 4.271
a 
 4.547
a 
 3.646
a 
 3.368
a 
 2.802
a 
 2.414
b 
 2.302
a 
 1.822
b 
 1.490
c 
 0.565 
-0.178 
 1.632
b 
 0.938
c 
 0.970 
 0.726 
 0.591 
 0.475 
 0.911 
 0.892 
 0.457 
 0.514 
 0.691 
 1.005 
 0.622 
 0.686 
 1.240 
 1.376 
 1.165 
 0.578 
 0.310 
 0.407 
 0.328 
CARs% 
-0.981 
-0.870 
-0.503 
-0.426 
-0.617 
-0.166 
-0.140 
-0.249 
-0.277 
-0.393 
-0.254 
-0.507 
-0.223 
-0.163 
-0.384 
-0.203 
-0.039 
 0.383 
 0.490 
 0.490
c 
 0.191 
 0.131 
 0.035 
-0.301 
-0.427 
-0.275 
-0.125 
 0.123 
 0.251 
 0.336 
 0.323 
 0.055 
 0.456 
 0.470 
 0.454 
 0.030 
-0.065 
 0.117 
-0.080 
-0.270 
-0.272 
CARs% 
 1.609
c 
 1.269 
 0.942 
 1.155 
 1.216 
 1.436
c 
 1.076 
 1.052 
 1.220 
 1.065 
 0.978 
 0.884 
 0.889 
 1.096
 
 1.216
b 
 1.049
b 
 0.869
c 
 0.501 
 0.384 
-1.089 
-1.060
c 
-0.000 
-0.053 
-0.396 
-0.775
c 
-0.757
c 
-0.858
c 
-0.608 
-0.686 
-0.649 
-1.074
c 
-1.016
c 
-0.966 
-0.250 
-0.005 
 0.126 
 0.262 
 0.035 
-0.062 
-0.083 
 0.140 
K-W 
4.611 
5.103
c 
3.900 
4.170 
4.845
c 
3.629 
4.350 
4.645
c 
6.182
b 
4.917
c 
6.403
b 
3.797 
1.947 
1.620 
2.315 
2.512 
1.208 
0.291 
0.151 
6.433
b 
4.415 
0.305 
1.308 
1.323 
2.256 
1.299 
2.507 
2.479 
2.087 
2.828 
3.104 
2.882 
3.060 
1.341 
1.324 
2.278 
1.020 
1.452 
0.925 
1.033 
0.565 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
L 
S 
L 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
S 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
CARs% 
-1.581 
-1.249 
-0.551 
-0.501 
-0.242 
 0.035 
 0.535 
 0.454 
 0.915 
 0.680 
 1.281 
 0.729 
 0.685 
 0.378 
 0.299 
 0.580 
 0.464 
 0.427 
-0.161 
-0.543 
 1.306 
 0.470 
 0.152 
-0.355 
-0.767 
-1.251 
-1.075 
-1.408 
-2.201 
-2.482 
-2.596 
-2.688 
-3.408 
-3.545 
-3.371 
-3.557 
-4.067 
-4.900 
-5.410 
-5.573 
-5.971 
CARs% 
-1.269 
-1.117 
-0.729 
-0.648 
-0.808 
-0.352 
-0.330 
-0.404 
-0.423 
-0.521 
-0.366 
-0.586 
-0.301 
-0.213 
-0.413 
-0.261 
-0.094 
 0.356 
 0.465 
 0.457 
 0.140 
 0.057 
-0.050 
-0.403 
-0.561 
-0.425 
-0.290 
-0.067 
 0.044 
 0.103 
 0.101 
-0.136 
 0.250 
 0.265 
 0.229 
-0.179 
-0.296 
-0.069 
-0.260 
-0.422 
-0.432 
CARs% 
 2.093
b 
 1.723
c 
 1.361 
 1.549
c 
 1.601
c 
 1.782
b 
 1.401 
 1.361 
 1.494
c 
 1.324 
 1.207 
 1.086 
 1.082 
 1.264
c 
 1.359
a 
 1.171
a 
 0.958
b 
 0.564 
 0.413 
 0.105 
-1.054 
 0.070 
 0.066 
-0.227 
-0.535 
-0.478 
-0.541 
-0.259 
-0.301 
-0.237 
-0.636 
-0.532 
-0.440 
 0.314 
 0.594 
 0.722 
 0.898 
 0.709 
 0.624 
 0.586 
 0.805 
K-W 
6.515
b 
6.693
b 
5.218
c 
5.518
c 
6.365
b 
5.704
c 
6.387
b 
6.154
b 
6.179
b 
4.872
c 
5.448
c 
4.254 
1.968 
1.380 
2.091 
1.984 
0.833 
0.341 
0.312 
6.572 
3.011 
0.126 
0.869 
0.204 
0.570 
0.154 
1.063 
0.782 
0.740 
0.827 
1.147 
0.809 
1.002 
0.171 
0.339 
1.208 
0.393 
0.266 
0.108 
0.225 
0.068 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
S 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
L 
M 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
 
126 
 
This evidence is not surprising as earlier researchers have found that small market 
capitalisation stocks on average gave more returns that its counterparts. A recent 
study by Wu and Wang (2005) suggested that asymmetric information and other key 
determinants are necessary conditions for positive announcement return 
continuations in favour of small market capitalization stocks.  
 
In Table 5.4 we also reported on announcement CARs for acquirers for each of the 
group’s small, medium and large liquidity stocks under the GJR-GARCH estimate. 
On announcement day, CARs for small, medium and large liquidity stocks are 
insignificant. We found a large difference in our liquidity measure under the GJR-
GARCH estimates. The significant CARs on the event date for small and large firms 
under the OLS contrasts considerably with those of the GJR-GARCH which are 
insignificant. Further, the pattern of returns exhibited here after the announcement 
shows that, returns are substantially decreasing in small liquidity stocks relative to 
OLS method. The results might happen because the CARs are more efficiently 
estimated under the GJR-GARCH method. Small liquidity stocks were positive up to 
two days, whilst the CARs for medium and large liquidity stocks showed negative 
and positive returns and are insignificant at conventional levels for the estimation 
period. The result supports market efficiency in small, medium and large liquidity 
stocks. The reaction of market makers or investors in the stock market to the 
announcement of an acquisition suggests that their behaviour drives the market 
leading to market efficiency. This also shows that, U.S. acquirer’s for small, medium 
and large firms overreact to new information. 
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5.5 Market Capitalization for Acquirer Firms and Fama-French Model 
Table 5.5 presents the time series returns for acquirer firms using the Fama-French 
three-factor model. The CARs are grouped according to small, medium and large 
market capitalization stocks under the same estimation method. We are comparing 
the announcement period CARs for acquiring firms for each of the three categories; 
small, medium and large liquidity stocks under the OLS estimates in Table 5.5. The 
results on announcement day indicated that CAR for small liquidity stocks was 
positive and significant at the 5% level. For day one and centred on the 
announcement day, CAR of 0.931 percent for small liquidity stocks was generated 
and is also significant at the 10% level. Pre-announcement CARs for t=-3 day 
window up to t=-20 day window are significantly positive at conventional levels only 
in small liquidity stocks. On the contrary, CAR for medium liquidity stocks is 
insignificant on announcement. However, one day before announcement saw a 
positive CAR of 0.503 percent which is significant different from zero at the 1% level. 
For large liquidity stocks, CAR is significant at the 10% level on announcement day. 
Large liquidity stocks also generated CARs which were negative for the entire 
estimated period. Thus the stock market reaction on announcement for large liquidity 
stocks under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH are significant, but their economic 
significance is extremely trivial. Specifically, strong return continuations were more 
positive for small liquidity stocks than both medium and large liquidity stocks. The 
evidence reported here indicated that our liquidity measure has a significant effect on 
the CARs. The differences in CARs are not statistically significant implying that any 
fall in the value of the bidding firms will not have any serious impact on the acquirer 
shareholders’ value. 
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Table 5.5: CARs Grouped by Market Capitalization Value for Acquirer firms under Fama-French 
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CARs% 
 5.021
a 
 4.961
a 
 5.380
a 
 5.163
a 
 5.131
a 
 5.013
a 
 5.252
a 
 4.726
a 
 4.800
a 
 4.317
a 
 4.536
a 
 3.578
a 
 3.207
a 
 2.704
a 
 2.401
b 
 2.325
a 
 1.889
b 
 1.529
c 
 0.619 
-0.136 
 1.715
b 
 0.931
c 
 1.014 
 0.731 
 0.613 
 0.394 
 0.680 
 0.600 
 0.123 
 0.171 
 0.327 
 0.643 
 0.343 
 0.450 
 0.986 
 1.123 
 0.892 
 0.319 
 0.126 
 0.291 
 0.255 
CARs% 
-1.095 
-0.972 
-0.640 
-0.535 
-0.616 
-0.201 
-0.184 
-0.267 
-0.202 
-0.241 
-0.144 
-0.406 
-0.136 
-0.008 
-0.320 
-0.171 
-0.010 
 0.388 
 0.483 
 0.503
c 
 0.200 
 0.115 
-0.048 
-0.297 
-0.376 
-0.244 
-0.054 
 0.086 
 0.165 
 0.259 
 0.199 
-0.012 
 0.358 
 0.352 
 0.324 
-0.023 
-0.157 
 0.091 
-0.055 
-0.297 
-0.312 
CARs% 
 0.898 
 0.604 
 0.273 
 0.491 
 0.538 
 0.770 
 0.261 
 0.385 
 0.565 
 0.384 
 0.394 
 0.354 
 0.436 
 0.690 
 0.911
c 
 0.795
c 
 0.652 
 0.356 
 0.264 
 0.064 
-1.060
c 
-0.116 
-0.156 
-0.605 
-0.933
b 
-0.978
b 
-1.128
a 
-0.940
b 
-0.920
c 
-0.940
c 
-1.355
a 
-1.329
a 
-1.305
b 
-0.607 
-0.409 
-0.278 
-0.102 
-0.238 
-0.373 
-0.360 
-0.173 
K-W 
5.757
c 
6.637
b 
6.490
b 
7.040
b 
7.696
b 
6.332
b 
7.676
b 
6.978
b 
7.470
b 
5.989
b 
6.117
b 
3.703 
0.982 
0.927 
1.617 
2.313 
0.793 
0.141 
0.201 
5.964
c 
4.841
c 
0.548 
1.661 
2.193 
3.972 
2.724 
4.146 
4.300 
3.527 
3.720 
3.437 
3.867 
3.885 
1.837 
2.014 
2.333 
1.329 
1.236 
0.960 
1.012 
0.910 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
M 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
CARs% 
 1.116 
 1.289 
 1.876 
 1.874 
 2.034 
 2.138 
 2.489 
 2.163 
 2.466 
 2.207 
 2.647 
 1.949 
 1.761 
 1.347 
 1.198 
 1.356 
 1.110 
 0.910 
 0.154 
-0.360 
 1.490
c 
 0.678 
 0.553 
 0.179 
-0.075 
-0.482 
-0.266 
-0.840 
-1.186 
-1.353 
-1.330 
-1.281 
-1.785 
-1.751 
-1.380 
-1.377 
-1.763 
-2.506 
-2.859 
-2.854 
-3.072 
CARs% 
-0.790 
-0.620 
-0.295 
-0.194 
-0.268 
 0.134 
 0.152 
 0.085 
 0.104 
 0.030 
 0.141 
-0.131 
 0.088 
 0.178 
-0.133 
-0.041 
 0.087 
 0.468 
 0.549
c 
 0.528
c 
 0.167 
 0.067 
-0.128 
-0.410 
-0.510 
-0.415 
-0.202 
-0.061 
 0.021 
 0.105 
 0.091 
-0.124 
 0.221 
 0.230 
 0.221 
-0.191 
-0.351 
 0.056 
-0.127 
-0.359 
-0.355 
CARs% 
 1.768 
 1.431 
 1.066 
 1.235 
 1.261 
 1.432 
 0.888 
 0.978 
 1.114 
 0.911 
 0.860 
 0.777 
 0.796 
 0.983 
 1.136
b 
 0.966
c 
 0.777 
 0.434 
 0.310 
 0.098 
-1.044
c 
-0.001 
 0.026 
-0.361 
-0.615 
-0.605 
-0.700 
-0.461 
-0.392 
-0.363 
-0.724 
-0.618 
-0.550 
 0.205 
 0.445 
 0.618 
 0.868 
 0.783 
 0.685 
 0.713 
 0.929 
K-W 
5.517
c 
6.637
b 
6.429
b 
6.353
b 
6.534
b 
6.397
b 
7.787
b 
6.986
b 
6.967
b 
6.074
b
 
6.519
b 
4.664
c 
1.612 
0.835 
1.171 
2.028 
0.394 
0.365 
0.359 
5.902 
4.055 
0.413 
1.595 
1.210 
2.527 
3.052 
3.052 
2.815 
1.700 
2.011 
3.203 
3.018 
2.930 
1.826 
2.459 
3.752 
2.654 
1.844 
1.669 
2.330 
2.035 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
L 
L 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
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In Table 5.5 we also reported CARs for acquiring firms based on our liquidity 
measure for each of the three firm groups under the GJR-GARCH estimation. Table 
5.5 showed that CARs for small, medium and large liquidity stocks differ significantly 
on the announcement day. On announcement day CAR for small and large liquidity 
stocks are significant at the 10% level. However, CAR of 0.167 percent for medium 
liquidity stocks is not significant. Thus large liquidity stocks underperformed both 
small and medium liquidity stocks. CARs for small liquidity stocks were positive up to 
three days and are not significant. In contrast, CARs for medium and large liquidity 
stocks showed evidence of both positive and negative returns. But pre-
announcement CARs for medium liquidity stocks for t=-1 to t=-2 day window are 
significant at the 10% level. Indeed, small liquidity stocks had significantly 
deteriorated in CARs under the GJR-GARCH estimates relative to the OLS 
estimates. Also, note that, the CARs under the GJR-GARCH method for medium 
and large liquidity stocks contrasts with those under the OLS method. However, the 
variation is not substantial. Thus shareholders’ wealth gains for medium and large 
liquidity stocks under the GJR-GARCH are not different from those under the OLS. 
 
5.6 Market Capitalization for Acquirer Firms and Carhart Model 
Table 5.6 presents the CARs obtained from the time-series of our liquidity measure 
for small, medium and large market capitalization stocks using Carhart four-factor 
models. The ARs were estimated using the same estimation methods. 
 
Table 5.6 examines acquiring firms CARs on announcement date (t=0) for each of 
the three groups; small, medium and large market capitalization stocks under the 
OLS estimates. The results showed that CARs for small and large market  
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Table 5.6: CARs  Grouped by Market Capitalization Value for Acquirer Firms under Carhart  
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CARs% 
 4.987
a 
 4.940
a 
 5.343
a 
 5.150
a 
 5.114
a 
 4.997
a 
 5.235
a 
 4.676
a 
 4.752
a 
 4.241
a 
 4.467
a 
 3.501
a 
 3.131
a 
 2.644
b 
 2.368
b 
 2.299
a 
 1.881
b 
 1.545
c 
 0.616 
-0.136 
 1.733
b 
 0.975
c 
 1.087
c 
 0.803 
 0.666 
 0.454 
 0.719 
 0.593 
 0.091 
 0.124 
 0.261 
 0.544 
 0.237 
 0.317 
 0.852 
 0.980 
 0.745 
 0.193 
-0.025 
 0.178 
 0.148 
CARs% 
-1.242 
-1.101 
-0.725 
-0.612 
-0.645 
-0.234 
-0.221 
-0.351 
-0.240 
-0.289 
-0.204 
-0.430 
-0.107 
 0.056 
-0.296 
-0.137 
 0.019 
 0.421 
 0.508 
 0.478
c 
 0.135 
 0.079 
-0.084 
-0.342 
-0.466 
-0.357 
-0.157 
 0.045 
 0.108 
 0.173 
 0.097 
-0.110 
 0.238 
 0.199 
 0.188 
-0.188 
-0.286 
-0.106 
-0.281 
-0.524 
-0.537 
CARs% 
 0.716 
 0.479 
 0.206 
 0.452 
 0.551 
 0.819 
 0.310 
 0.440 
 0.595 
 0.401 
 0.400 
 0.386 
 0.437 
 0.684 
 0.910
c 
 0.807
c 
 0.680 
 0.382 
 0.286 
 0.060 
-1.096
b 
-0.103 
-0.103 
-0.523 
-0.870
b 
-0.918
b 
-1.120
a 
-0.943
b 
-0.933
c 
-0.924
c 
-1.310
a 
-1.262
a 
-1.222
b 
-0.541 
-0.340 
-0.214 
-0.075 
 -0.242 
-0.370 
-0.336 
-0.157 
K-W 
6.320
b 
7.182
b 
6.864
b 
7.485
b 
7.758
b 
6.419
b 
7.654
b 
6.663
b 
7.332
b 
5.781
b 
6.102
b 
3.733
 
0.822 
0.590 
1.397 
1.991 
0.661 
0.105 
0.314 
5.378
c 
5.222
c 
0.582 
1.770 
2.258 
3.758 
2.418 
4.320 
4.418 
3.230 
3.736 
3.136 
3.171 
3.135 
1.338 
1.387 
1.682 
0.910 
0.907 
0.768 
0.789 
0.798 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
M 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
CARs% 
15.252 
14.714 
14.593 
13.896 
13.348 
12.720 
12.353
c 
11.313
c 
10.914
c 
  9.886
c 
  9.618
c 
  8.214
c 
  7.312
c 
  6.257
c 
  5.424
c 
  4.907
c 
  3.953
c 
  3.044
c 
  1.532 
  0.334 
  2.172
a 
  1.454
c 
  2.028 
  2.332 
  2.766 
  3.030 
  3.922 
  4.339 
  4.307 
  4.841 
  5.542 
  6.249 
  6.381 
  7.063 
  8.099 
  8.769 
  9.067 
  9.060 
  9.400 
10.129 
10.610 
CARs% 
-1.268 
-1.072 
-0.668 
-0.685 
-0.574 
-0.224 
-0.245 
-0.299 
-0.262 
-0.301 
-0.177 
-0.373 
-0.114 
 0.022 
-0.290 
-0.143 
 0.034 
 0.427 
 0.512
c 
 0.517
c 
 0.139 
 0.073 
-0.063 
-0.302 
-0.528 
-0.426 
-0.296 
-0.102 
-0.064 
-0.069 
-0.095 
-0.365 
 0.024 
-0.027 
-0.081 
-0.459 
-0.656 
-0.440 
-0.604 
-0.878 
-0.989 
CARs% 
 2.074 
 1.769 
 1.445 
 1.626 
 1.671 
 1.854 
 1.287 
 1.353 
 1.509 
 1.278 
 1.167 
 1.073 
 0.994 
 1.121 
 1.247
b 
 1.060
b 
 0.848
c 
 0.472 
 0.337 
 0.096 
-1.071
c 
 0.017 
 0.088 
-0.266 
-0.551 
-0.537 
-0.665 
-0.400 
-0.276 
-0.182 
-0.491 
-0.348 
-0.276 
 0.485 
 0.752 
 0.943 
 1.170 
 1.104 
 1.025 
 1.089 
 1.308 
K-W 
 7.829
b 
 9.143
b 
 9.190
b 
 9.346
b 
 8.939
b 
 9.208
b 
10.997
b 
10.736
b 
 9.648
b 
 7.879
b 
 7.500
b 
 5.968
b 
 2.359 
 1.491 
 2.219 
 2.597 
 0.837 
 0.280 
 0.449 
 6.010
b 
 5.219
c 
 
0.408 
 1.342 
 1.311 
 2.354 
 1.279 
 3.065 
 2.728 
 1.424 
 1.321 
 2.107 
 1.791 
 1.671 
 0.539 
 0.904 
 2.188 
 1.259 
 0.512 
 
0.627 
 1.104 
 1.033 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
L 
M 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
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capitalization stocks are significant at the 5% level, whilst CAR for medium market 
capitalization is insignificant. Thus small liquidity stocks strongly outperformed other 
stock sizes on the announcement day. We expect that small liquidity stocks would 
create more shareholders’ wealth than both medium and large liquidity stocks. The 
pre- and post event CARs significantly differ for small and larger market 
capitalization stocks under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates. For small 
market capitalization stocks, the CARs are significant up to two days. Positive and 
pre-announcement CARs for the period t=-3 up to t=-20 are statistically significant 
only in small market capitalization stocks. Hence it seems that the market does not 
respond considerably to the announcement from the small stocks’ point of view. In 
the case of medium market capitalization stocks, on announcement day, CAR of 
0.135 percent is insignificant, however, CAR for t=-1 window before announcement 
is significant different from zero at the 10% level. Medium market capitalization 
stocks had both positive and negative announcement returns. In contrast to small 
and medium stocks, large market capitalization stocks CARs continuously displayed 
extensively negative announcement returns for the full twenty days. The CARs under 
the OLS estimates for both small and large capitalization stocks contrast extensively 
with those of the GJR-GARCH estimates.  
 
Table 5.6 also presented the estimated CARs for acquiring firms, categorised into 
small, medium and large market capitalization stocks under the GJR-GARCH.  Our 
liquidity measure showed that on announcement day, small and large market 
capitalisation stocks are significant, whilst medium market capitalization stocks is 
insignificant. Explicitly, the announcement day CARs for small, medium and large 
capitalization stocks are different from each other. The evidence indicated here 
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showed no difference for medium liquidity stocks returns for both estimation 
methods. For small market capitalization stocks, the CARs are significant up one day 
at the 10% level and were positive for the full event period. For the period t=-3 up to 
t=-14 prior to the announcement, CARs are significant at conventional levels only in 
the small market capitalization stocks. It appears these results are unrelated to the 
event date. For medium market capitalization stocks, two days CARs (i.e. t=-1 and 
t=-2) prior to the announcement are significant at the 10% level. In addition, both 
medium and large market capitalization stocks generated positive and negative 
announcement returns. As expected, our liquidity measure produces stronger return 
continuations in small market capitalization stocks than medium and large market 
capitalization stocks. The results reported in this section shows that judicious 
investors will prefer to buy small liquidity stocks when a takeover is to be announced. 
Our liquidity measure seems to support market efficiency of the three dimensions.  
 
In all, our liquidity measure constantly captured similar results for the acquiring firms 
for the standard CAPM and Fama-French models under both the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimates; however, under the Carhart four-factor models, small liquidity 
stocks generate bigger CARs under the GJR-GARCH method. 
 
5.7 Trading Volume for Target Firms and Standard CAPM  
Table 5.7 reports the results of the CARs under the standard CAPM grouped into 
small, medium and large trading volume stocks for target firms. The ARs were 
estimated under the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods. 
Table 5.7 evaluates the results for target firms under the OLS estimate. The results 
revealed that, on the announcement CARs generated are different for the three 
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liquidity stocks under the OLS estimates. Specifically, on announcement, the CARs 
for small, medium and large liquidity stocks are significant at the 1% level. Indeed, 
on announcement shareholders of small liquidity stocks enjoy higher rate of return 
relative to both medium and large liquidity stocks. CARs for medium liquidity stocks 
are significant up to day two. The significant of the CARs lasts much shorter under 
the OLS relative to the GJR-GARCH, only in the medium liquidity stocks. For small 
liquidity stocks, day one window up to day twelve window generated CARs which 
were considerably larger than CARs for large liquidity stocks for the same period. 
Notice that both small and large liquidity stocks are insignificant after the 
announcement date implying that the market is efficient. However, CARs for medium 
liquidity stocks were larger than both the small and large liquidity stocks for the 
complete twenty days. In addition, leading up to the announcement day, CARs over 
the window of eleven days (t=-11 and t=-20) portray a steady trend of statistically 
significantly positive returns only in the medium firms.  
The results reported in Table 5.7 under the GJR-GARCH estimation were not 
materially different from, but were similar to, the ones achieved under the OLS 
estimate for our liquidity measures. On announcement day (t=0), CARs for the small, 
medium and large liquidity stocks were positive and are significant at the 1% level. 
For medium liquidity stocks, CARs are significant up to day three and were positive 
for the full twenty days. Thus the significance of the CARs lasts much longer for 
medium liquidity stocks. Also, notice that after the announcement the magnitudes of 
the CARs were much higher under the medium liquidity stocks compared to small 
and large liquidity stocks. We expect investors’ sentiment in medium liquidity stocks 
due to high returns under the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods. CARs over the 
window of sixteen days (t=-5 up to t=-20) were positive and which are statistically  
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       Table 5.7: CARs Grouped by Trading Volume Stocks for Target Firms under the CAPM 
                OLS ESTIMATES                                                       GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CARs% 
-1.018 
-0.466 
-0.818 
-1.182 
-0.900 
-1.272 
-1.517 
-1.072 
 0.703 
 0.787 
 0.325 
 0.595 
 0.397 
 1.079 
 0.283 
 0.681 
 0.601 
 0.383 
-0.234 
-0.343 
 4.892
a 
 1.495 
 1.268 
 1.325 
 1.327 
 1.206 
 1.321 
 1.554 
 1.117 
 1.127 
 1.026 
 1.073 
 0.669 
 0.088 
-0.065 
 0.593 
 0.167 
-0.012 
-0.118 
-0.744 
-0.767 
CARs% 
2.622
a 
2.480
a 
2.065
b 
2.179
a 
2.254
a 
2.401
a 
2.078
b 
2.337
b 
1.644
c 
1.435
c 
1.231 
1.169
c 
1.243
b 
0.911 
0.920
c 
0.544 
0.264 
0.530 
0.787
a 
0.170 
4.291
a 
1.768
c 
2.067
c 
1.815 
1.657 
1.328 
1.659 
1.486 
1.587 
1.484 
1.310 
1.186 
1.039 
0.683 
1.019 
0.492 
0.389 
0.348 
0.220 
0.291 
0.189 
CARs% 
-0.547 
-0.368 
 0.430 
 0.612 
 0.655 
 0.743 
 0.687 
 0.841 
 0.834 
 0.315 
 0.162 
 0.796 
 0.984 
 0.713 
 0.577 
 0.805 
 0.758 
 0.362 
 0.747 
 0.514  
 2.787
a 
 0.121 
 0.244 
 0.696 
 0.901 
 0.802 
 1.277
c 
 0.863 
 0.740 
 0.979 
 0.796 
 0.413 
 0.274 
 0.412 
-0.032 
-0.079 
 0.109 
 0.297 
 0.151 
 0.200 
 0.117 
K-W 
5.058
c 
5.432
c 
2.883 
4.029 
4.019 
6.255
b 
4.975
c 
4.223 
0.466 
0.856 
1.260 
1.026 
1.273 
0.728 
1.105 
0.083 
0.051 
1.967 
2.607 
1.842 
0.961 
0.275 
0.525 
0.306 
0.438 
0.117 
0.993 
0.059 
0.584 
0.545 
0.344 
0.192 
0.305 
1.179 
0.583 
0.044 
0.088 
0.466 
0.209 
0.848 
0.787 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
M 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Smallest 
Rank 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
L 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
CARs% 
-2.917 
-2.417 
-2.749 
-3.023 
-2.625 
-2.877
c 
-3.052
c 
-2.575 
-0.725 
-0.582 
-0.990 
-0.703 
-0.835 
-0.125 
-0.802 
-0.303 
-0.271 
-0.430 
-0.940 
-0.641
c 
 4.820
a 
 1.414 
 1.151 
 1.192 
 1.137 
 0.966 
 1.031 
 1.186 
 0.695 
 0.640 
 0.510 
 0.491 
 0.025 
-0.588 
-0.830 
-0.464 
-0.895 
-1.178 
-1.347 
-1.995 
-2.027 
CARs% 
4.753
a 
4.524
a 
4.023
a 
4.070
a 
3.999
a 
3.985
a 
3.576
a 
3.637
a 
2.797
a 
2.500
a 
2.151
a 
2.035
a 
2.017
a 
1.577
a 
1.424
a 
0.953
c 
0.497 
0.755
b 
0.976
a 
0.305 
4.344
a 
1.816
c 
2.118
c 
1.898
c 
1.802 
1.518 
1.942 
1.885 
2.047 
2.044 
1.940 
1.902 
1.823 
1.530 
1.982 
1.590 
1.581 
1.593 
1.591 
1.803 
1.862 
CARs% 
-0.978 
-0.765 
 0.065 
 0.286 
 0.379 
 0.530 
 0.509 
 0.715 
 0.690 
 0.85 
 0.062 
 0.692 
 0.901 
 0.651 
 0.518 
 0.741 
 0.727 
 0.347 
 0.739 
 0.505 
 2.763
a 
 0.123 
 0.218 
 0.677 
 0.873 
 0.793 
 1.303 
 0.878 
 0.738 
 0.997 
 0.825 
 0.476 
 0.371 
 0.487 
 0.066 
 0.010 
 0.199 
 0.394 
 0.284 
 0.357 
 0.265 
K-W 
12.734
a 
13.781
a 
10.858
a 
11.531
a 
11.026
a 
13.557
a 
11.835
a 
10.495
a 
 3.386 
 3.812 
 4.426 
 4.801
c 
 4.957
c 
 3.021 
 4.016 
 1.167 
 0.780 
 3.331 
 5.861
c 
 4.651
c 
 
1.005 
 0.309 
 0.596 
 0.418 
 0.508 
 0.085 
 0.723 
 0.240 
 1.317 
 0.675 
 0.822 
 0.558 
 0.730 
 0.895 
 0.973 
 0.620 
 0.506 
 0.838 
 0.723 
 1.261 
 1.213 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Smallest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
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significant at conventional levels only in the medium liquidity stocks. The significance 
of these CARs is unconnected to the event date because they occurred before the 
event. The CAR for small liquidity stocks on the day prior to the announcement was - 
0.641 percent and is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. Post event 
date CARs for both small and large liquidity stocks are insignificant.  
Our post-announcement market capitalization stocks CARs statistically significantly 
differ from those CARs from our trading volume under both the OLS and GJR-
GARCH method for only medium liquidity stocks. The significant of the CARs last 
much longer for market capitalization stocks relative to the trading volume for both 
sets of estimation. Amihud (2002) contended that, ‘‘if small liquidity investors 
anticipated higher market illiquidity, they will price stocks so that they generate 
higher expected returns’’. This proved that small liquidity stocks should have had 
strong announcement returns compared to medium liquidity stocks. 
5.8 Trading Volume for Target Firms and Fama-French Model 
Table 5.8 depicts the time series returns for target firm grouped for small, medium 
and large trading volume stocks using the Fama-French three-factor model. The ARs 
were estimated using the same method. 
 
Table 5.8 represents CARs for target firms for each of the categories of small, 
medium and large volume stocks under the OLS estimates. The results showed that, 
on announcement day (t=0), small volume stocks generated CAR which was 
significantly higher than the CARs of medium and large volume stocks and all are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The CARs for small volume stocks are not 
significant beyond day zero (t=0) and pre-event CARs are insignificant under the  
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Table 5.8:CARs Grouped by Trading Volume Stocks for Target Firms under Fama-French  
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CARs% 
-1.891 
-1.292 
-1.643 
-1.848 
-1.552 
-1.919 
-2.167 
-1.642 
 0.185 
 0.295 
-0.151 
 0.143 
-0.011 
 0.717 
-0.085 
 0.408 
 0.405 
 0.292 
-0.190 
-0.389 
 4.887
a 
 1.490 
 1.307 
 1.519 
 1.559 
 1.342 
 1.397 
 1.533 
 1.019 
 1.005 
 0.963 
 0.999 
 0.637 
 0.089 
-0.044 
 0.663 
 0.127 
-0.069 
-0.119 
-0.705 
-0.718 
CARs% 
 2.206
b 
 2.143
b 
 1.774
c 
 1.895
b 
 2.034
b 
 2.248
b 
 1.944
b 
 2.239
a 
 1.519
c 
 1.307
c 
 1.114 
 1.094
c 
 1.088
c 
 0.860 
 0.806 
 0.469 
 0.280 
 0.488 
 0.788
a 
 0.157 
 4.171
a 
 1.771
b 
 1.983
c 
 1.781 
 1.607 
 1.199 
 1.536 
 1.400 
 1.513 
 1.426 
 1.246 
 1.163 
 1.014 
 0.777 
 1.059 
 0.478 
 0.428 
 0.228 
-0.001 
-0.038 
-0.123 
CARs% 
-0.552 
-0.385 
 0.491 
 0.635 
 0.661 
 0.825 
 0.767 
 0.956 
 0.917 
 0.358 
 0.287 
 0.894 
 1.013 
 0.789 
 0.688 
 0.882 
 0.830 
 0.317 
 0.738 
 0.464 
 3.042
a 
-0.001 
 0.170 
 0.541 
 0.728 
 0.540 
 0.949 
 0.406 
 0.322 
 0.514 
 0.356 
-0.002 
-0.246 
-0.050 
-0.476 
-0.524 
-0.338 
-0.148 
-0.405 
-0.435 
-0.474 
K-W 
5.435
c 
5.193
c 
4.258 
5.650
c 
5.212
c 
7.826
b 
6.488
b 
6.435
b 
1.182 
1.123 
1.806 
1.466 
1.999 
0.659 
1.297 
0.118 
0.021 
1.787 
3.182 
2.047 
0.618 
0.741 
0.334 
0.029 
0.201 
0.059 
0.278 
0.019 
0.664 
0.325 
0.393 
0.196 
0.202 
0.562 
0.247 
0.053 
0.051 
0.237 
0.036 
0.176 
0.323 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Smallest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
CARs% 
-2.961 
-2.400 
-2.691 
-2.898 
-2.542 
-2.831 
-3.003
c 
-2.447 
-0.532 
-0.408 
-0.781 
-0.463 
-0.612 
 0.065 
-0.696 
-0.190 
-0.162 
-0.285 
-0.787 
-0.624
c 
 4.877
a 
 1.442 
 1.224 
 1.368 
 1.357 
 1.146 
 1.241 
 1.405 
 0.901 
 0.850 
 0.729 
 0.670 
 0.233 
-0.370 
-0.584 
-0.101 
-0.474 
-0.756 
-0.895 
-1.521 
-1.545 
CARs% 
3.188
a 
3.021
a 
2.622
a 
2.705
a 
2.795
a 
2.907
a 
2.562
a 
2.658
a 
1.891
a 
1.612
b 
1.377
b 
1.310
b 
1.298
a 
1.002
c 
0.930
c 
0.583 
0.297 
0.534 
0.851
a 
0.193 
4.300
a 
1.773
c 
1.942
c 
1.731 
1.601 
1.248 
1.599 
1.501 
1.633 
1.612 
1.519 
1.482 
1.397 
1.196 
1.596 
1.114 
1.091 
1.000 
0.868 
0.983 
1.004 
CARs% 
-1.466 
-1.153 
-0.279 
-0.092 
 0.055 
 0.243 
 0.262 
 0.533 
 0.481 
-0.005 
-0.088 
 0.566 
 0.730 
 0.543 
 0.493 
 0.718 
 0.666 
 0.300 
 0.694 
 0.446 
 2.765
a 
 0.077 
 0.164 
 0.563 
 0.712 
 0.537 
 0.986 
 0.452 
 0.259 
 0.466 
 0.332 
-0.017 
-0.177 
-0.027 
-0.437 
-0.537 
-0.383 
-0.231 
 -0.459 
-0.457 
-0.537 
K-W 
5.811
c 
5.750
c 
5.635
c 
5.629
c 
5.773
c 
8.635
b 
8.168
b
 
7.375
b 
1.532 
1.359 
1.382 
1.098 
1.303 
0.630 
1.324 
0.274 
0.025 
1.527 
4.110 
3.456 
1.274 
0.355 
0.006 
0.189 
0.488 
0.229 
0.055 
0.048 
0.146 
0.036 
0.075 
0.094 
0.001 
0.199 
0.074 
0.077 
0.007 
0.214 
0.038 
0.231 
0.175 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
L 
L 
S 
L 
S 
M 
L 
M 
M 
S 
L 
M 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Smallest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
M 
S 
M 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
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OLS estimates. The CARs up to eighteen days window (t=+1 up to t=+18) for small 
volume stocks were higher than large volume stocks for the same period and both 
are insignificant at conventional levels for the whole period. Pre- and post-
announcement CARs for large volume stocks are insignificant under the two 
estimation methods. For the medium volume stocks, CARs are significant up to day 
two and positive until day seventeen. Before the event date, our liquidity measure 
captured CARs which are statistically significant between the period of t=-11 and t=-
20 in the medium volume stocks. The magnitudes of CARs were large in medium 
volume stocks compared to both the small and large volume stocks. Intuitively, our 
results support the efficient market hypothesis especially in small and large volume 
stocks after the event date. 
 
In Table 5.8 under the GJR-GARCH estimation we obtained similar results like those 
under the OLS estimates. That is, the significance of the CARs after the 
announcement is the same under the two estimation methods. The target firms for 
small, medium and large liquidity stocks on announcement generated positive CARs 
which are significant at the 1% levels. Specifically, CARs for small, medium and 
large liquidity stocks were 4.877 percent, 4.300 percent and 2.765 percent in that 
order. One day leading up to the announcement (t=-1), CAR of -0.624 percent is 
significant at the 10% level in small liquidity stocks. Again, small liquidity stocks were 
positive up to day twelve and are not significant after the announcement. The results 
achieved for large liquidity stocks are different from those generated under the OLS 
method. CARs for large liquidity stocks were positive up to ten days and are 
insignificant throughout the twenty day after the event. For medium liquidity stocks, 
the CARs were statistically significant up to day two and were positive in the overall 
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period. As observed the significance of the CARs last somehow much longer under 
both the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates for only medium firms. Moreover, prior 
event date CARs over the window of ten days (t=-11 to t=-20) are significant under 
the OLS and whilst CARs under the GJR-GARCH estimates are statistically 
significant up to fifteen days (t=-6 to t=-20) only in the medium volume stocks. We 
observed strong return continuations for medium liquidity stocks under both sets of 
estimation methods compared to the small liquidity stocks. 
 
5.9 Trading Volume for Target Firms and Carhart Model 
Table 5.9 illustrates the CARs of our liquidity measure for target firms for each of the 
categories, small, medium and large trading volume stocks under the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimates. The time series was estimated using the Carhart model. 
 
The results in Table 5.9 under the OLS estimate shows that CAR of 2.789 percent 
for large liquidity stocks on announcement was significantly lower than the CARs of 
small and medium liquidity stocks. The result is not surprising because large liquidity 
stocks are perceived to be high liquidity stocks and therefore lower returns will 
compensate for large liquidity stocks. CARs for the three liquidity measures on 
announcement are significant at the 1% level. Pre- and post-event CARs are 
insignificant for small and large volume stocks under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH 
methods. The results suggested that both small and large liquidity stocks investors 
overreact to information, thus, market efficiency is accordingly advocated. Both small 
liquidity stocks and large liquidity stocks exhibited positive and negative CARs after 
the announcement. However, the majority of the CARs for small liquidity stocks were  
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Table 5.9: CARs Grouped by  Trading Volume Stocks for Target Firms under Carhart Model 
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CARs% 
-1.752 
-1.095 
-1.404 
-1.612 
-1.316 
-1.690 
-1.970 
-1.447 
 0.383 
 0.453 
-0.036 
 0.222 
-0.002 
 0.663 
-0.118 
 0.346 
 0.375 
 0.308 
-0.195 
-0.382 
 4.874
a 
 1.500 
 1.299 
 1.452 
 1.384 
 1.133 
 1.147 
 1.229 
 0.699 
 0.655 
 0.540 
 0.607 
 0.243 
-0.317 
-0.480 
 0.202 
-0.365 
-0.556 
-0.607 
-1.265 
-1.305 
CARs% 
2.297
b 
2.138
b 
1.806
b 
1.906
b 
1.982
b 
2.172
b 
1.874
b 
2.204
a 
1.467
c 
1.295
c 
1.075 
1.068
c 
1.026
c 
0.777 
0.711 
0.373 
0.174 
0.378 
0.734
a 
0.180 
4.175
a 
1.788
b 
2.031
c 
1.823 
1.708 
1.301 
1.626 
1.469 
1.572 
1.528 
1.364 
1.256 
1.147 
0.940 
1.241 
0.675 
0.669 
0.484 
0.257 
0.206 
0.149 
CARs% 
-0.523 
-0.364 
 0.390 
 0.466 
 0.568 
 0.699 
 0.749 
 0.972 
 0.923 
 0.446 
 0.370 
 0.955 
 1.045 
 0.804 
 0.666 
 0.869 
 0.828 
 0.362 
 0.695 
 0.456 
 2.789
a 
-0.009 
 0.142 
 0.551 
 0.772 
 0.621 
 1.085 
 0.553 
 0.441 
 0.705 
 0.546 
 0.197 
 0.013 
 0.222 
-0.151 
-0.195 
-0.030 
 0.145 
-0.007 
-0.018 
-0.115 
K-W 
5.793
c 
5.062
c 
3.608 
4.858
c 
4.324 
6.947
b 
5.388
c 
6.017
b 
0.954 
1.039 
1.567 
1.377 
1.905 
0.602 
1.129 
0.173 
0.045 
1.212 
2.195 
1.629 
0.817 
0.571 
0.235 
0.050 
0.461 
0.177 
0.878 
0.226 
0.871 
0.893 
0.757 
0.439 
0.565 
1.523 
0.866 
0.266 
0.374 
1.273 
0.985 
1.559 
1.860 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
M 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
Smallest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
CARs% 
-3.421 
-2.788 
-3.021 
-3.226 
-2.805 
-2.986 
-3.084
c 
-2.449 
-0.548 
-0.399 
-0.661 
-0.347 
-0.405 
 0.202 
-0.487 
-0.190 
-0.018 
-0.162 
-0.752 
-0.537 
 4.756
a 
 1.453 
 1.291 
 1.604 
 1.671 
 1.380 
 1.317 
 1.418 
 0.863 
 0.660 
 0.489 
 0.538 
 0.173 
-0.495 
-0.629 
 -0.264 
-0.763 
-0.859 
 -0.793 
-1.216 
-1.400 
CARs% 
3.807
a 
3.569
a 
3.168
a 
3.183
a 
3.286
a 
3.362
a 
2.949
a 
2.986
a 
2.214
a 
1.899
a 
1.622
a 
1.508
a 
1.460
a 
1.094
b 
1.003
c 
0.649 
0.317 
0.561 
0.877
a 
0.195 
4.319
a 
1.837
b 
2.040
c 
1.860 
1.839 
1.586 
1.919 
1.843 
1.982 
1.992 
1.933 
1.933 
1.859 
1.675 
2.087 
1.643 
1.623 
1.583 
1.479 
1.647 
1.711 
CARs% 
-1.651 
-1.398 
-0.581 
-0.431 
-0.243 
-0.029 
 0.076 
 0.401 
 0.339 
-0.122 
-0.150 
 0.482 
 0.632 
 0.461 
 0.352 
 0.557 
 0.549 
 0.187 
 0.613
 
 0.410 
 2.761
a 
 0.053 
 0.114 
 0.509 
 0.695 
 0.514 
 0.948 
 0.379 
 0.251 
 0.473 
 0.295 
-0.050 
-0.220 
-0.087 
-0.491 
-0.614 
-0.498 
-0.359 
-0.536 
-0.535 
-0.683 
K-W 
 7.736
b 
 7.174
b 
 6.777
b 
 7.607
b 
 7.920
b 
10.944
a 
 9.626
a 
 
8.139
b 
 1.830 
 1.919 
 2.016 
 1.670 
 1.282 
 0.700 
 1.273 
 0.264 
 0.024 
 1.949 
 3.934 
 2.381 
 1.251 
 0.046 
 0.088 
 0.015 
 0.172 
 0.011 
 0.466 
 0.041 
 0.592 
 0.398 
 0.730 
 0.529 
 0.240 
 0.493 
 0.398 
 0.111 
 0.051 
 0.471 
 0.281 
 0.615 
 0.689 
Largest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
M 
M 
L 
S 
M 
M 
L 
L 
S 
L 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Smallest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
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higher than large liquidity stocks. CARs for medium liquidity stocks are significant 
different from those realised for small and large liquidity stocks. For medium liquidity 
stocks, CARs were positive and statistically significant up to day two. Furthermore, 
prior to the announcement, CARs between the period of t=-8 and t=-20 were positive 
and significant at conventional levels.  
 
Table 5.9 also shows the results obtained under the GJR-GARCH for target firms for 
each of the small, medium and large liquidity stocks. The GJR-GARCH results are 
similar to those under the OLS estimates in terms of significance of CARs on the 
event date. On announcement day, CARs for small, medium and large stocks were 
4.756 percent, 4.319 percent and 2.761 percent respectively and which are 
significant at the 1% level. Here, small liquidity stocks outperformed both medium 
and large liquidity stocks. As mentioned earlier, this might be consistent with the 
literature that small firms have higher returns on announcement day. For medium 
liquidity stocks, CARs are significant up to day two and positive for the entire period. 
Prior announcement CARs up to fifteen days (t=-6 up to t=-20) captured by our 
liquidity measures were positive and are significant at conventional levels only in the 
medium liquidity stocks. In contrast, pre- and post-event CARs for both small and 
large liquidity stocks are not significant. The evidence we have seen so far suggests 
that strong return continuations in favour of medium liquidity stocks under both the 
OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates. 
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5.10 Trading Volume for Acquirer Firms and Standard CAPM  
Table 5.10 presents the CARs for acquirer firms for each of the groups small, 
medium and large trading volume stocks using the standard CAPM model. The ARs 
were estimated under the same methods.  
 
Table 5.10 presents the results achieved under the OLS estimates for acquirer firms 
for small, medium and large volume stocks. On announcement day, CARs for small 
and large volume stocks are significantly different from zero at the 5% levels. CAR 
for small volume stocks on announcement was higher and positive compared to both 
medium and large volume stocks which generated negative CARs. The evidence 
reported here suggests that shareholders’ of small liquidity stocks enjoy higher rate 
of returns. In contrast to both small and large volume stocks, medium volume stocks 
are insignificant on the announcement date. For small volume stocks, CARs are 
significant up to day four and were positive for the whole period. Pre-announcement 
CARs were positive and are significant for the period of t=-5 window to t=-20 
window. These results might be unconnected to the event date as they happened 
before the event date.  
 
For both medium and large volume stocks, CARs were insignificant after the 
announcement date; hence the results support market efficiency. The magnitudes of 
those CARs do not seem to be statistically different with those under the GJR-
GARCH method. Nevertheless, the results obtained for small liquidity stocks under 
the OLS method differ substantially with those under the GJR-GARCH method, 
Based on these results, it appears that the market reacts negatively to the  
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Table 5.10: CARs Grouped by Trading Volume Stocks for Acquirer Firms under  CAPM 
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CAR% 
 3.593
b 
 3.423
c 
 3.546
c 
 3.516
b 
 3.665
b
 
 3.983
b 
 4.147
a 
 3.851
b 
 3.849
a 
 3.033
b 
 3.111
a 
 2.395
c 
 2.347
c 
 1.994
c 
 2.028
b 
 1.808
b 
 1.319 
 1.096 
 0.369 
-0.050 
 1.518
b 
 1.584
a 
 1.420
a 
 1.361
b 
 1.153
c 
 1.237 
 1.636
c 
 1.664
c 
 1.495 
 1.381 
 1.682
c 
 1.918
c 
 1.607 
 1.117 
 1.744 
 1.905
c 
1.644 
 0.927 
 0.591 
 0.629 
 0.766 
CAR% 
 0.084 
-0.575 
-0.855 
-0.688 
-0.597 
-0.830 
-0.697 
-0.544 
-0.720 
-0.644 
-0.932 
-0.338 
-0.299 
-0.364 
-0.390 
-0.519 
-0.347 
-0.212 
-0.209 
-0.063 
-0.394 
 0.111 
-0.106 
 0.454 
 0.525 
 0.557 
 0.408 
 0.065 
 0.068 
-0.174 
 0.133 
 0.218 
 0.001 
-0.168 
-0.113 
 0.151 
 0.454 
 0.132 
 0.619 
 0.588 
 0.894 
CAR% 
 1.981
c 
 1.275 
 1.309 
 1.509 
 1.250 
 1.348 
 1.149 
 1.086 
 1.183 
 1.248 
 1.207 
 1.272 
 1.374 
 1.366
c 
 0.823 
 0.813 
 0.978
c 
 1.061
a 
 0.857
a 
 0.390 
-1.151
b 
-0.395 
-0.568 
-0.869 
-1.232
c 
-1.226
c 
-1.290
b 
-1.182 
-1.390
c 
-1.342 
-1.594
c 
-1.642
c 
-1.481 
-0.373 
-0.151 
-0.214 
 0.178 
-0.060 
 0.200 
 0.017 
 0.330 
K-W 
2.497 
0.790 
0.277 
0.573 
0.756 
1.172 
1.579 
1.892 
1.597 
0.664 
0.620 
0.262 
0.721 
0.574 
0.024 
0.139 
0.714 
2.844 
2.848 
5.833
c 
5.152
c 
4.424 
4.979 
4.756
c 
5.563
c 
4.387 
6.174
c 
5.430
c 
3.783 
4.157 
5.136
c 
6.462
b 
5.350
c 
1.424 
2.976 
5.139
c 
2.737 
1.719 
1.487 
1.322 
2.753 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
M 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
CAR% 
-3.223 
-3.067 
-2.630 
-2.313 
-1.793 
-1.144 
-0.650 
-0.613 
-0.283 
-0.728 
-0.301 
-0.647 
-0.427 
-0.480 
-0.104 
 0.068 
-0.059 
 0.031 
-0.349 
-0.394 
 1.167 
 1.094
c 
 0.580 
 0.254 
-0.262 
-0.524 
-0.414 
-0.717 
-1.278 
-1.734 
-1.750 
-1.921 
-2.564 
-3.280 
-3.040 
-3.214 
-3.778 
-4.755 
-5.392 
-5.585 
-5.766 
CAR% 
 0.020 
-0.697 
-0.980 
-0.814 
-0.743 
-0.971 
-0.827 
-0.673 
-0.845 
-0.741 
-1.014 
-0.433 
-0.371 
-0.423 
-0.425 
-0.564 
-0.392 
-0.249 
-0.212 
-0.030 
-0.399 
 0.146 
-0.087 
 0.469 
 0.493 
 0.546 
 0.376 
 0.008 
-0.011 
-0.243 
 0.020 
 0.074 
-0.148 
-0.351 
-0.279 
-0.027 
 0.283 
-0.106 
 0.334 
 0.290 
 0.570 
CAR% 
 2.461
b 
 1.701 
 1.700 
 1.872
c 
 1.579 
 1.621
c 
 1.411 
 1.336 
 1.406 
 1.448 
 1.385 
 1.422 
 1.505
c 
 1.473
c 
 0.919 
 0.850 
 0.987
c 
 1.062
a 
 0.851
a 
 0.384 
-1.177
b 
-0.342 
-0.492 
-0.760 
-1.102 
-1.074 
-1.106
c 
-0.999 
-1.178 
-1.114 
-1.348 
-1.350 
-1.170 
-0.033 
 0.219 
 0.177 
 0.601 
 0.391 
 0.682 
 0.467 
 0.740 
K-W 
2.665 
0.909 
0.356 
0.564 
0.980 
1.365 
1.857 
2.143 
2.188 
0.988 
0.446 
0.410 
0.933 
0.877 
0.128 
0.014 
1.286 
2.024 
2.847 
5.844
c 
4.616
c 
3.740 
3.874 
2.883 
3.203 
2.808 
4.228 
3.656 
1.868 
2.616 
3.583 
4.110 
3.385 
0.863 
2.116 
3.428 
1.884 
1.221 
1.187 
1.163 
2.065 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
S 
S 
S 
M 
S 
S 
L 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
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announcement effect for large volume stocks under the two estimation methods and 
also for small volume stocks under the GJR-GARCH estimates. As expected, we 
perceived strong return continuations in the small volume stocks compared to 
medium and large volume stocks. This finding is consistent with earlier results. 
Intuitively, as the evidence suggested, large volume stocks have high liquidity, will 
compensate for lower returns. Our results are confirmed by the Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
Table 5.10 indicates the results for acquiring firms under the GJR-GARCH estimates 
for small, medium and large volume stocks. On announcement day (t=0) CARs for 
both small and medium volume stocks were 1.167 percent and -0.399 percent 
respectively and both are insignificant. However, large volume stocks CAR of -1.177 
percent is significant at the 5% level. Small volume stocks are significant up to day 
one and were positive up to day three. The CARs for medium volume stocks showed 
a different pattern of returns. Pre- and post-event CARs are insignificant and 
therefore have no effect on M&As announcement. For the large volume stocks, pre- 
and post-event immediately following the announcement are insignificant. We found 
weaker return continuations in small volume stocks relative to medium and large 
volume stocks under the GJR-GARCH.  
 
5.11 Trading Volume for Acquirer Firms and Fama-French Model 
Table 5.11 summarises results for acquiring firms categories as small, medium and 
large volume stocks; the time series were estimated using the Fama-French three-
factor model. The ARs were estimated under the OLS and GJR-GARCH. 
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Table 5.11 indicates that under the OLS method, on the announcement day (t=0), 
CARs for both small and large liquidity stocks are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. These are in sharp contrast to the medium liquidity stocks CAR which is 
insignificant. On day t=0, both small and medium volume stocks were positive, whilst 
large volume stock was negative. The post-event CARs for small volume stocks are 
significant up to day four. The significant of the CARs lasts much longer under the 
OLS method relative to the GJR-GARCH method. Prior to the announcement date, 
CARs for sixteen days window (t=-5 up to t=-20) were positive and are statistically 
significant for only small liquidity stocks. As suggested before, these significant 
CARs might not be unrelated to the event date. Again, these returns were not 
surprising since speculations might have resulted in unparalleled increases in the 
share prices of small liquidity stocks. Pre- and post-announcement CARs for medium 
and large liquidity stocks are not significant.  Indeed, shareholders of small liquidity 
stocks enjoyed normal rate of returns, whilst shareholders of medium and large 
liquidity stocks experienced a negative rate of returns. This finding is consistent with 
the view that small liquidity stocks outperform large liquidity stocks on 
announcement. 
 
Table 5.11 also reports the CARs for acquiring firms grouped as small, medium and 
large liquidity stocks under the GJR-GARCH estimates. The results indicated that on 
announcement day (t=0), CARs for small and large liquidity stocks are significant.  
Specifically, CARs for small and large liquidity stocks were 1.329 percent and -1.142 
percent and are significant at the 10% and 5% levels, whilst medium liquidity stock is 
not significant. Post-event CARs for medium and large volume stocks are statistically 
zero. In the case of the large volume stocks, this finding is consistent with the prior  
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Table 5.11:CARs Grouped by TRADING VOLUME Stocks for Acquirer Firms under Fama-French  
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CAR% 
 4.061
a 
 3.796
b 
 3.848
b 
 3.846
a 
 4.027
a 
 4.219
a 
 4.455
a 
 4.072
a 
 4.091
a 
 3.306
b 
 3.341
a 
 2.546
b 
 2.375
b 
 2.057
b 
 2.046
b 
 1.777
b 
 1.301 
 1.058 
 0382 
-0.017 
 1.593
b 
 1.576
a 
 1.464
a 
 1.346
b 
 1.111
c 
 1.194 
 1.515
c 
 1.501
c 
 1.297 
 1.201 
 1.486 
 1.716 
 1.509 
 1.093 
 1.693 
 1.857
c 
 1.594 
 0.890 
 0.603 
 0.709 
 0.897 
CAR% 
-0.511 
 0.124 
 0.361 
 0.243 
 0.186 
 0.428 
 0.288 
 0.177 
 0.391 
 0.445 
 0.758 
 0.238 
 0.194 
 0.351 
 0.387 
 0.525 
 0.358 
 0.208 
 0.190 
 0.039 
 0.405 
-0.111 
 0.039 
-0.424 
-0.406 
-0.555 
-0.441 
-0.212 
-0.272 
-0.024 
-0.374 
-0.426 
-0.271 
-0.142 
-0.208 
-0.378 
-0.712 
-0.384 
-0.898 
-0.945 
-1.315 
CAR% 
 1.260 
 0.655 
 0.782 
 1.010 
 0.824 
 0.925 
 0.574 
 0.585 
 0.671 
 0.694 
 0.670 
 0.727 
 0.926 
 0.967 
 0.553 
 0.639 
 0.863 
 1.000
b 
 0.791
b 
 0.412 
-1.144
b 
-0.525 
-0.686 
-1.083
c 
-1.395
b 
-1.456
b 
-1.564
a 
-1.529
b 
-1.640
b 
-1.672
b 
-1.924
a 
-1.973
b 
-1.825
b 
-0.748 
-0.573 
-0.648 
-0.240 
 -0.325 
-0.001 
-0.124 
 0.197 
K-W 
4.516 
3.450 
2.251 
2.615 
3.268 
3.363 
3.808 
3.296 
3.056 
1.523 
1.293 
0.312 
0.272 
0.192 
0.450 
0.091 
0.483 
2.674 
2.326 
4.857
c 
5.746
c 
5.090
c 
5.805
c 
5.730
c 
6.458
b 
5.994
b 
7.027
b 
6.079
b 
4.464 
4.226 
5.013
c 
6.738
b 
6.016
b 
2.442 
3.982 
6.397
b 
3.203 
1.953 
2.374 
2.384 
3.489 
Largest   
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
CAR% 
-0.095 
-0.123 
 0.145 
 0.380 
 0.795 
 1.206 
 1.560 
 1.381 
 1.600 
 1.073 
 1.348 
 0.816 
 0.855 
 0.681 
 0.861 
 0.838 
 0.552 
 0.484 
-0.032 
-0.205 
 1.329
c 
 1.306
b 
 0.941 
 0.725 
 0.324 
 0.212 
 0.426 
 0.242 
-0.208 
-0.502 
-0.388 
-0.409 
-0.861 
-1.396 
-1.022 
-1.027 
-1.459  
 -2.328 
-2.813 
-2.840 
-2.839 
CAR% 
-0.120 
 0.583 
 0.821 
 0.692 
 0.633 
 0.870 
 0.692 
 0.558      
 0.758 
 0.773 
 1.057 
 0.523 
 0.425 
 0.505 
 0.484 
 0.612 
 0.425 
 0.258 
 0.205 
 0.020 
 0.423 
-0.087 
 0.115 
-0.354 
-0.285 
-0.411 
-0.257 
 0.039 
-0.001 
 0.200 
-0.092 
-0.143 
 0.067 
 0.265 
 0.206 
 0.050 
-0.288 
 0.066 
-0.427 
-0.454 
-0.774 
CAR% 
 2.291
c 
 1.619 
 1.656 
 1.821 
 1.582 
 1.614 
 1.263 
 1.276 
 1.313 
 1.284 
 1.224 
 1.240 
 1.351 
 1.312 
 0.850 
 0.824 
 0.989
c 
 1.063
b 
 0.837
b 
 0.453 
-1.142
b 
-0.465 
-0.600 
-0.955 
-1.232
c 
-1.292
c 
-1.326
c 
-1.272 
-1.333 
-1.297 
-1.468 
-1.457 
-1.306 
-0.179 
 0.108 
 0.032 
 0.504 
 0.598 
 0.939 
 0.795 
 1.118 
K-W 
5.384
c 
4.559 
2.887 
2.941 
3.818 
4.103 
4.649
c 
4.322 
4.524 
2.523 
1.928 
0.874 
0.718 
0.351 
0.229 
0.207 
0.282 
1.567 
2.049 
5.126
c 
5.242
c 
5.421
c 
5.496
c 
4.884
c 
5.735
c 
6.861
b 
8.318
b 
7.886
b 
5.157
c 
5.246
c 
6.297
b 
7.154
b 
6.534
b 
2.828 
4.375 
6.218
b 
4.230 
2.872 
2.880 
2.750 
3.523 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
M 
M 
L 
L / M 
S 
M 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
L 
M 
M 
M 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
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studies of Higson and Elliott (1998) who documented that large firms post takeover 
returns are not significantly different from zero. For small liquidity stocks, CARs are 
significant up to day one and positive up to day seven. In contrast to small volume 
stocks, CARs for large liquidity stocks were negative up to day thirteen. The CARs 
obtained under the GJR-GARCH contradicts with those CARs under the OLS 
estimate for only small liquidity stocks. Thus shareholders’ of small liquidity stocks 
suffered a significant decline in announcement returns under the GJR-GARCH 
estimates. However, for medium and large liquidity stocks shareholders 
announcement returns were somewhat improved under the GJR-GARCH estimates 
relative to the OLS estimates. Indeed, the evidence strongly supports market 
efficiency in the three liquidity stocks. These results are also confirmed by the 
Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
5.12 Trading Volume for Acquirer Firms and Carhart Model 
Table 5.12 reports CARs for acquirer firms classified as small, medium and large 
trading volume stocks under the two estimation methods. The Carhart four-factor 
model was used for time series returns. 
 
The results in Table 5.12 showed that, CARs on announcement day (t=0) for both 
small and large volume stocks are significant at the 5% levels under the OLS 
estimates. However, CAR of 0.342 percent under the OLS estimate on the 
announcement day for medium volume stocks is insignificant. For small volume 
stocks, CARs are significant up to seven continuous days and positive for the full 
twenty days. The significance of the CARs lasts much longer under the OLS method 
and the effect of event last rather shorter under the GJR-GARCH. Prior-event CARs  
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Table 5.12: CARs Grouped by  TRADIND VOLUME Stocks for Acquirer Firms under Carhart  
                     OLS ESTIMATES                                                             GJR-GARCH ESTIMATES                                      
                SMALL    MEDIUM    LARGE                                                            SMALL       MEDIUM     LARGE                  
DAYS 
 
-20 
-19 
-18 
-17 
-16 
-15 
-14 
-13 
-12 
-11 
-10 
-9 
-8 
-7 
-6 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
+1 
+2 
+3 
+4 
+5 
+6 
+7 
+8 
+9 
+10 
+11 
+12 
+13 
+14 
+15 
+16 
+17 
+18 
+19 
+20 
CAR% 
 3.966
a 
 3.717
b 
 3.763
b 
 3.785
a 
 3.974
a 
 4.167
a 
 4.384
a 
 3.980
a 
 4.010
a 
 3.216
b 
 3.254
a 
 2.452
b 
 2.280
c 
 1.990
c 
 2.007
b 
 1.757
b 
 1.308 
 1.089 
 0.393 
-0.016 
 1.606
b 
 1.613
a 
 1.536
a 
 1.416
b 
 1.160
c 
 1.253
c 
 1.553
c 
 1.503
c 
 1.266 
 1.164 
 1.444 
 1.675 
 1.458 
 1.031 
 1.643 
 1.811
c 
 1.555  
 0.875   
 0.569 
 0.696 
 0.889 
CAR% 
-0.663 
-0.026 
 0.252 
 0.153 
 0.141 
 0.381 
 0.258 
 0.128 
 0.380 
 0.411 
 0.701 
 0.237 
 0.250 
 0.412 
 0.410 
 0.536 
 0.367 
 0.210 
 0.193 
 0.013 
 0.342 
-0.151 
 0.009 
-0.461 
-0.496 
-0.667 
-0.548 
-0.269 
-0.332 
-0.127 
-0.504 
-0.581 
-0.441 
-0.369 
-0.418 
-0.615 
-0.919 
-0.654 
-1.212 
-1.252 
-1.628 
CAR% 
 1.143 
 0.610 
 0.786 
 1.032 
 0.889 
 1.022 
 0.669 
 0.646 
 0.706 
 0.711 
 0.691 
 0.753 
 0.919 
 0.971 
 0.560 
 0.667 
 0.896
c 
 1.044
b 
 0.822
b 
 0.407 
-1.178
b 
-0.503 
-0.639 
-1.008 
-1.328
b 
-1.395
b 
-1.550
a 
-1.525
b 
-1.651
b 
-1.648
b 
-1.875
b 
-1.905
b 
-1.746
b 
-0.675 
-0.514 
-0.605 
-0.241 
-0.365 
-0.024 
-0.118 
 0.205 
K-W 
4.777
c 
3.833 
2.561 
3.016 
3.462 
3.381 
3.615 
3.066 
3.013 
1.387 
1.148 
0.212 
0.190 
0.085 
0.436 
0.114 
0.538 
2.968 
2.706 
4.912
c 
6.060
b 
5.592
c 
6.039
b 
6.102
b 
6.297
b 
6.048
b 
7.474
b 
6.398
b 
4.302 
4.056 
4.462 
5.744
c 
5.154
c 
1.917 
3.693 
6.155
b 
3.135 
2.041 
2.722 
2.231 
3.479 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
S 
M 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
M 
M 
M 
CAR% 
13.596 
12.877 
12.449 
12.015 
11.754 
11.470 
11.105 
10.217 
 9.759 
 8.516 
 8.106 
 6.874 
 6.221 
 5.402 
 4.925 
 4.244 
 3.265 
 2.518 
 1.293 
 0.460 
 1.997
b 
 2.040
a 
 2.321
c 
 2.764 
 3.026 
 3.584 
 4.458 
 4.922 
 5.111 
 5.460 
 6.250 
 6.879 
 7.072 
 7.212 
 8.245 
 8.923 
 9.160 
 8.990 
 9.166 
 9.843 
10.522 
CAR% 
 0.911 
 1.603 
 1.826 
 1.663 
 1.563 
 1.706 
 1.483 
 1.324 
 1.495 
 1.434 
 1.624 
 1.076 
 0.875 
 0.920 
 0.836 
 0.913 
 0.657 
 0.419 
 0.298 
 0.047 
 0.457 
-0.029 
 0.261 
-0.174 
-0.096 
-0.244 
-0.049 
 0.294 
 0.330 
 0.604 
 0.343 
 0.315 
 0.531 
 0.701 
 0.685 
 0.562 
 0.254 
 0.624 
 0.183 
 0.175 
-0.147 
CAR% 
 1.527 
 0.904 
 1.064 
 1.131 
 1.105 
 1.155 
 0.789 
 0.810 
 0.891 
 0.893 
 0.855 
 0.944 
 1.080 
 1.065 
 0.623 
 0.656 
 0.903
c 
 0.998
b 
 0.786
b 
 0.442 
-1.217
a
 
 
-0.458 
-0.525 
-0.819 
-1.239
c 
-1.264
c 
-1.440
b 
-1.370
b 
-1.462
c 
-1.465
c 
-1.626
b 
-1.648
c 
-1.464
c 
-0.389 
-0.158 
-0.229 
 0.168 
 0.108 
 0.469 
 0.317 
 0.553 
K-W 
4.299 
3.830 
2.487 
2.581 
3.149 
3.705 
4.680
c 
4.392 
4.232 
2.088 
1.511 
0.579 
0.345 
0.304 
0.755 
0.307 
0.530 
1.177 
2.169 
5.332
c 
6.976
b 
4.619
c 
4.314 
3.955 
4.648
c 
4.637
c 
6.957
b 
6.517
b 
3.836 
4.064 
4.743
c 
5.155
c 
4.251 
1.192 
2.020 
3.724 
1.849 
1.080 
1.109 
1.037 
1.507 
Largest 
Rank 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
M 
M 
M 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
Smallest 
Rank 
M 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
S 
S 
S 
S 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
M 
M 
M 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of CARs      
estimated using student t-statistics. K-W donates Kruskal-Wallis Test of the Chi-Square Value and Test Statistics. 
LRank denotes Large Rank and SRank denotes Small Rank. 
L, M, S, denote Large, Medium and Small Firms. 
 
148 
 
were positive and significant for sixteen days window (t=-5 up to t=-20) only in small 
volume stocks. Information by classification changes expectations and therefore 
information might have leaked that takeover announcement in the small volume 
stocks resulting in matchless rises in the share prices before the event date. Thus, 
these results were unconnected to the event date. Furthermore, the magnitudes of 
CARs generated under small liquidity stocks were higher than both the medium and 
large liquidity stocks under both sets of estimation methods. Pre- and post-
announcement CARs immediately following the event for medium and large liquidity 
stocks are not significant at conventional levels. Large liquidity stocks generated 
negative CARs for nineteen consecutive days.  
 
Table 5.12 also showed the estimated CARs for small, medium and large liquidity 
stocks under the GJR-GARCH model. The results revealed that on announcement 
day (t=0), CAR for medium liquidity stocks was not significant. However, CARs for 
small and large liquidity stocks are significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
For small liquidity stocks, CARs are significant up to day two. The magnitudes of 
CARs under the GJR-GARCH contradict significantly with those under the OLS only 
in small liquidity stocks. For medium liquidity stocks, pre- and post CARs are not 
significant at conventional levels in the entire twenty days period. CARs for large 
liquidity stocks on the other hand are not significant both pre- and post immediately 
following the announcement. 
 
Our liquidity measure under the two estimation methods showed that GJR-GAARCH 
estimates produced bigger announcement returns than the OLS estimates. Our 
liquidity measure also reveals interesting distinction between market capitalization 
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and trading volume. The significance of CARs for medium market capitalization last 
much longer under the GJR-GARCH estimates than those CARs under the OLS 
estimates for the target firms. 
 
We used the Kruskal-Wallis test, a nonparametric test, to compare the three CARs of 
both the target and acquirer firms grouped by market capitalization value as well as 
the trading volume for small, medium and large firms under the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimation to ascertain whether the CARs are significantly different. In our 
Kruskal-Wallis test, we assume that the CARs of each group are independent. 
Kruskal-Wallis test statistics is approximately a chi-square distribution with k-1 
degree of freedom. We reported the Kruskal-Wallis test statistics of the chi-square 
value with associated significant level and the (mean ranks of each CAR) largest 
rank and smallest rank. Using the significant levels, the null hypotheses for the 
Kruskal-Wallis will be accepted or rejected. The results of these tests indicated that 
there are significant differences between the three CARs for small, medium and 
large firms. 
 
From Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, using the Kruskal-Wallis test, CARs grouped by 
market capitalization value for target firms showed that after the announcement, 
medium firms had largest mean ranks above both small and large firms across the 
three methodologies that were applied in this empirical study; under the two 
estimation models. In other words, shareholders of medium firms had the highest 
rate of returns after the announcement, compared to small and large firms’ 
shareholders, whilst the smallest mean ranks were predominantly recorded in large 
firms, suggesting shareholders of large firms had the least rate of returns. From the 
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three tables, therefore there was evidence to reject the null hypotheses in favour of 
the alternatives hypotheses. We can therefore authoritatively say that there are 
statistically significant differences between the three CARs for small, medium and 
large firms. 
 
Using Kruskal-Wallis test CARs grouped by market capitalization value for acquirer 
firms in Tables 5.4; 5.5 and 5.6 showed significant differences under the OLS and 
GJR-GARCH estimation methods. The largest mean ranks were seen in both small 
and medium firms with the small firms slightly above the medium firms after the 
announcement. These results convincingly indicated that shareholders of both small 
and medium firms substantially gained after the announcement. In contrast to the 
small and medium firms, smallest mean ranks were reported in large firms under the 
OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates after the announcement; however, few were also 
recorded for medium firms only in the GJR-GARCH models. These results 
commandingly show that the performance of large firms was not encouraging. As 
indicated above, the null hypotheses were rejected in favour of the alternative 
hypotheses. We can therefore confidently say that there are statistically significant 
differences between those CARs of small, medium and large firms. 
 
Surprising results came from the analysis of Tables 5.7; 5.8 and 5.9 for CARs 
grouped by trading volume stocks for target firms under the two estimation methods. 
Both the largest and smallest mean ranks were in some cases under the OLS and 
GJR-GARCH was reported for the three firms after the announcement. For the target 
firms under the standard CAPM, largest mean rank were equally reported for both 
medium and large firms under the OLS estimate with largest rank mostly recorded 
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for medium firms under the GJR-GARCH estimate. Smallest mean ranks were seen 
in small firms, meaning a small rate of returns went to shareholders of small firms 
after the announcement. For the target firms under the Fama-French model, the 
largest mean ranks were recorded for the three firms with the medium firms as the 
winner under the OLS estimate whilst under the GJR-GARCH was large firms.  
 
As indicated in the tables, despite the smallest mean ranks reported in all the three 
categories of firms, small firms were seen as the losers after the announcement. The 
results for the target firms under the Carhart model for the largest mean ranks were 
opposite to the Fama-French model. Here the largest mean ranks were reported for 
large firms under the OLS estimate whilst the largest mean ranks under the GJR-
GARCH went to medium firms. In contrast, smallest mean ranks are common in 
small firms. Based on the Kruskal-Wallis test we can convincingly conclude that 
there are statistically significant differences between these CARs for small, medium 
and large firms.  
 
As depicted in Tables 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12, using the Kruskal-Wallis test, CARs 
grouped by trading volume stocks for acquirer firms indicated that, on 
announcement, largest mean ranks of small firms are more than medium firms, and 
also more than large firms. In other words, small firms gain considerably more than 
both medium and large firms. Whilst the smallest mean ranks were commonly 
pronounced in large firms, with a few also reported in medium firms. The results of 
the Kruskal-Wallis test statistics clearly show that there is a statistically significant 
difference among the CARs for small, medium and large stocks. 
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The findings presented here correspond to the Kruskal-Wallis test concerning the 
target and acquiring firm’s shareholders. Using market capitalization value for 
investment purposes, acquiring firm shareholders will prefer to buy medium target 
firms when a takeover attempt is announced. Likewise, using trading volume stocks, 
rational investors will prefer to acquire small firms. These results suggest that 
liquidity measure has substantial influence in determining the size of the firm that 
must be acquired when a takeover is announced. The announcement returns for 
these small and medium stocks under the two liquidity measures were considerably 
impressive. The results here are consistent across all the methodologies that were 
used in this study. 
 
5.13 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates how stock liquidity measure by market capitalization and 
trading volume can impact shareholders’ wealth. Firms are categorised as small, 
medium and large using market capitalization stock and trading volume as our 
liquidity measure. The chapter had revealed an important revelation concerning the 
liquidity measure and the two sets of firms that were engaged in the acquisition. 
Using market capitalization as our liquidity measure, medium liquidity firms 
significantly generate larger CARs under the two estimation methods as well as 
across all the methodologies that were used in this study for the target firms. 
However, small liquidity firms realised bigger CARs under acquirer firms for both 
OLS and GJR-GARCH models across all the methodologies applied. Our trading 
volume liquidity measure was not different. Specifically, we still observed large CARs 
for medium liquidity firms across all the methodologies for target firms. Whilst small 
liquidity firms persistently generate bigger CARs for acquirer firms under both the 
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OLS and GJR-GARCH models for all the three methodologies in this empirical study. 
One of the major facts in this chapter is that the size effect had substantial influence 
on our liquidity measure. Secondly, there is a clear distinction of the two set of firms; 
target firms and acquirer firms that were involved in takeover activities.  
 
We found strong evidence in support of market efficiency in both small and large 
liquidity markets for target firms. We also persistently found the presence of market 
efficiency in medium and large liquidity markets for acquiring firms. We used the 
Kruskal-Wallis test, a nonparametric test, to compare the three CARs of both the 
target and acquirer firms for small, medium and large firms under the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimation to ascertain whether the CARs are significantly different. Our 
Kruskal-Wallis test showed that there are statistically significant differences between 
these CARs for small, medium and large firms. The CARs generated for small, 
medium and large liquidity stock correspond to the Kruskal-Wallis test for the target 
and acquiring firm’s shareholders.  
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                                                       CHAPTER SIX  
 
           GJR-GARCH Estimates for Conditional Mean and Variance Equations 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the coefficient estimates of the GJR-GARCH-in-mean (GJR-
GARCH-M) and variance equations when those estimates are for firms according to 
the size of market capitalization and trade volume. Under the trading volume, we 
report only the Carhart four-factor model of the GJR-GARCH-M and variance 
equations without reporting both the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model.  
The value of the coefficient for each constituent of the conditional mean and variance 
is based on their simple average within each grouping. The GJR-GARCH is likely to 
capture both conditional volatility and asymmetry that might influence on the time 
series regression. We developed hypotheses to test the estimation of GJR-GARCH-
in-mean (GJR-GARCH-M) and variance equations of the coefficients to ascertain 
which of our coefficient variables has predictive power in explaining our time series 
regression. The sample period used to estimate the GJR-GARCH method was ±250 
days, prior to and after the announcement days. 
 
   6.1 Conditional Variance of Target Firms under Standard CAPM 
The average coefficients for the GJR-GARCH-in-mean and variance equations 
grouped by market capitalization for target firms under the standard CAPM model 
are presented in Table 6.1 panel A and panel B. The i  coefficient of the mean 
equation captures the relationship between the mean excess returns of the stock 
and its risk. As can be seen, the i  coefficients for all firm sizes were small and only 
medium firms are significant. We can confidently say that there is a positive 
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relationship between excess return and risk for the target firm shareholders. More 
specifically, the positive synergies will outweigh the risk associated with the M&As 
and thus potential increase in shareholders’ wealth. The i coefficients for small, 
medium and large firms are highly negative and which are statistically significant. As 
expected, the i coefficients for the market on the stocks’ excess returns for target 
firms are highly positive and significant across all firm sizes. Hence, target’s wealth 
gain would be expected. The i coefficients for the permanent component or average 
volatility of the conditional variance of the variance equation for all firm sizes were 
highly positive and both small and large firms are significant. Thus we document 
positive relation between average volatility and its conditional variance. The result 
shows that average volatility for target firms is positive and therefore we expect an 
increase in the share prices of target firms and that will increase shareholders’ 
wealth. The i  coefficients for the past new had small positive and significant effects 
on the current conditional variance for all firm sizes. The i coefficients which capture 
past conditional volatility were small for all firm sizes and therefore had no effect on 
the current volatility and significant only in large firms. The i  coefficients which 
capture conditional asymmetry were very high and predominantly statistically 
significantly positive for small, medium and large firms. Notice that positive 
asymmetry-leverage effect and significant will have a positive impact on the share 
prices. Thus volatility asymmetries are present and therefore must be incorporated 
into the model. The conditional general error distributions were highly positive for the 
target firms under the CAPM. 
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Table 6.1 Conditional Mean and Variance Equations Grouped by Market Capitalization for Target Firms under CAPM 
 
Panel A. Average Coefficients for Individual Firms in Sample according to Size of Market Capitalization 
                     MEAN   EQUATION                                    VARIANCE   EQUATION                                 
FIRMS No. hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( )  i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK 
 
GED  
Small 
 Firms 
66 -1.357 
(5.691) 
-0.014
a 
(0.001)
 
0.005
a 
(0.001) 
0.001
a 
(0.000) 
0.175
a 
(0.048) 
0.100 
(0.076) 
0.531
a 
(0.054) 
0.969
a 
(0.043) 
Medium 
Firms 
66 3.756
c 
(2.175) 
-0.014
a 
(0.001) 
0.007
a 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.086
a 
(0.016) 
0.034 
(0.022) 
0.674
a 
(0.039) 
1.258
a 
(0.031) 
Large 
 Firms 
66 14.093 
(10.951) 
-0.018
a 
(0.005) 
0.008
a 
(0.001) 
9.846
a 
(1.688) 
0.057
a 
(0.010) 
0.080
a 
(0.018) 
0.603
a 
(0.054) 
1.278
a 
(0.031) 
All 198         
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent significance level, respectively. The value of the coefficient for each parameter of 
the conditional mean and variance is based on their simple average of the corresponding parameter within each grouping. Test of statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates is based on the standard deviation of the sample mean for each group of capitalization value. The 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
Panel B .Frequency Count of Positive and Negative Coefficients that are Significant for Mean and Variance Equations 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( )  i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
66 16+ 5- 0+ 60- 51+ 2- 39+ 1- 24+ 11- 20+ 4- 44+ 4- 66+ 0- 
Medium 
Firms 
66 9+ 10- 0+ 56- 62+ 0- 36+ 1- 25+ 10- 19+ 7- 50+ 1- 66+ 0- 
Large  
Firms 
66 12+ 7- 0+ 57- 64+ 0- 47+ 2- 16+ 7- 26+ 3- 49+ 2- 66+ 0- 
ALL 198 37+ 22- 0+ 173- 177+ 2- 122+ 4- 65+ 28- 65+ 14- 143+ 7- 198+ 0 
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 6.2 Conditional Variance of Target Firms under Fama-French Model 
Table 6.2 indicates GJR-GARCH-in-mean and variance equations grouped by 
market capitalization for target firms under the Fama-French model. Panel A and 
panel B of Table 6.2 shows that the i coefficients of the mean equation for all the 
firms were small and medium firms are significant. This might suggest low risk in 
relation to the M&As for the target shareholders. Indeed, whilst the i coefficients in 
the mean equations are negatively significant for all firm sizes, the i coefficients for 
the market in the mean equations are positively significant, with the exception of 
small firms whose two individual firms were negatively significant. It is important to 
recognize that the stocks’ excess returns of the market for target firms are significant 
and positive. One important finding is the explanatory power of tSMB and tHML in 
explaining the risk premium associates with time series regression in stock returns. 
For tSMB  69.696% and 54.55% respectively for small and large firms were strongly 
able to explain the risk premium in time series regression in stock returns, whilst 
34.848% for medium firms and that might be considered as weak explanatory power 
in explaining the time series regression in stock returns. This showed size effect in 
favour of small and large firms compared to medium firms. In the case of the tHML , 
the explanatory power for small firms was 50.000%, medium firms was 60.606% and 
large firms 71.212% in explaining the time series regression in stock returns. In this 
subsection both the coefficients of tSMB and tHML are positive and significant in 
explaining stocks’ excess returns. The i coefficients for the permanent components 
of the conditional variance equation for all firm sizes are highly positive and 
significant only in large firms. 
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Table 6.2 Conditional Mean and Variance Equations Grouped by Market Capitalization for Target Firms under Fama-French  
 
Panel A.  Average Coefficients for Individual Firms in Sample according to Size of Market Capitalization 
                                   MEAN   EQUATION                           VARIANCE   EQUATION 
FIRMS No. hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK 
 
GED  
Small 
Firms 
66 -1.659 
(6.146) 
-0.015
a 
(0.001) 
0.007
a 
(0.001) 
0.004
a
 
(0.001) 
0.002
a
 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.272
a
 
(0.084) 
0.062 
(0.049) 
0.540
a
 
(0.050) 
1.002
a 
(0.042) 
Medium 
Firms 
66 4.374
b
 
(2.022) 
-0.014
a
 
(0.001) 
0.009
a
 
(0.001) 
0.001
a
 
(0.001) 
0.003
a
 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.100
a
 
(0.019) 
0.060
c
 
(0.031) 
0.658
a
 
(0.042) 
1.228
a 
(0.030) 
Large 
Firms 
66 4.675 
(11.082) 
-0.015
a
 
(0.005) 
0.009
a
 
(0.001) 
-0.002
a
 
(0.000) 
0.002
b
 
(0.001) 
0.000
a
 
(1.671) 
0.062
a
 
(0.011) 
0.081
a
 
(0.018) 
0.594
a
 
(0.049) 
1.277
a 
(0.031) 
All 198           
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent significance level, respectively.  The value of the coefficient for each parameter 
of the conditional mean and variance is based on their simple average of the corresponding parameter within each grouping. Test of statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates is based on the standard deviation of the sample mean for each group of capitalization value. The 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
Panel B .Frequency Count of Positive and Negative Coefficients that are Significant for Mean and Variance Equations 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK 
 
GED  
Small 
Firms 
66 13+ 9- 0+ 59- 51+ 2- 41+ 5- 26+ 7- 40+ 1- 25+ 11- 17+ 6- 46+ 6- 66+ 0- 
Medium 
Firms 
66 12+ 7- 0+ 58- 62+ 0- 16+ 7- 34+ 6- 38+ 1- 24+ 11- 15+ 6- 51+ 2- 66+ 0- 
Large 
Firms 
66 8+ 6- 0+ 54- 62+ 0- 5+ 31- 36+ 11- 45+ 2- 15+ 9- 22+ 7- 52+ 2- 66+ 0- 
All 198 33+ 22- 0+ 171- 175+ 2- 62+ 43- 96+ 24- 123+ 4- 64+ 31- 54+ 19- 149+ 10- 198+ 0- 
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It appears the i coefficients of past news have a small effect (47.98%) on the 
current conditional variance and are significant. This suggests that past news i  has 
positive and small effects on the conditional variance of target firms aggregate 
stocks’ excess returns. The i coefficients which capture past conditional volatility 
were slightly small (36.87%) for firm sizes and therefore appears to have no effects 
on current volatility of the stocks, excess returns. The i coefficients which capture 
conditional asymmetry were very high and mostly positive significant for all firm 
sizes. This implies that, there was evidence to suggest that conditional asymmetry –
leverage effects were present in small, medium and large firms. 
 
6.3 Conditional Variance of Target Firms under Carhart Model 
Table 6.3 presents the results of GJR-GARCH-in-mean and variance equations 
grouped by market capitalization for target firms under the Carhart four-factor model. 
As indicated in panel A and panel B that the i  coefficient of the mean equations are 
very small. This showed that the risk associated with the firms aggregate excess 
returns were very low. The i coefficients in the mean equation for all firm sizes were 
highly negatively significant. Thus i coefficients have negative and significant 
effects on the aggregate target firms’ sizes. As expected, the i coefficients for the 
markets were highly positively significant for all firm sizes. Indeed, the stocks’ excess 
returns of the market for target firms are positive and significant.  
 
Both tSMB and tHML  have greater exposure in explaining the time series regression 
in stock returns and which are significant for all firm sizes, except small firms under 
the tHML . It appears both tSMB  and tHML  has more power than the tMOM in 
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explaining time series in stocks’ excess returns.  With regard to tMOM , 36.364%, 
43.939% and 59.091% respectively for small, medium and large firms in explaining 
time series regression in stock excess returns. The i coefficients for the permanent 
component for conditional variance of aggregate stocks’ excess returns for target 
firms are highly positive and significant for small, medium and large firms. Past news 
i coefficients appears to have not much effects on the current conditional variance 
for aggregate stocks’ excess returns for target firms, especially for small and large 
firms and significant across all firm sizes. Thus the stocks’ excess returns of the 
target firms respond more positive volatility than negative volatility. The 
i coefficients which capture past conditional volatility have moderate effect on the 
current volatility of the stocks’ excess return across all firm sizes and which are 
significant. The i  coefficients which capture conditional asymmetry in the 
conditional variance equation were highly positive and significant for all firm sizes. 
Thus, there is evidence for positive conditional asymmetry-leverage effect for target 
firms’ share prices. The conditional generalized error distribution of the variance 
equation is positive and significant for all firm sizes. 
 
In this subsection, the results achieved for target firms’ shareholders do not showed 
many discrepancies but rather similar results under the CAPM, Fama-French and 
Carhart models. However, tHML  has strong exposure in explaining the time series 
variation on stock’s excess returns than the tSMB  under both Fama-French and 
Carhart model. 
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Table 6.3 Conditional Mean and Variances Equation Grouped by Market Capitalization for Target Firms under Carhart  
 
Panel A. Average Coefficients for Individual Firms in Sample according to Size of Market Capitalization 
                                   MEAN   EQUATION                   VARIANCE   EQUATION 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML  tiMOM
 

i
 
1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK 
 
GED  
Small 
Firms 
66 -2.418 
(6.672) 
-0.015
a
 
(0.002) 
0.007
a
 
(0.001) 
0.004
a
 
(0.001) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001
c
 
(0.001) 
0.186
a
 
(0.043) 
0.071
b
 
(0.034) 
0.538
a
 
(0.048) 
1.013
a 
(0.040) 
Medium 
Firms 
66 3.357 
(2.488) 
-0.014
a
 
(0.001) 
0.009
a
 
(0.001) 
0.001
a
 
(0.000) 
0.003
a
 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000
a
 
(3.261) 
0.098
a
 
(0.020) 
0.060
c
 
(0.031) 
0.557
a
 
(0.054) 
1.199
a 
(0.029) 
Large 
Firms 
66 -4.548 
(7.716) 
-0.008
a
 
(0.003) 
0.009
a
 
(0.000) 
-0.002
a
 
(0.000) 
0.002
a
 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000
a
 
(2.719) 
0.068
a
 
(0.012) 
0.076
a
 
(0.019) 
0.486
a
 
(0.059) 
1.273
a 
(0.030) 
All 198            
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent significance level, respectively. The value of the coefficient for each parameter of 
the conditional mean and variance is based on their simple average of the corresponding parameter within each grouping.  Test of statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates is based on the standard deviation of the sample mean for each group of capitalization value. The 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
Panel B. Frequency Count of Positive and Negative Coefficients that are Significant for Mean and Variance Equations 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML  tiMOM   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
66 10+ 5- 0+ 57- 52+ 3- 42+ 3- 22+ 7- 13+ 11- 39+ 1- 21+ 10- 17+ 3- 40+ 3- 66+ 0- 
Medium 
Firms 
66 11+ 7- 1+ 57- 63+ 0- 19+ 9- 34+ 7- 10+ 19- 40+ 0- 23+ 10- 17+ 9- 46+ 2- 66+ 0- 
Large 
Firms 
66 9+ 4- 0+ 58- 64+ 0- 6+ 28- 33+ 11- 15+ 24- 47+ 1- 15+ 9- 20+ 7- 45+ 5- 66+ 0- 
All 198 30+ 16- 1+ 172- 179+ 3- 67+ 40- 89+ 25- 38+ 54- 126+ 2- 59+ 29- 54+ 19- 131+ 10- 198+ 0- 
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6.4 Conditional Variance of Acquirer Firms under Standard CAPM  
Table 6.4 reports the GJR-GARCH-in-mean and variance equations grouped by 
market capitalization for acquirer firms under the CAPM model. In Panel A and panel 
B the estimation results of the  i  coefficients of the mean equation for acquirer 
firms stocks’ excess returns were very small and insignificant. This might suggest 
that the i  coefficients of the stocks’ excess returns in relation to its risk are very 
small.   The i  coefficients of the mean equation are negative and significant, across 
all firm sizes. The i  coefficients of the market for stocks’ excess returns for acquirer 
firms are highly positive and significant across all firms. The effect appears larger in 
both medium and large firms. The i  coefficients for the permanent component in 
the conditional variance equation of the stocks, excess returns are highly positive 
and significant. Thus i  coefficients are positive and significant for all firm sizes, 
except three firms which is negative and significant.  The i  coefficients for past 
period news have significant effect on the current conditional variance for all 
aggregate stocks’ excess returns for all firm sizes. The t  coefficients which capture 
past conditional volatility were very small (32.02%) and does not seem to impact on 
the current volatility. Here the  t  coefficients which are significant were small and 
medium firms. There was evidence that the coefficients i for asymmetry-leverage 
effect are highly positive and significant, implying that good news generates less 
volatility than bad news (see e.g. Black 2006). 
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Table 6.4 Conditional Mean and Variance Equations Grouped by Market Capitalization for Acquirer Firms under CAPM 
 
Panel A. Average Coefficients for Individual Firms in Sample according to Size of Market Capitalization 
                          MEAN   EQUATION                                     VARIANCE   EQUATION 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( )  i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small Firms 67 -0.062 
(8.308) 
-0.010
b
 
(0.004) 
0.006
a
 
(0.001) 
0.000
a
 
(9.626) 
0.140
a
 
(0.021) 
0.041
b
 
(0.019) 
0.517
a
 
(0.049) 
1.139
a 
(0.042) 
Medium 
Firms 
68 -5.623 
(6.134) 
-0.010
a
 
(0.001) 
0.007
a
 
(0.000) 
8.696
a
 
(1.289) 
0.084
a
 
(0.011) 
0.068
a 
(0.016)
 
0.585
a
 
(0.043) 
1.252
a 
(0.027) 
Large Firms 68 -5.493 
(4.222) 
-0.011
a
 
(0.001) 
0.009
a
 
(0.000) 
9.441
a
 
(1.915) 
0.078
a
 
(0.011) 
0.023 
(0.016) 
0.628
a
 
(0.049) 
1.389
a 
(0.025) 
All 203         
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent significance level, respectively. The value of the coefficient for each parameter of 
the conditional mean and variance is based on their simple average of the corresponding parameter within each grouping. Test of statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates is based on the standard deviation of the sample mean for each group of capitalization value. The 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
Panel B. Frequency Count of Positive and Negative Coefficients that are Significant for Mean and Variance Equations 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( )  i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
 Firms 
67 7+ 10- 0+ 58- 56+ 1- 51+ 1- 26+ 4- 12+ 5- 45+ 4- 67+ 0- 
Medium 
Firms 
68 11+ 7- 0+ 58- 67+ 1- 52+ 0- 25+ 4- 20+ 5- 47+ 0- 68+ 0- 
Large  
Firms 
68 8+ 7- 0+ 61- 67+ 0- 42+ 2- 27+ 6- 11+ 12- 52+ 1- 68+ 0- 
All 203 26+ 24- 0+ 177- 190+ 2- 145+ 3- 78+ 14- 43+ 22- 144+ 5- 203+ 0- 
164 
 
6.5 Conditional Variance of Acquirer Firms under Fama-French Model 
The average coefficients for the GJR-GARCH-in-mean and variance equations 
grouped by market capitalization for acquirer firms under the Fama-French three-
factor models are evaluates in Table 6.5, panel A and panel B. The i  coefficient of 
the mean equation that captures the relationship between the mean excess returns 
and its risk is small and significant only in large firms. Thus, there is evidence for a 
negative but insignificant relation between stocks’ excess returns and risk for 
acquirer firms. Indeed, this might be in line with the literature that the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model is capable of capturing the risk associated with stock’s 
excess returns. The i  coefficients are highly negative and significant for stocks’ 
excess returns. The i  coefficients of the market of the mean equation are positive 
and significant across all firm sizes. The time series regression in stock returns have 
greater exposure to both the tSMB  and tHLM . Thus 65.52% and 62.07% are 
significant in explaining the time series regression in stocks’ excess returns for tSMB  
and tHLM  respectively for acquirer firms. The coefficients for both tSMB and tHML  
have strong positive effects more than negative effect on the stocks’ excess returns. 
 
The i  coefficients for the permanent component for conditional variance of the 
aggregate stocks excess returns are highly positive and significant across all firm 
sizes. The i  coefficients for prior period news had 42.36% significant effect on all 
firm sizes. It appears the past news have small effects on the current conditional 
variance for stocks’ excess returns across all firm sizes. There was strong evidence 
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Table 6.5 Conditional Mean and Variance Equations Grouped by Market Capitalization for Acquirer Firms under Fama-French  
 
Panel A. Average Coefficients for Individual Firms in Sample according to Size of Market Capitalization 
                     MEAN   EQUATION                         VARIANCE   EQUATION 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
67 -0.155 
(8.576) 
-0.009
b
 
(0.005) 
0.008
a
 
(0.001) 
0.005
a
 
(0.000) 
0.003
a
 
(0.001) 
0.000
a
 
(4.465) 
0.130
a
 
(0.017) 
0.033
c
 
(0.017) 
0.494
a
 
(0.048) 
1.133
a 
(0.039) 
Medium 
Firms 
68 1.846 
(3.586) 
-0.012
a
 
(0.001) 
0.009
a
 
(0.000) 
0.002
a
 
(0.000) 
0.005
a
 
(0.001) 
0.000
a
 
(1.920) 
0.078
a
 
(0.010) 
0.075
a
 
(0.016) 
0.548
a
 
(0.048) 
1.240
a 
(0.032) 
Large 
Firms 
68 -11.389
c
 
(5.816) 
-0.010
a
 
(0.001) 
0.009
a
 
(0.000) 
-0.001
c
 
(0.000) 
0.002
c
 
(0.001) 
0.000
a
 
(2.604) 
0.067
a
 
(0.011) 
0.031
a
 
(0.013) 
0.571
a
 
(0.056) 
1.371
a 
(0.026) 
All            
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent significance level, respectively.  The value of the coefficient for each parameter 
of the conditional mean and variance is based on their simple average of the corresponding parameter within each grouping. Test of statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates is based on the standard deviation of the sample mean for each group of capitalization value. The 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
Panel B. Frequency Count of Positive and Negative Coefficients that are Significant for Mean and Variance Equations 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
67 6+ 12- 0+ 55- 60+ 0- 51+ 2- 31+ 6- 52+ 1- 27+ 5- 12+ 6- 44+ 4- 67+ 0- 
Medium 
Firms 
68 10+ 7- 0+ 61- 68+ 0- 28+ 12- 42+ 2- 50+ 1- 23+ 4- 15+ 3- 45+ 2- 68+ 0- 
Large 
Firms 
68 9+ 9- 2+ 54- 67+ 0- 11+ 30- 31+ 15- 43+ 1- 21+ 7- 18+ 7- 47+ 4- 68+ 0- 
All 203 25+ 28- 2+ 169- 194+ 0- 89+ 44- 104+ 22- 144+ 3- 70+ 16- 45+ 15- 136+ 10- 203+ 0- 
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that the t coefficient which captures past conditional volatility had a very small 
(29.56%) significant impact on the current volatility. The i  coefficients for 
conditional asymmetry are highly positive and significant. Thus positive asymmetry-
leverage effect will generate less volatility and that will have a positive impact on the 
share prices on acquirer firms. 
 
6.6 Conditional Variance of Acquirer Firms under Carhart Model 
Table 6.6 GJR-GARCH-in-mean and variance equations grouped by market 
capitalization for acquirer firms under Carhart model. In panel A and panel B, the 
estimation results of the i  coefficients of the mean equations on stocks’ excess 
returns are very small (24.14%) and significant in large firms. We report negative 
relation between stocks’ excess returns and its risk for acquirer firms. This results is 
similar to the one achieved under Fama-French model. Thus both Fama-French and 
Carhart model capture additional pricing elements that may affect stock returns. The 
i  coefficients on the stocks’ excess returns are negative and significant. As 
expected, the i  coefficients of the market on the stocks’ excess returns are positive 
and significant across all firm sizes. Both the tSMB  and tHLM  were strongly 
significant in explaining the time series regression on stocks’ excess returns relative 
to the tMOM , which predictive power is insignificant in explaining the time series 
regression. The i  coefficients for the permanent component of the conditional 
variance on aggregate stocks’ returns are highly positive and significant across all 
firms. The i  coefficients for prior period news have very moderate significant effect 
on the current conditional variance for all firm sizes. 
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Table 6.6 Conditional Mean and Variance Equations Grouped by Market Capitalization for Acquirer Firms under Carhart  
 
Panel A. Average Coefficients for Individual Firms in Sample according to Size of Market Capitalization 
                                    MEAN   EQUATION                       VARIANCE   EQUATION 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML  tiMOM   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
67 7.587 
(10.042) 
-0.019
a
 
(0.006) 
0.008
a
 
(0.001) 
0.004
a
 
(0.000) 
0.003
a
 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000)
 
0.000
a
 
(9.258) 
0.138
a
 
(0.019) 
0.028
c
 
(0.016) 
0.579
a
 
(0.043) 
1.140
a 
(0.041) 
Medium 
Firms 
68 3.154 
(3.192) 
-0.012
a
 
(0.001) 
0.009
a
 
(0.000) 
0.002
a
 
(0.000) 
0.005
a
 
(0.001) 
8.006 
(0.000) 
9.025
a
 
(1.398) 
0.077
a
 
(0.011) 
0.065
a
 
(0.016) 
0.600
a
 
(0.043) 
1.259
a 
(0.028) 
Large 
Firms 
68 -9.326
c
 
(5.171) 
-0.009
a
 
(0.002) 
0.009
a
 
(0.000) 
-0.001
b
 
(0.000) 
0.002
c
 
(0.001) 
1.098 
(0.001) 
0.000
a
 
(2.551) 
0.066
a
 
(0.010) 
0.030
b
 
(0.014) 
0.561
a
 
(0.055) 
1.372
a 
(0.027) 
All 203            
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent significance level, respectively. The value of the coefficient for each parameter of 
the conditional mean and variance is based on their simple average of the corresponding parameter within each grouping. Test of statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates is based on the standard deviation of the sample mean for each group of capitalization value. The 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
Panel B .Frequency Count of Positive and Negative Coefficients that are Significant for Mean and Variance Equations 
FIRMS No. 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML  tiMOM   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
67 5+ 13- 0+ 58- 58+ 0- 50+ 1- 29+ 5- 7+ 12- 48+ 1- 28+ 5- 9+ 6- 51+ 0- 67+ 0- 
Medium 
Firms 
68 11+ 5- 0+ 60- 68+ 0- 24+ 9- 42+ 2- 13+ 10- 44+ 1- 21+ 5- 19+ 4- 47+ 2- 68+ 0- 
Large 
Firms 
68 6+ 9- 0+ 56- 66+ 0- 8+ 33- 35+ 10- 15+ 21- 39+ 2- 26+ 5- 13+ 8- 45+ 4- 68+ 0- 
All 203 22+ 27- 0+ 174- 192+ 0- 82+ 43- 106+ 17- 35+ 43- 131+ 4- 75+ 15- 41+ 18- 143+ 6- 203+ 0- 
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The t  coefficients which capture past conditional volatility do not appear to 
influence the current volatility. The coefficients i for conditional asymmetry-leverage 
effect are highly positive significant for all firm sizes. 
 
6.7 Conditional Variance by Trading Volume for Target Firms under Carhart Model 
Tables 6.7 presents the GJR-GARCH-in-mean and variance equations grouped by 
trading volume for target firms under Carhart four-factor models. In panel A and 
panel B, the i  coefficients of the mean equation are very small for all firms. Thus 
we document insignificant positive relationship between stocks’ excess returns and 
risk for target firms. The i  coefficients generate 0.51% positive and 87.37% 
negative respectively which are significant. The i  coefficients of the market of the 
mean equation on stocks’ excess returns are highly positive and significant for all 
firm sizes. The predictive power in explaining the times series regression are 
significant for tSMB (54.55%) whilst the tHML (57.07%) are significant for medium 
and large firms. Thus the aggregate stocks’ excess returns which are significantly 
exposed to tSMB  and tHML  were high, except for small firms under the tHML  which 
is insignificant. The tMOM  lacks power in explaining the time series variation on 
stocks’ excess returns and only large firms are significant. The i  coefficients for 
permanent component of the conditional variance are highly positive significant for 
all firm sizes. The i  coefficients for prior news have small significant influence on 
the current conditional variance for the target excess returns. The i  coefficients 
which capture past conditional volatility on stocks’ excess returns for the target firms 
are very small and significant and seem not to influence the current volatility. 
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Table 6.7 Conditional Mean and Variance Equations Grouped by Trading Volume for Target Firms under Carhart  
 
Panel A. Average Coefficients for Individual Firms in Sample according to Size of Trading Volume 
                                   MEAN   EQUATION                        VARIANCE   EQUATION 
FIRMS No 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML  tiMOM   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
66 -2.174 
(6.641) 
-0.015
a 
(0.002) 
0.007
a
 
(0.001) 
0.003
a
 
(0.001) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001
c
 
(0.001) 
0.167
a
 
(0.043) 
0.087
a
 
(0.034) 
0.561
a
 
(0.049) 
1.072
a
 
(0.041) 
Medium 
Firms 
66 0.831 
(2.947) 
-0.013
a
 
(0.001) 
0.009
a
 
(0.001) 
0.001
a
 
(0.000) 
0.003
a
 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000
a
 
(3.294) 
0.121
a
 
(0.021) 
0.054
c
 
(0.031) 
0.560
a
 
(0.053) 
1.160
a
 
(0.034) 
Large 
Firms 
66 -2.152 
(7.608) 
-0.009
a 
(0.003) 
0.010
a
 
(0.000) 
-0.001
b
 
(0.000) 
0.002
a
 
(0.001) 
-0.001
c 
(0.000) 
0.000
a
 
(2.984) 
0.064
a
 
(0.014) 
0.069
a
 
(0.017) 
0.473
a
 
(0.058) 
1.259
a
 
(0.027) 
All 198            
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent significance level, respectively. The value of the coefficient for each parameter of 
the conditional mean and variance is based on their simple average of the corresponding parameter within each grouping.  Test of statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates is based on the standard deviation of the sample mean for each group of sales value. The Standard Errors 
are in parentheses. 
Panel B .Frequency Count of Positive and Negative Coefficients that are Significant for Mean and Variance Equations 
FIRMS No 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML  tiMOM   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
66 9+ 4- 0+ 57- 52+ 3- 38+ 5- 24+ 5- 13+ 11- 44+ 1- 21+ 14- 22+ 4- 50+ 2- 66+ 0- 
Medium 
Firms 
66 11+ 8- 1+ 59- 62+ 0- 21+ 12- 34+ 7- 12+ 16- 38+ 0- 25+ 6- 12+ 9- 47+ 2- 66+ 0- 
Large 
Firms 
66 8+ 4- 0+ 57- 65+ 0- 10+ 22- 32+ 11- 16+ 27- 47+ 1- 16+ 11- 21+ 7- 43+ 5- 66+ 0- 
All 198 28+ 16- 1+ 173- 179+ 3- 69+ 39- 90+ 23- 41+ 54- 129+ 2- 62+ 31- 55+ 20- 140+ 9- 198+ 0- 
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 About 75.25% of the i  coefficients of conditional variance on stocks’ excess 
returns show conditional asymmetry-leverage effects which are highly positive and 
significant for all firm sizes.  
 
6.8 Conditional Variance by Trading Volume for Acquirer Firms under Carhart Model 
Table 6.8 shows the GJR-GARCH-in-mean and variance equations grouped by 
trading volume for acquirer firms under Carhart four-factor models. The results in 
panel A and panel B indicated that, the i  coefficients of the mean equation are very 
small and only large firms are significant. Indeed, the stocks, excess returns in 
relation to its risk is negative, however, is very trivial.  The i  coefficients are highly 
negative and significant across all firms. As expected, the i  coefficients of the 
market on stocks’ excess returns are positive and significant for all firm sizes. Both 
tSMB  and tHML  have strong exposure in explain the time series regression on 
stocks’ excess returns and in both cases small and medium firms are significant,  
compared to the tMOM  which is insignificant and lacked power in explaining time 
series variation on stocks’ excess returns for acquirer firms. The i  coefficients for 
permanent component of the aggregate stocks’ excess returns have 67.49% 
significant. The i  coefficients for prior news have 43.83% significant influence on 
the current conditional variance for all firm sizes. The i  coefficients which capture 
past conditional volatility on stocks’ excess returns are very small but significant and 
appear not to impact the current volatility. The i  coefficients which capture 
conditional asymmetry-leverage effects are highly positive and significant across all 
firms.  
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Table 6.8 Conditional Mean and Variance Equations Grouped by Trading Volume for Acquirer Firms under Carhart  
 
Panel A. Average Coefficients for Individual Firms in Sample according to Size of Trading Volume 
                                    MEAN   EQUATION                    VARIANCE   EQUATION 
FIRMS No 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML  tiMOM   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
67 8.780 
(10.142) 
-0.019
a 
(0.006) 
0.007
a
 
(0.000) 
0.003
a
 
(0.000) 
0.004
a
 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000
a
 
(3.881) 
0.119
a
 
(0.019) 
0.040
a
 
(0.016) 
0.596
a 
(0.044) 
1.168
a
 
(0.040) 
Medium 
Firms 
68 1.266 
(2.771) 
-0.012
a
 
(0.001) 
0.010
a
 
(0.000) 
0.002
a
 
(0.000) 
0.003
a
 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000
a
 
(8.434) 
0.088
a
 
(0.011) 
0.043
a
 
(0.014) 
0.582
a
 
(0.045) 
1.294
a
 
(0.033) 
Large 
Firms 
68 -8.614
c
 
(5.227) 
-0.009
a
 
(0.002) 
0.010
a
 
(0.000) 
-2.616 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001)
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000
a
 
(3.239) 
0.074
a
 
(0.012) 
0.040
a
 
(0.017) 
0.562
a
 
(0.053) 
1.311
a
 
(0.027) 
All 203            
a, b, c denote statistical significance at the 1-, 5-, or 10-percent significance level, respectively. The value of the coefficient for each parameter of 
the conditional mean and variance is based on their simple average of the corresponding parameter within each grouping. Test of statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates is based on the standard deviation of the sample mean for each group of sales value. The Standard Errors 
are in parentheses. 
Panel B .Frequency Count of Positive and Negative Coefficients that are Significant for Mean and Variance Equations 
FIRMS No 
hii
2
   i  ftmti RR ( ) ti SMB  tiHML  tiMOM   i  1
2
tii  1
2
tiih              
2
1,1,  titiiK   GED  
Small 
Firms 
67 6+ 13- 1+ 58- 59+ 0- 44+ 5- 34+ 1- 7+ 12- 43+ 1- 25+ 5- 11+ 7- 51+ 0- 67+ 0- 
Medium 
Firms 
68 10+ 6- 0+ 60- 66+ 0- 26+ 9- 41+ 4- 12+ 11- 42+ 1- 30+ 3- 13+ 7- 47+ 3- 68+ 0- 
Large 
Firms 
68 8+ 6- 0+ 56- 67+ 0- 12+ 29- 29+ 14- 17+ 19- 48+ 2- 19+ 7- 17+ 4- 47+ 2- 68+ 0- 
All 203 24+ 25- 1+ 174- 192+ 0- 82+ 43- 104+ 19- 36+ 42- 133+ 4- 74+ 15- 41+ 18- 145+ 5- 203+ 0- 
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6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the GJR-GARCH-in- mean and variance equations. The 
i  coefficients of the mean equation for all firms are low and predominantly 
insignificant across all the methodologies used in this study. Using both market 
capitalization and trading volume we document positive but insignificant relation 
between stocks’ excess returns and risk for target firms. In contrast to negative and 
insignificant relationship between stocks’ excess returns and risk for acquirer firms. 
While the i  coefficients are highly negatively significant, those of the i  coefficients 
are highly positively significant on stocks’ excess returns for all firm sizes in the 
models. We found strong evidence that tSMB and tHML had much more explanatory 
power than tMOM in explaining time series regression in returns, especially for 
acquirer firms. The i  coefficients for the permanent component have highly positive 
and significant for all firm sizes. We document that i  coefficients for past news have 
small positive and significant effects on the current conditional variance for all firms. 
It seems the i  coefficients for past conditional volatility do not have an effect on the 
current volatility on stocks’ excess returns for all firms across all the methodologies 
applied in this empirical study. Finally, the i  coefficients for the conditional 
asymmetry-the leverage effect are highly positive significant for all firms across all 
three methodologies. Indeed, positive asymmetry-leverage effect generated less 
volatility for both firms across all methodologies. In all our GJR-GARCH-M and 
variance equations under the three methodologies did not show substantial 
differences in our results. 
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                                                     CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
                              BOOTSTRAPPING SIMULATION ON CARS 
 
7.0 Introduction 
One of the major setbacks of long-run event studies is the problem associated with 
data mining for the CARs obtained. Empirical evidence had shown that stock returns 
are non-normality distributed exhibit and heteroskedasticity (Malliaropulos, 1996; 
Hein and Westfall, 2004) and positive skewness (Barber and Lyon, 1997). These 
stylized features will affect estimation efficiency particular in event studies that rely 
on high frequency data. The main aim of using a nonparametric bootstrapping 
simulation is to solve the bias in standard errors estimation because no assumptions 
are made about the underlying sample data of the distribution. This chapter 
evaluates whether the CARs obtained under the various pricing models are 
statistically different from a bootstrapping simulation of the CARs themselves. Any 
difference in the two estimates will affect the reliability of the actual CARs. 
 
7.1 Experiment  
We used the bootstrapping simulation method to generate a sample of 401 (that is, a 
sample of 198 target firms and 203 acquirer firms) CARs for each stock in the 
sample by re-sampling with replacement from the actual CARs (see e.g. Conrad and 
Kaul, 1998). The bootstrapping is performed in simulation runs of 150, 500 and 1000 
with replacement of the actual CARs. We use different replications to assess the 
reliability of the simulations. Statistical significance is based on the standard t-test, 
using a 90% confidence level. Some studies use different size draws. For example,  
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Sullivan, Timmermann and White (1999) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) use 500 
draws, whilst Barber and Lyon (1997) Kothari and Warner (1997) and Ahern (2008) 
used 1000 drawings. The literature has not been able to explain the assumption 
behind the use of drawings or replications when performing bootstrapping simulation. 
However, a snap look at the bootstrapping results in table 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that, 
the more consistent estimates for the skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are 
obtained at 1000 draws. As expected, at 1000 draws (compared with smaller draws), 
the standard errors are smaller and the distribution of the CARs tend to normality. 
Also, most of the skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera were statistically significant 
when 1000 replications were performed, which indeed outperform 150 and 500 
simulations.  
 
The use of the non-parametric bootstrapping method has been suggested to arrest 
these methodological issues (Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999; Byun and Rozeff, 2003).  
Again, Kothari and Warmer (2006) noted that bootstrapping based on test statistics 
could solve cross-correlations leading to efficiency conclusions.   
 
However, the literature has suggested that bootstrapping simulation might not solve 
most of the statistical issues associated with event studies (Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000). Brav (1998, p.5) suggested that the bootstrapping methodology had two 
deficiencies. First, ‘‘if the two samples have systematically different residual variation 
then the resulting empirical distribution will be biased’’. Second, ‘’if the original 
sample ARs are cross-sectionally correlated the replacement with random sample, 
which are by construction uncorrelated, may lead to false inferences’’. Furthermore, 
Kothari and Warner (2006) documented that the bootstrapping method had failed to 
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rectify the bias in standard errors due to cross-correlated data. Based on these 
studies the bootstrapping is no panacea of the problems associated with the long-run 
studies. Appendix II shows the Statistics for Sample Skewness, Kurtosis and Jarque-
Bera.. 
   
 7.2 ROBUSTNESS of CARs for Target Firms under Standard CAPM 
Table 7.1 and 7.2 reports the result of the bootstrapping simulation of the target 
firms’ CARs using the standard CAPM.  The simulations are performed for the CARs 
estimated under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH method. For comparison, the actual 
CARs are also shown in the tables. The simulation was limited to ± ten days around 
the event date since the actual CARs are effectively zero beyond this interval. Table 
6.1 shows the bootstrapping simulation using the OLS method to evaluate the 
reliability of the performance of the actual CARs. On the event day, target firm 
shareholders realised statistically significant positive actual mean CAR under the 
OLS estimate. Under the GJR-GARCH in Table 6.2, a positive actual mean CAR 
was generated and is significant. The results of the simulated mean CARs on the 
event date are also significant under both estimation methods. The pre-event actual 
mean CARs are not significant for either estimation method. After the 
announcement, actual mean CARs under the OLS and the GJR-GARCH are 
statistically different. In contrast to actual mean CARs, our results in Table 6.1 and 
Table 6.2 indicated that bootstrapping mean CARs were statistically significant at 1% 
levels throughout the entire event window.  
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                                                                                               Table 7.1 Bootstrapping Simulation for Target Firms’ CARs under the CAPM  using OLS  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque- 
Bera 
-10 0.0059 0.0057
a 
-0.1055  0.0306 0.2842 0.0059 0.0057
a
        0.0899       -0.1346         1.0512       0.0059 0.0057
a
       0.0894         0.3886
b
        7.6249
b
      
-9 0.0087
c 
0.0081
a 
 0.4122
b 
 0.9144
b 
9.4726
a 
0.0087
c 
0.0087
a
        0.1057       -0.1057         1.1632 0.0087
c 
0.0087
a
      0.0371        -0.0729         0.4510    
-8 0.0089
c
       0.0090
a
      -0.0175      -0.1245      0.1045       0.0089
c
       0.0094
a
        0.0571        0.2471     1.5432    0.0089
c
       0.0087
a
       0.1957
b
         0.2678
c
         9.3737
a 
-7 0.0093
c
       0.0098
a
       0.0942       -0.0181       0.2241      0.0093
c
       0.0088
a
        0.2280
b
        0.0682         4.4274       0.0093
c
       0.0095
a
       0.0661        0.0877         1.0491       
-6 0.0062       0.0062
a
        0.0689       0.0925       0.1722       0.0062       0.0061
a
       0.0639        0.0186         0.3473 0.0062       0.0062
a
      0.1542
b
        -0.0265         3.9929       
-5 0.0070       0.0069
a
      0.4147
b
        0.0756       4.3346       0.0070       0.0070
a
        0.5518
a
        0.5022
b
       30.6322
a
       0.0070       0.0069
a
       0.3926
a
         0.2471      28.2304
a
       
-4 0.0056       0.0052
a
        0.3869
c
        0.6119       6.0832
b
       0.0056       0.0057
a
        0.3810
a
        0.5718
a
       18.9100
a
       0.0056       0.0058
a
      0.3254
a
        -0.0064
 
 17.6456
a
       
-3 0.0044       0.0038
a
        0.3864
c
        0.2565       4.1431       0.0044       0.0045
a
        0.1793  0.7757
a
       15.2164
a
       0.0044       0.0044
a
       0.1971
b
        0.0804    6.7449
b
       
-2 0.0045 0.0042
a
       -0.2701       -0.5650       3.8189       0.0045 0.0045
a 
 0.2051
c
     -0.0286         3.5228       0.0045 0.0045
a
       0.3267
a
        0.1918        19.3197
a
      
-1 0.0012       0.0012
a
       -0.3984
c
       -0.3698       4.8222
c
       0.0012       0.0012
a
       -0.0818       -0.0681         0.6540       0.0012       0.0012
a
       0.0208         0.0410         0.1421       
0 0.0400
a
      0.0396
a
       -0.3288        0.5790      4.7974
c
       0.0400
a
       0.0398
a
        0.2262
b
        0.3260     6.4761
b
       0.0400
a
       0.0399
a
      0.2385
a
         0.2406      11.8942
a
       
1 0.0111
b
       0.0105
a
        0.2652        0.1120       1.8366       0.0111
b
       0.0110
a 
 0.4038
a
       0.2779       15.1966
a
       0.0111
b
       0.0111
a
      0.3062
a
        0.0178        15.6356
a
       
2 0.0117
b
       0.0106
a
        0.5881
a
        0.1831       8.8551
b
       0.0117
b
       0.0118
a
        0.2610
b
        0.4304
b
         9.5357
a
       0.0117
b
       0.0118
a
       0.2601
a 
 -0.0242       11.2982
a
       
3 0.0127
b
       0.0128
a
        0.0528       -0.1626       0.2350       0.0127
b
       0.0127
a
        0.2329
b
       -0.2147         5.4797
c
       0.0127
b
       0.0124
a
       0.2517
a
        0.4488
a
       18.9555
a
       
4 0.0127
b
       0.0126
a
       -0.0076       -0.0408       0.0119       0.0127
b
       0.0128
a
        0.2980
a 
 0.2715         8.9347
b
       0.0127
b
       0.0132
a
       0.1437
c
       0.2267         5.5834
c
       
5 0.0108
b
       0.0108
a
        0.2863        0.5777       4.1359       0.0108
b
       0.0105
a
        0.3134
a
        0.1350         8.5621
b
       0.0108
b
       0.0111
a
       0.3021
a
        0.4536
a
       23.7810
a
       
6 0.0140
b
       0.0139
a
        0.4916
b
        0.2318       6.3768
b
       0.0140
b
       0.0141
a
        0.2355
b
        0.2056         5.5043
b
      0.0140
b
      0.0139
a
      0.2774
a
        0.2364      15.1522
a
       
7 0.0129
b
       0.0128
a
        0.0879       -0.2881      0.7119       0.0129
b
       0.0126
a
       0.1834
c
       -0.4097
c
         6.3016
b
       0.0129
b
       0.0131
a
       0.1202         0.0546       2.5319       
8 0.0115
c
       0.0114
a
        0.0601       -0.0775       0.1277       0.0115
c
       0.0121
a
       0.2709
b
        0.0956         6.3059
b
       0.0115
c
       0.0115
a
      0.3164
a 
  0.3361
b
        21.3886
a
       
9 0.0119
b
       0.0123
a
        0.0498       0.1939       0.2969       0.0119
b
       0.0120
a
        0.2008
c
        0.2167         4.3392       0.0119
b
       0.0119
a
       0.2311
a
        -0.0669          9.0851
b
       
10 0.0103       0.0096
a
        0.0687       -0.3894       1.0654       0.0103       0.0097
a
        0.0227       -0.0729         0.1536      0.0103       0.0105
a
       0.1654
b
         0.1300         5.2618
b
       
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics.
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                                                                                               Table 7.2: Bootstrapping Simulation for Target Firms’ CARs under the CAPM  using GJR-GARCH Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
-10 0.0043       0.0037
a
      -0.0976       -0.0587       0.2597       0.0043        0.0044
a
       -0.2240
b
        0.1492         4.6447
c
     0.0043       0.0042
a
       -0.1400
c
        0.2203         5.2900
c
      
-9 0.0071       0.0067
a
       -0.0856      -0.5428       2.0246       0.0071        0.0066
a
        0.1944
c
        0.2284         4.2353       0.0071       0.0067
a
       -0.0276        0.2629
c
        3.0059       
-8 0.0071       0.0064
a
       -0.1289       -0.3502       1.1822       0.0071        0.0075
a
        0.0221       -0.1791         0.7090       0.0071       0.0074
a
       -0.0038        0.0913         0.3498      
-7 0.0073       0.0078
a
       -0.1094       -0.2520       0.6961       0.0073        0.0070
a
      -0.0368       -0.2826         1.7765      0.0073       0.0073
a
        0.0930       -0.0574         1.5775       
-6 0.0041       0.0040
a
       0.0214        0.1901      0.2374       0.0041        0.0042
a
       -0.0111        0.1162         0.2915      0.0041       0.0042
a
       -0.1320
c
        0.5287
a
       14.5517
a
       
-5 0.0049       0.0045
a
       -0.0636       -0.1513       0.2443       0.0049        0.0046
a
        0.1390        0.0004         1.6109       0.0049       0.0052
a
        0.1666
b
        0.0468         4.7161
c
       
-4 0.0034       0.0036
a
        0.4767
b
        0.1507       5.8224
b
       0.0034        0.0031
a
       0.4531
a
        0.6836
a
       26.8459
a
       0.0034       0.0034
a
        0.1533
b
       -0.2148         5.8387
b
       
-3 0.0024       0.0026
a
        0.0292        0.2498       0.4112       0.0024        0.0025
a
        0.2318
b
       -0.0054        4.4781       0.0024       0.0024
a
        0.0754        0.0970         1.3399       
-2 0.0027      0.0027
a
        0.0246       -0.3073       0.6052       0.0027       0.0027
a
        0.3271
a
        0.3966
b
       12.1918
a
       0.0027      0.0027
a
       -0.0684        0.1407         1.6037       
-1 0.0007      0.0004
a
       -0.0337        0.7246
c
       3.3099       0.0007       0.0006
a
        0.1906
b
       0.1143         3.3004       0.0007      0.0006
a 
-0.1445
c
       -0.0142         3.4908       
0 0.0399
a
       0.0396
a
        0.0591       -0.5548       2.0113      0.0399
a
        0.0399
a
        0.2198
b
       0.2403         5.2295
c
       0.0399
a
       0.0401
a
        0.1187        0.1199         2.9480       
1 0.0110
b
       0.0105
a
        0.3213        0.1303       2.6876       0.0110
b
        0.0109
a
        0.2738
b
        0.3197         8.3781
b
       0.0110
b
       0.0113
a
        0.2487
a
        0.0539       10.4282
a
       
2 0.0115
b
       0.0106
a
        0.4301        0.0638       4.6495       0.0115
b
        0.0113
a
        0.1931
c
       -0.3589         5.7897
b
       0.0115
b
       0.0115
a
        0.3589
a
       -0.0022       21.4700
a
       
3 0.0125
b
       0.0123
a
        0.1208       -0.0302       0.3707       0.0125
b
        0.0127
a
        0.2471
b
        0.3055         7.0323
b
      0.0125
b
       0.0125
a
        0.1370
c
       -0.2823
c
        6.4466
b
       
4 0.0126
b
       0.0122
a
       -0.0304       -0.0185       0.0253       0.0126
b
        0.0111
a
        0.1818
c
        0.0381         2.7854      0.0126
b
       0.0126
a
        0.0625        0.0317         0.6922       
5 0.0107
c
       0.0106
a
       -0.0681        0.5714       2.1563       0.0107
c
        0.0107
a
        0.0569        0.4418
b
         4.3351       0.0107
c
      0.0105
a
        0.1210      -0.0419         2.5139       
6 0.0142
b
       0.0138
a
        0.2090        0.1556       1.2436       0.0142
b
       0.0141
a
       0.1567       0.0094         2.0471       0.0142
b
       0.0140
a
        0.1009        0.1782        3.0190       
7 0.0131
b
       0.0121
a
        0.1331        0.0378       0.4516       0.0131
b
        0.0135
a
        0.2909
a
        0.6868
a
       16.8776
a
       0.0131
b
       0.0131
a
        0.1885
b
        0.1529         6.8931
b
       
8 0.0118       0.0111
a
        0.2117       -0.3753       2.0008       0.0118        0.0118
a
        0.0410       -0.1759         0.7846       0.0118       0.0118
a
       -0.0074        0.2405         2.4197      
9 0.0124       0.0111
a
        0.0459        0.2847       0.5592      0.0124        0.0128
a
        0.0145      -0.3200         2.1503       0.0124       0.0124
a
        0.0441       -0.1031         0.7662       
10 0.0109       0.0112
a
        0.0278        0.6449       2.6191       0.0109        0.0107
a
        0.1848
c
       0.2062        3.7326      0.0109       0.0109
a
       -0.1008        0.0479         1.7882       
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics.. 
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Ten days to the announcement, the actual means CARs indicate that the market is 
efficient under both estimation methods whereas the bootstrapping mean CARs 
suggest that the market is not efficient. There is considerable evidence that most 
people will rely on the bootstrapping mean results more than the actual mean 
results, because they are simulated.  
 
Despite variation of the level of significance of means, there are no considerable 
differences between the actual CARs and the bootstrapping CARs. However, it is 
interesting to note that the standard errors for the bootstrapping means were slightly 
smaller compared to the actual means (see also e.g. Mozouz et al. 2009). The 
results achieved from the means simulation of 150, 500 and 1000 replications 
showed no substantial discrepancy. The pre announcement actual means which are 
statistically different from the bootstrapping means, the post-announcement actual 
means are consistent with the bootstrapping means.  
 
The results of the simulated CARs under both OLS and GJR-GARCH estimations 
were not materially different. Nevertheless, the skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera 
were more significant under the OLS than the GJR-GARCH estimation, especially 
under the 1000 draws. The Jarque-Bera statistic under the OLS estimation showed 
that CARs were not normally distributed compared to the GJR-GARCH estimation.  
 
7.3 ROBUSTNESS of CARs for Target Firms under Fama-French Model 
The results indicated in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 represent bootstrapping simulation 
for target firms’ CARs under the Fama-French where the CARs are generated from 
the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods. The results show that the simulated 
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mean CARs generated over the entire ten days are statistically significant at 1% 
levels under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates, with day t=-1 mean CAR 
using 150 draws under the GJR-GARCH estimate is insignificant. Following the 
announcement, the significance of the actual mean CARs under the OLS estimate 
contradicts considerable with those of the GJR-GARCH estimate. Here the 
significance of the actual CARs lasts a much shorter period relative to the standard 
CAPM which lasts much longer. The difference between the actual mean CARs and 
the simulated mean CARs was predictably small but significantly different. 
 
Most of the simulated CARs were positively skewed under both estimation methods. 
However, the immense positive skewness occurred under the OLS estimates. It 
appears the returns on excess kurtosis are normally distributed under both 
estimation methods. The Jarque-Bera statistics show that using 150 replications are 
normally distributed under the GJR-GARCH estimates than the OLS estimates. 
Notice that the Jarque-Bera statistics under the OLS estimate were not normally 
distributed when 1000 simulations run; only three out of 21 returns are normally 
distributed.  
 
The t-statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the two set of CARs are statistically 
different. Prior announcement simulated CARs are normally small compared to post 
announcement simulated CARs under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH method. 
Thus, given its potential impact the share prices of the target increase after the 
announcement for the economic benefit of the shareholders. 
180 
 
Table 7.3: Bootstrapping Simulation for Target Firms’ CARs under the FF using OLS Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque- 
Bera 
-10 0.0042       0.0046
a
        0.1997        0.0709       1.0288       0.0042       0.0044
a
        0.3018
a
        0.0119         7.5916
b
       0.0042       0.0044
a
        0.1379
c
        0.0201         3.1866       
-9 0.0072      0.0069
a
        0.0956       -0.3554       1.0177       0.0072      0.0071
a
        0.0469      -0.0412         0.2189       0.0072      0.0073
a
       0.0167       -0.0310         0.0869       
-8 0.0071       0.0061
a
        0.2796        0.5241       3.6706       0.0071       0.0075
a
        0.1600        0.0041         2.1337       0.0071       0.0071
a
        0.1556
b
        0.0563         4.1676       
-7 0.0081
c
       0.0087
a
        0.4116
b
       0.6189       6.6296
b
       0.0081
c
       0.0077
a
        0.3424
a
        0.5267
b
       15.5498
a
       0.0081
c
       0.0079
a
        0.1647
b
        0.0356         4.5748       
-6 0.0050       0.0046
a
        0.3717
c
        0.1981       3.6992       0.0050       0.0050
a
         0.1621        0.0152         2.1933       0.0050       0.0046
a
        0.3548
a
        0.1124       21.5033
a
       
-5 0.0061       0.0059
a
        0.4575
b
        0.1578       5.3871
c
       0.0061       0.0060
a
        0.4803
a
        0.5112
b
       24.6673
a
       0.0061       0.0062
a
        0.3535
a
        0.2207       22.8605
a
       
-4 0.0052       0.0052
a
        0.2678        0.1734       1.9810       0.0052       0.0053
a
        0.3894
a
        0.4738
b
       17.3102
a
       0.0052       0.0051
a
        0.3828
a
        0.1187       25.0069
a
       
-3 0.0038       0.0036
a
       0.3351
c
        0.3534       3.5874       0.0038       0.0038
a
        0.0913        0.2268         1.7653       0.0038       0.0038
a
        0.3272
a
        0.1019       18.2732
a
       
-2 0.0046       0.0044
a
        0.0267       -0.3015       0.5859       0.0046       0.0048
a
        0.2084
b
       -0.2291         4.7113
c
       0.0046       0.0046
a
        0.2313
a
        0.1389         9.7192
a
       
-1 0.0009       0.0008
a
       0.0147       -0.1581       0.1617       0.0009       0.0009
a
        0.1158       -0.1293         1.4654       0.0009       0.0008
a
       -0.0125        0.0098         0.0299       
0 0.0404
a
       0.0404
a
        0.0311       -0.0964       0.0822       0.0404
a
       0.0403
a
        0.1812
b
       -0.0640         2.8229      0.0404
a
       0.0404
a
        0.2101
a
       -0.1521         8.3203
b
       
1 0.0107
b
       0.0109
a
        0.5173
b
        0.2921       7.2235
b
       0.0107
b
       0.0109
a
        0.3496
a
       0.3966
c
       13.4629
a
       0.0107
b
       0.0105
a
        0.2202
a
       -0.1172         8.6549
b
       
2 0.0113
b
       0.0111
a
        0.2014       -0.3762       1.8981       0.0113
b
       0.0107
a
        0.1674        0.1345         2.7107       0.0113
b
       0.0113
a
        0.4316
a
        0.4014
a
       37.7605
a
       
3 0.0127
b
       0.0127
a
        0.2866       -0.1500       2.1949       0.0127
b
       0.0126
a
        0.3734
a
        0.4447
b
       15.7404
a
       0.0127
b
       0.0127
a
       0.2369
a
        0.0166         9.3689
a
       
4 0.0128
b
       0.0129
a
        0.3309        0.8360
b
       7.1061
b
       0.0128
b
       0.0126
a
        0.1827
c
       -0.2869         4.4965       0.0128
b
       0.0128
a
       0.2565
a
       -0.0830       11.2562
a
       
5 0.0100
c
       0.0099
a
        0.3057       -0.2130       2.6200       0.0100
c
       0.0100
a
        0.2964
a
        0.4484
b
      11.5096
a
       0.0100
c
       0.0097
a
        0.3370
a
        0.6908
a
       38.8048
a
       
6 0.0128
b
       0.0134
a
        0.0580        0.1835       0.2946       0.0128
b
       0.0124
a
        0.1490       -0.1201         2.1504       0.0128
b
       0.0128
a
        0.0477       -0.3143
b
         4.4953       
7 0.0110
c
       0.0110
a
        0.3902
b
        0.3781       4.7008
c
       0.0110
c
       0.0113
a
        0.3888
a
       0.5375
b
       18.6174
a
       0.0110
c
       0.0129
a
        0.3381
a
        0.3591
b
       24.4204
a
       
8 0.0095       0.0100
a
       -0.2629        0.5230       3.4374       0.0095       0.0095
a
        0.1361        0.1736         2.1706       0.0095       0.0092
a
        0.1703
b
        0.1701         6.0378
b
       
9 0.0098       0.0107
a
        0.4437
b
        0.4385       6.1231
b
       0.0098       0.0100
a
       -0.0268       -0.0859        0.2137       0.0098       0.0097
a
        0.0411       -0.0902        0.6207       
10 0.0083       0.0076
a
       -0.0509       -0.5488       1.9473       0.0083       0.0083
a
        0.0943      -0.1547         1.2396       0.0083       0.0084
a
        0.1832
b
        0.2757
c
         8.7630
b
       
Note: a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics. 
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                                                                                            Table 7.4: Bootstrapping Simulation for Target Firms’ CARs under the FF using GJR-GARCH Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque- 
Bera 
-10 0.0019       0.0014
b
       -0.1583       -0.0049         0.6264       0.0019       0.0022
a
           -0.5380
a
        0.3843
c
       27.1933
a
       0.0019       0.0022
a
       -0.1440
c
        0.0083         3.4569      
-9 0.0049       0.0050
a
     -0.2394        0.4028         2.4474       0.0049       0.0047
a
       -0.2090
b
       -0.0135         3.6445       0.0049       0.0052
a
       -0.2511
a
        0.3847
b
       16.6788
a
       
-8 0.0049       0.0049
a
      -0.2211      -0.3331         1.9157       0.0049       0.0048
a
       -0.0015        0.0601         0.0755       0.0049       0.0049
a
       -0.0818        0.2281         3.2841       
-7 0.0056       0.0061
a
            0.3832
b
        0.0760         3.7067       0.0056       0.0062
a
       -0.0883        0.0826         0.7924       0.0056       0.0056
a
        0.1226        0.0699         2.7095       
-6 0.0027       0.0023
a
       -0.0929       -0.3711         1.0763       0.0027       0.0029
a
        0.0639       -0.0141         0.3440       0.0027       0.0026
a
        0.0618        0.2411         3.0588       
-5 0.0040       0.0038
a
       -0.0749       -0.7442
c
         3.6019       0.0040       0.0042
a
        0.1857
c
          0.4637
b
         7.3536
b
       0.0040       0.0041
a
       0.3031
a
        0.4314
a
       23.0721
a
       
-4 0.0029           0.0032
a
       -0.1980        0.2557         1.3890       0.0029           0.0030
a
        0.4440
a
        0.5707
a
       23.2143
a
       0.0029           0.0028
a
       0.2129
a
        0.1061         8.0272
b
      
-3 0.0020       0.0019
a
           0.1187        0.2791         0.8393       0.0020       0.0019
a
        0.0710        0.4781
b
         5.1827
c
       0.0020       0.0019
a
        0.1150        0.0666         2.3906       
-2 0.0027       0.0027
a
        0.1858      -0.3673         1.7067       0.0027       0.0027
a
        0.1357        0.3158        3.6122       0.0027       0.0027
a
       -0.0515        0.0135         0.4505       
-1 0.0002       0.0002       0.0614        0.2298         0.4244       0.0002       0.0001
c
       -0.1700       -0.1898         3.1580       0.0002       0.0002
a
        0.0689       -0.0611         0.9470       
0 0.0399
a
       0.0397
a
       -0.0242       -0.3855         0.9434       0.0399
a
       0.0404
a
        0.0175        0.0377         0.0550       0.0399
a
      0.0399
a
        0.0604       -0.1255         1.2646       
1 0.0108
b
       0.0116
a
        0.1861       -0.0786        0.9049       0.0108
b
       0.0105
a
        0.2978
a
        0.3890
c
       10.5424
a
       0.0108
b
       0.0106
a
        0.2369
a
        0.1431       10.2041
a
       
2 0.0109
b
       0.0114
a
        0.3134        0.2934         2.9927       0.0109
b
       0.0111
a
        0.2020
b
        0.1630         3.9526 0.0109
b
       0.0113
a
        0.2222
a
       -0.0725          8.4506
b
       
3 0.0121
b
       0.0120
a
        0.6411
a
        1.5797
a
       25.8702
a
       0.0121
b
       0.0122
a
        0.0564       -0.3292         2.5228       0.0121
b
       0.0121
a
        0.0897       -0.2631
c
         4.2239       
4 0.0121
b
       0.0118
a
        0.3135      -0.1939         2.6915       0.0121
b
       0.0130
a
        0.4196
a
        0.1603       15.2063
a 
0.0121
b
       0.0119
a
        0.1953
b
        0.1904          7.8650
b
       
5 0.0096       0.0098
a
        0.0589              0.0952         0.1433       0.0096       0.0095
a
        0.0997       -0.3001         2.7033       0.0096       0.0094
a
        0.0841       -0.0393          1.2439       
6 0.0127
b
      0.0131
a
        0.3810
b
        0.4220         4.7416
c
       0.0127
b
      0.0133
a
        0.2138
b
       0.0552         3.8715       0.0127
b
      0.0128
a
       0.2028
a
      -0.0090          6.8593
b
       
7 0.0112           0.0100
a
        0.0377       -0.2900         0.5612       0.0112           0.0114
a
       -0.0671        0.0071         0.3765       0.0112           0.0113
a
       -0.0553       -0.0856          0.8150       
8 0.0095       0.0120
a
             -0.0369       -0.0260         0.0382      0.0095       0.0095
a
        0.0482       -0.1367        0.5827       0.0095       0.0094
a
       -0.0016        0.2238          2.0870       
9 0.0099       0.0120
a
        0.3163       -0.4042         3.5221       0.0099       0.0100
a
        0.0687        0.0518         0.4491       0.0099       0.0100
a
       -0.0209       -0.1722          1.3089       
10 0.0086       0.0116
a
      0.1222       -0.3985
a
         1.3654
a
       0.0086       0.0085
a
       -0.0360       -0.2544   1.4566       0.0086       0.0085
a
       0.0581       -0.2409          2.9800       
Note: a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics. 
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7.4 ROBUSTNESS of CARs for Target Firms under Carhart Model 
In Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 simulation were performed on the actual CARs for the 
target firms under the Carhart using the two estimation methods. The simulations 
were executed on the actual CARs with replacement using the same replications. 
The results show that under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods, on the event 
date t=0 positive actual mean CAR and simulated mean CAR are obtained which are 
both significant at 1% levels. Moreover, the simulated mean CARs are significant at 
1% conventional levels for ten days (-10, +10), pre- and post-announcement under 
both estimation methods. Interestingly, following the announcement, the actual mean 
CARs under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimations are statistically significant 
up to seven continuous days.  
 
There was no extensive difference between the actual mean CARs and the 
bootstrapping mean CARs using the same replications, but rather we obtained closer 
results whatever drawings we made. As already indicated, the bootstrapping 
simulated standard errors are typically small and that might have the bootstrapping 
simulated mean CARs statistically significant before the announcement. Most 
positive skewed were pronounced under the OLS estimates than the GJR-GARCH 
estimates. Furthermore, the returns of skewness were mostly significant under the 
OLS estimates than the GJR-GARCH estimate using 500 and 1000 draws. The 
results of kurtosis suggested that the returns are normally distributed under both 
estimation methods. The Jarque-Bera statistics are normally distributed when 150 
simulations run but mostly not statistically significant. 
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                                                                                        Table 7.5: Bootstrapping Simulation for Target Firms’ CARs under the Carhart using OLS Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
-10 0.0046       0.0051
a
       -0.0441        0.1019       0.1135       0.0046       0.0047
a
        0.0061        0.0038         0.0034      0.0046        0.0043
a
       0.0914        0.2024         3.1001       
-9 0.0075       0.0074
a
       -0.0392       -0.6103       2.3666       0.0075       0.0079
a
        0.2142
b
        0.6985
a
       13.9857
a
       0.0075        0.0075
a
       0.1434
c
       -0.1070   3.9052       
-8 0.0070       0.0068
a
       0.0073      -0.0763       0.0377       0.0070       0.0073
a
        0.1949
c
        0.3782
c
         6.1459
b
      0.0070       0.0070
a
       0.2492
a
        0.0437 10.4282
a
       
-7 0.0076       0.0077
a
        0.3273       -0.1846       2.8914       0.0076       0.0081
a
       0.2647
b
        0.2742         7.4036
b
       0.0076       0.0076
a
       0.1519
b
       -0.1177         4.4244       
-6 0.0044       0.0046
a
        0.2474        0.1491       1.6693       0.0044       0.0046
a
        0.3894
a
        0.3203       14.7720
a
       0.0044       0.0044
a
       0.1415
b
        0.1190         3.9249       
-5 0.0055       0.0049
a
        0.3391
c
        0.4539       4.1619       0.0055       0.0056
a
        0.5837
a
        0.4556
b
       32.7184
a
       0.0055       0.0055
a
       0.3992
a
        0.4030
a
       33.3252
a
       
-4 0.0047       0.0047
a
        0.4916
b
        0.3477      6.7966
b
       0.0047       0.0046
a
        0.5344
a
        0.4517
b
       28.0467
a
       0.0047       0.0047
a
       0.3772
a
        0.0355       23.7643
a
       
-3 0.0036       0.0034
a
        0.2381       -0.1950       1.6545       0.0036       0.0035
a
        0.1521        0.1634         2.4832       0.0036       0.0036
a
       0.1645
b
      -0.0678         4.7013
c
       
-2 0.0042       0.0039
a
        0.2320       -0.0538       1.3640       0.0042       0.0043
a
        0.3408
a
       -0.1075         9.9210
a
       0.0042       0.0043
a
       0.2447
a
        0.1256       10.6347
a
       
-1 0.0009       0.0008
a
        0.0550       0.0672       0.1039       0.0009       0.0009
a
       -0.0029        0.0734         0.1130       0.0009       0.0010
a
       0.0292        0.0290         0.1774       
0 0.0396
a
       0.0407
a
       0.0126       -0.2715       0.4646       0.0396
a
       0.0396
a
        0.1461       -0.1096         2.0288       0.0396
a
       0.0400
a
       0.2618
a
        0.3826
b
       17.5206
a
       
1 0.0108
b
       0.0108
a
       -0.0755       -0.0743       0.1769       0.0108
b
       0.0105
a
        0.2702
b
       -0.2037         6.9486
b
       0.0108
b
       0.0105
a 
0.2562
a
       -0.1837       12.3423
a
       
2 0.0114
b
       0.0112
a
        0.3974
b
        0.0128       3.9489       0.0114
b
       0.0114
a 
 0.1080       -0.4072
c
         4.4260 0.0114
b
       0.0116
a
       0.1902
b
        0.2409         8.4502
b
       
3 0.0127
b
       0.0125
a
       0.1511       -0.0006       0.5707       0.0127
b
       0.0126
a
        0.2762
b
        0.1147         6.6319
b
       0.0127
b
       0.0127
a
       0.2640
a
       -0.0940       11.9801
a
       
4 0.0127
b
       0.0132
a 
 0.3183        0.6041      4.8144
c
       0.0127
b
       0.0125
a 
 0.1992
c
       -0.0348         3.3315       0.0127
b
       0.0128
a
       0.1217        0.1844         3.8844       
5 0.0099
c
       0.0102
a
        0.1512       -0.1739       0.7604       0.0099
c
       0.0095
a
        0.2190
b
       -0.0228         4.0060       0.0099
c
       0.0101
a
       0.2126
a
        0.1666         8.6878
b
       
6 0.0128
b
      0.0131
a
        0.2661        0.3072       2.3599       0.0128
b
      0.0101
a
        0.2275
b
       -0.0605         4.3883       0.0128
b
      0.0130
a
       0.2848
a
        0.3449
b
       18.4742
a
       
7 0.0108
c
       0.0110
a
        0.2572       -0.4643      3.0014       0.0108
c
       0.0104
a
        0.2594
b
        0.0937         5.7896
b 
0.0108
c
       0.0107
a
       0.3046
a
        0.1378       16.2526
a
       
8 0.0091       0.0084
a
        0.4221
b
       -0.0741       4.4879       0.0091       0.0092
a
        0.2377
b
        0.0766         4.8307
c
       0.0091       0.0090
a
       0.4157
a
        0.3273
b
       33.2648
a
       
9 0.0096       0.0100
a
        0.3905
b
        0.0875       3.8593       0.0096       0.0097
a
        0.3418
a
        0.3606       12.4439
a
       0.0096       0.0093
a
      0.2070
a
        0.4550
a
       15.7661
a
       
10 0.0081       0.0087
a
        0.4148
b
        0.0407       4.3113       0.0081       0.0084
a
        0.3465
a
        0.0607       10.0792
a
       0.0081       0.0079
a
      0.1208        0.1771         3.7382       
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics.  
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                                                                                           Table 7.6: Bootstrapping Simulation for Target Firms’ CARs under the Carhart using GJR-GARCH Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
-10 0.0028       0.0037
a
        0.1069       -0.5835       2.4136       0.0028       0.0028
a
       -0.2129
b
       -0.2497         5.0782
c
       0.0028        0.0028
a
       -0.1909
b
       -0.1783         7.3992
b
       
-9 0.0056       0.0053
a
       -0.4166
b
        0.4020       5.3492
c
       0.0056       0.0053
a
       -0.1802        0.0038         2.7057       0.0056        0.0051
a
       -0.2311
a
        0.1560         9.9128
a
       
-8 0.0058       0.0058
a
       -0.1509        0.4772       1.9920       0.0058       0.0055
a
       0.1253       -0.2376         2.4833       0.0058       0.0058
a
       -0.0254 -0.0514         0.2170       
-7 0.0061       0.0062
a
       -0.0441       -0.2368 0.3991       0.0061       0.0060
a
       -0.0815        0.0442         0.5935       0.0061       0.0060
a
       -0.1020        0.0001         1.7326       
-6 0.0032       0.0040
a
        0.2989        0.6518       4.8884
c
       0.0032       0.0030
a
        0.0388       -0.1133         0.3927       0.0032       0.0032
a
      -0.0321        0.2582
c
         2.9502       
-5 0.0036       0.0031
a
        0.0194       -0.0221       0.0124       0.0036       0.0040
a
        0.1483        0.4020
c
         5.1990
c
       0.0036       0.0038
a
        0.2946
a
        0.3336
b
      19.1062
a
       
-4 0.0030       0.0033
a
       -0.0182        0.0560       0.0278       0.0030       0.0033
a
       -0.1037       -0.1633         1.4509       0.0030       0.0032
a
        0.2542
a
        0.2806
c
       14.0498
a
       
-3 0.0021       0.0022
a
       -0.0932        0.0004       0.2173       0.0021       0.0019
a
        0.2267
b
       -0.0412         4.3188       0.0021       0.0020
a 
-0.0124        0.0034         0.0261       
-2 0.0026       0.0026
a
       -0.0357       -0.0359       0.0399       0.0026       0.0022
a
       -0.0569        0.5193
b
         5.8882
b
       0.0026       0.0025
a
       -0.0922       -0.0333         1.4639       
-1 0.0003       0.0002       -0.0525       -0.1162       0.1534       0.0003       0.0004
a
       -0.0939      -0.2495         2.0316       0.0003       0.0003
a
       -0.0737        0.2332         3.1728       
0 0.0396
a
       0.0396
a
       -0.1077       -0.0226       0.2931       0.0396
a
       0.0395
a
        0.3535
a
        0.2247       11.4674
a
       0.0396
a
       0.0396
a
        0.1661
b
        0.0577         4.7386
c
       
1 0.0110
b 
0.0110
a
        0.2416       -0.2146       1.7466       0.0110
b 
0.0111
a
        0.1533  0.2461         3.2200       0.0110
b 
0.0110
a 
 0.2423
a
        0.0688         9.9843
a
       
2 0.0113
b
       0.0110
a
        0.4230
b
        0.3261       5.1381
c
       0.0113
b
       0.0115
a
        0.1534        0.1968         2.7667       0.0113
b
       0.0114
a
        0.3338
a
        0.1953       20.1650
a
       
3 0.0132
b
       0.0138
a
        0.0936       -0.3002       0.7822       0.0132
b
       0.0130
a
        0.3960
a
        0.6457
a 
21.7571
a
       0.0132
b
       0.0130
a
        0.2216
a
        0.2384       10.5537
a
       
4 0.0139
b
       0.0139
a
       -0.3289       -0.0946       2.7602       0.0139
b
       0.0137
a
        0.2227
b
        0.4854
b
         9.0415
b
       0.0139
b
       0.0142
a 
 0.0909       -0.1431         2.2295       
5 0.0114
c
       0.0113
a
       -0.0676        0.7077
c
       3.2443 0.0114
c
       0.0113
a
        0.2794
b
        0.0612         6.5817
b
       0.0114
c
       0.0113
a
        0.2173
a
       -0.2042         9.6089
a
       
6 0.0139
b
       0.0147
a
        0.1176        0.2453       0.7215       0.0139
b
       0.0140
a
        0.2588
b
       0.5878
a
       12.7772
a
       0.0139
b
       0.0136
a
        0.0793       -0.0812         1.3232       
7 0.0121
c 
0.0120
a
        0.1905        0.0167       0.9091       0.0121
c 
0.0121
a
        0.0125        0.1503         0.4836       0.0121
c 
0.0123
a
        0.1263       -0.1470         3.5587       
8 0.0105       0.0107
a
       -0.0767       -0.0526       0.1643       0.0105       0.0109
a
        0.1348       -0.0105         1.5173       0.0105       0.0104
a
        0.1888
b
       0.4178
a
       13.2140
a
       
9 0.0105 0.0114
a
        0.1800        0.4398       2.0190 0.0105 0.0106
a
       -0.0989        0.1353         1.1963       0.0105 0.0104
a
        0.0809       -0.1569         2.1169       
10 0.0090       0.0083
a
        0.1312       -0.4368       1.6230       0.0090       0.0090
a
       -0.1645        0.3880
c
         5.3917
c
       0.0090       0.0087
a
      -0.0361        0.1811         1.5838       
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics. 
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In this subsection, it can be seen that the CARs for the target firms are not significant 
prior to the announcement date signifying that the market is efficient across all three 
methodologies used in this study. To summarise our model specifications, it is 
important to know that the bootstrapping mean CARs generated under the three 
methodologies are not significantly different. However, under the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimation methods, we observed somewhat discrepancies in terms of the 
statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics. For target 
firms, most of the skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera under the OLS method are 
significant relative to the GJR-GARCH method especially for 500 and 1000 
replications. The results achieved for the target firms for statistical significance of 
skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics under the two estimation methods are 
directly opposite to the acquirer firms. 
 
 
7.5 ROBUSTNESS of CARs for Acquirer Firms under Standard CAPM 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8 shows bootstrapping simulation for acquirer firms’ CARs 
under the standard CAPM where the CARs are generated from the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimation methods. The simulations were executed on sample of 203 on 
the actual CARs with replacement by using 150, 500 and 1000 replications. The 
actual mean CARs at the event date (t=0) for the acquirer firms are insignificant for 
both estimation methods. The actual mean CARs over the window of nine days (t=-
10 up to t-2) are statistically significant under the OLS estimation for all drawing. It 
appears the significance of those actual mean CARs were unrelated to the event. On 
the contrary, the results under the GJR-GARCH produced unequal results, with
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                                                                                                Table 7.7: Bootstrapping Simulation for Acquirer Firms’ CARs under the CAPM using OLS Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean
 
Bootstrap 
Mean
 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque- 
Bera 
-10  0.0174
a
          0.0174
a
        0.1036       -0.2487         0.6550        0.0174
a
          0.0171
a
        0.1104        0.5049
b
       6.3283
b
       0.0174
a
          0.0175
a
        0.1804
b
        0.3859
b
       11.6304
a
       
-9  0.0133
b
        0.0133
a
        0.1913  0.7335
c
         4.2771        0.0133
b
        0.0136
a
        0.0397       -0.1252       0.4579        0.0133
b
        0.0137
a
        0.0064        0.1204       0.6110       
-8  0.0133
b
       0.0122
a
        0.2183       -0.0171         1.1933        0.0133
b
        0.0135
a
       0.2164
b
       0.0909       4.0741        0.0133
b
        0.0135
a
      0.1119       -0.1970         3.7036       
-7  0.0124
b
        0.0121
a
        0.2318        0.1937         1.5772        0.0124
b
        0.0124
a
        0.0806        0.1753       1.1820        0.0124
b
        0.0126
a
      0.0689 -0.2371        3.1320 
-6  0.0108
b
        0.0111
a
        0.2303        0.3099         1.9259        0.0108
b
        0.0109
a
        0.1917
c
       -0.2280       4.1452       0.0108
b
        0.0106
a
      0.2058
a
        0.0779         7.3091
b
       
-5  0.0104
b
        0.0107
a
        0.2793        0.0660         1.9775  0.0104
b
        0.0101
a
        0.0669       -0.2562       1.7403        0.0104
b
        0.0103
a
        0.2721
a
        0.0778       12.5924
a 
-4  0.0088
b
        0.0087
a
        0.1099 -0.3617         1.1195        0.0088
b
        0.0088
a
        0.2861
a
        0.0549       6.8823
b
       0.0088
b
        0.0089
a
       0.2197
a
        0.1682        9.2241
a
       
-3  0.0079
b
        0.0081
a
        0.4936
b
        1.3177
a
       16.9421
a 
 0.0079
b
        0.0078
a
        0.2050
c
        0.5321
b
       9.4011
a
       0.0079
b
        0.0077
a
       0.3190
a
       0.0890      17.2906
a 
-2  0.0048
b
        0.0004
b
        0.0745        0.4734         1.5393        0.0048
b
        0.0048
a
       0.0512       -0.1744       0.8522        0.0048
b
        0.0047
a 
 0.0985       -0.0868        1.9308 
-1  0.0014        0.0014
a
        0.3616
b
        0.4059         4.2982       0.0014        0.0013
a
        0.1162        0.4547
b
       5.4312
c
        0.0014        0.0014
a
       0.1113
c
        0.2956
b
        5.7057
b 
0  0.0025        0.0017
a
      -0.1899       -0.3127         1.5132        0.0025        0.0027
a
           0.2078
b
        0.1957       4.3952        0.0025        0.0024
a
       0.1329       -0.0248        2.9678       
1  0.0035        0.0040
a 
 0.0892        0.1754         0.3913        0.0035        0.0035
a
        0.0211       -0.2133       0.9846        0.0035        0.0033
a
       0.0027        0.0688        0.1985       
2  0.0031        0.0035
a
        0.0222       -0.0184         0.0144  0.0031        0.0031
a
        0.1941
c
        0.5528
b
       9.5062
a
       0.0031        0.0030
a
     0.0016        0.1250         0.6511       
3  0.0001        0.0002       -0.1787        0.2165         1.0914        0.0001        0.0001       -0.0867        0.1531       1.1141        0.0001        0.0001    -0.0514        0.1684        1.6223       
4 -0.0021      -0.0022
a
       -0.0124        0.2333         0.3441       -0.0021      -0.0001       -0.1362      -0.0532       1.6052       -0.0021      -0.0020
a
      -0.0527       -0.0502         0.5677 
5 -0.0019       -0.0017
a
        0.0480       0.6721         2.8813 -0.0019       -0.0020
a
       0.0055       -0.1899       0.7535       -0.0019       -0.0019
a
      0.0261  0.0661         0.2960 
6 -0.0003      -0.0004        0.0929        0.0431         0.2274      -0.0003      -0.0002        0.0863        0.3043       2.5501       -0.0003      -0.0003
b
       0.0255        0.0091   0.1122 
7  0.0013        0.0014
a
        0.0098       -0.0276         0.0071        0.0013        0.0012
a
       -0.0357        0.2094       1.0194        0.0013        0.0013
a
     -0.0238       -0.1192         0.6863 
8  0.0000        0.0046
a
       -0.0323 -0.6196         2.4251        0.0000        0.0003        0.1719        0.0058       2.4640        0.0000        0.0002       0.1008        0.1944        3.2683 
9  0.0006        0.0007
c
        0.1443       0.4296         1.6735        0.0006        0.0011
a
       -0.1470       -0.0817       1.9387       0.0006        0.0009
a
     -0.1228        0.2049         4.2602 
10 -0.0002       -0.0002
 
-0.1915       -0.0811         0.9578       -0.0002       -0.0002       -0.0217       -0.0680       0.1356       -0.0002       -0.0003
c
        0.0174       -0.1319         0.7749 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics.  
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                                                                                           Table 7.8: Bootstrapping Simulation for Acquirer Firms’ CARs under the CAPM using GJR-GARCH Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque- 
Bera 
-10  0.0070       0.0075
a
       -0.6273
a 
 0.8441
b
    14.2919
a
      0.0070       0.0075
a
       -0.7418
a
       0.8881
a
       62.2823
a
       0.0070       0.0069
a
     -0.7643
a
        0.8053
a
       124.3836
a 
-9  0.0041     0.0041
a
       -0.5879
a
        0.0642        8.6663
b
        0.0041     0.0040
a
      -0.5471
a
       0.3478 27.4627
a
        0.0041     0.0052
a 
-0.6540
a
        0.2871
c
         74.7262
a 
-8  0.0049        0.0032
a
       -0.9331
a
        1.8162
a
       42.3835
a
       0.0049        0.0047
a 
-0.5725
a
       0.2144      28.2707
a
       0.0049        0.0046
a
       -0.5703
a
        0.9250
a
         89.8698
a 
-7  0.0048        0.0051
a
       -0.9000
a
        0.8306
b
       24.5632
a
       0.0048        0.0049
a 
-0.4093
a 
 0.0091       13.9634
a
        0.0048        0.0045
a
       -0.5058
a
        0.1826        44.0332
a 
-6  0.0042        0.0042
a
       -0.2825       -0.2681        2.4442        0.0042        0.0046
a
     -0.3786
a
        0.0945      12.1299
a
        0.0042        0.0037
a
      -0.6071
a
        0.6897
a
        81.2478
a
       
-5  0.0050  0.0040
a
       -0.5204
a
        0.0941   6.8259
a
        0.0050  0.0050
a 
-0.6066
a
       1.1899
a
      60.1657
a
       0.0050  0.0051
a
      -0.4115
a
        0.3533
b 
  33.4181
a
       
-4  0.0044       0.0049
a
       -0.7054
a
        1.5166
a
      26.8167
a
        0.0044       0.0045
a
      -0.4202
a
        0.2458      15.9721
a
        0.0044       0.0042
a
     -0.5722
a
        0.7054
a
        75.3054
a 
-3  0.0045       0.0040
a
       -0.1959        0.6797
c
        3.8470        0.0045       0.0044
a
       -0.3304
a
        0.0797        9.2275
a
       0.0045       0.0046
a
       -0.4640
a
        0.3534
b
         41.0943
a
       
-2  0.0024        0.0026
a
        0.0037       -0.0201        0.0029        0.0024        0.0023
a
       -0.2558
b
       -0.1572   5.9680
b
       0.0024        0.0024
a
       -0.4403
a
        0.2651
c
        35.2322
a 
-1  0.0001        0.0000       -0.1345        0.1068         0.5237        0.0001        0.0001       -0.3652
a 
 0.7427
a
       22.6100
a
       0.0001        0.0000         -0.2925
a
       -0.1386        15.0580
a 
0  0.0012       0.0007
b
        0.2145        0.3465         1.9003        0.0012       0.0013
a
        0.2589
b 
 0.2165         6.5639
b
      0.0012       0.0012
a
        0.0822       -0.1727           2.3687 
1  0.0020        0.0024
a
        0.0977       -0.1418        0.3641        0.0020        0.0020
a 
-0.1091        0.0467         1.0367      0.0020        0.0021
a
       -0.0328 -0.0050           0.1802 
2  0.0006       0.0010
a
       -0.2829        0.0376         2.0090        0.0006       0.0003      -0.4155       0.6328       22.7311        0.0006       0.0004
a
       -0.2421
a
       0.0900        10.1040
a
       
3 -0.0033       -0.0043
a
       -0.3175        0.3543         3.3050       -0.0033       -0.0031
a
       -0.3273
a
       -0.1283         9.2704
a
      -0.0033       -0.0033
a
      -0.3177
a
        0.0280         16.8591
a 
4 -0.0062      -0.0066
a
       -0.5578
a
        0.8556
b
      12.3531
a
       -0.0062      -0.0063
a
       -0.3962
a
       -0.0750      13.1975
a
       -0.0062      -0.0060
a
       -0.4000
a
        0.3809
b 
  32.7141
a 
5 -0.0072 -0.0075
a
       -0.3490
c
        0.1048   3.1143       -0.0072 -0.0073
a
       -0.5972
a
       0.4441
b
      33.8323
a
      -0.0072 -0.0071
a
       -0.6959
a
        0.6290
a
         97.1917
a
       
6 -0.0063 -0.0077
a
       -0.7187
a
        0.3298       13.5921
a
      -0.0063 -0.0067
a
       -0.8023
a
       1.0707
a
       77.5226
a
       -0.0063 -0.0061
a
       -0.7448
a
        1.2998
a
       162.8415
a 
7 -0.0057      -0.0068
a
       -0.4129
a
       -0.0936         4.3161       -0.0057      -0.0058
a
       -0.6473
a
       0.6734
a
      44.3696
a
       -0.0057      -0.0070
a
      -0.7210
a
        0.5851
a
       100.9057
a 
8 -0.0081      -0.0070
a
       -0.8442
a
        0.7080
c
       20.9485
a
      -0.0081      -0.0080
a
       -0.3410
a
      -0.0667         9.7812
a
       -0.0081      -0.0076
a
       -0.7831
a
        0.9812
a
      142.3115
a 
9 -0.0086       -0.0055
a
       -0.5768
a
       -0.0037         8.3188
b
       -0.0086       -0.0079
a
     -0.8104
a
        0.5516
b
      61.0720
a
       -0.0086       -0.0091
a 
-0.6995
a
       1.0157
a
       124.5275
a 
10 -0.0104       -0.0093
a
       -0.8225
a
       0.5044      18.5045
a
       -0.0104       -0.0114
a
      -0.7385
a
        0.4157
b
       49.0487
a
      -0.0104       -0.0105
a 
-0.7479
a
        0.4287
a
      100.8957
a 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics. 
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actual mean CARs over the same window are insignificant. The pre- and post-event 
simulated mean CARs under the OLS estimate over the window of thirteen days (t=-
10 up to t=+2) are significant at 1% conventional levels. Post-announcement 
simulated mean CARs under the GJR-GARCH estimate using 150 and 1000 
drawings are statistically significant at 1% levels for ten days (t=+1 up to t=+10). 
Furthermore, day t=-2 to t=-10 simulated mean CARs are also significant. Using 500 
draws, the simulated mean CARs over two day window (t=0 up to t=1) centred on 
the event, are significant. Again, as noted, the pre- and post-announcement date 
simulated mean CARs are not significant immediately following the event date. The 
significant mean CARs are for t=-2 and earlier and t=+3 and afterwards nevertheless 
only for GJR-GARCH method using 500 draws. 
 
Under the GJR=GARCH estimates, returns are normally negatively skewed and 
mostly statistically significant compared to the OLS estimates which are positively 
skewed and less statistically significant. The measure of kurtosis indicates that 
returns are normally distributed but less significant under both the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimates. The Jarque-Bera statistics under both estimation methods show 
a different pattern. Under the OLS estimates returns are normally distributed but less 
significant, whilst under the GJR-GARCH estimates returns are not normally 
distributed but mostly significant. 
 
The magnitude of those CARs do not seem to materially different with those of the 
Fama-French model. Nevertheless, the significance of the simulated mean CARs 
under the CAPM model contradicts considerable with those of the simulated mean 
CARs of the Fama-French model. 
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7.6 ROBUSTNESS of CARs for Acquirer Firms under Fama-French Model 
The results presented in Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 show bootstrapping simulation for 
acquirer firms’ CARs under Fama-French three-factor where the CARs are 
generated from the same estimation methods. The results reported in Table 6.9 and 
Table 6.10 indicate that the simulated mean CARs are statistically significant at 1% 
conventional levels over the window of twenty-one days (-10 up to +10) under both 
the OLS and GJR-GARCH, but  day t=+7 is insignificant when 150 draws are made 
only under the OLS estimates. 
 
As can be seen, the post-event actual mean CARs and bootstrapping mean CARs 
from t=+3 and onwards for acquirer firms’ are negative across all the three 
methodologies and the two estimation methods that were applied in this present 
study. Furthermore, pre-event actual mean CARs and bootstrapping mean CARs are 
bigger than post-event actual mean CARs and bootstrapping mean CARs. These 
results are in harmony with the literature that the share price of the acquirer firms 
generally decreases at announcement of a takeover. Our results are similar to 
Rosen (2006) and Le and Schultz (2007) who documented either insignificant or 
negative ARs for acquirer firms after announcement of takeover. There was an 
interesting revelation in relation to the skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera returns 
under the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods demonstrate similar results as one 
achieved under the CAPM model. 
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                                                                                             Table 7.9: Bootstrapping Simulation for Acquirer Firms’ CARs under the FF using OLS Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque- 
Bera 
-10  0.0158
a
        0.0155
a
        0.0704        0.1251         0.2215        0.0158
a
        0.0153
a
       -0.0238     -0.1957       0.8448        0.0158
a
        0.0154
a
       0.2159
a
       0.1794         9.1073
b 
-9  0.0116
b
        0.0115
a
        0.0115       0.0063         0.0035        0.0116
b
        0.0116
a
       -0.0316        0.0040         0.0834       0.0116
b
        0.0116
a
        0.0794      -0.1448         1.9245 
-8  0.0116
b
      0.0116
a
        0.3190       -0.0466   2.5576        0.0116
b
      0.0117
a
      0.0448       -0.1553        0.6694       0.0116
b
      0.0117
a
        0.0603      -0.1845         2.0235 
-7  0.0112
b
        0.0111
a
        0.1891        0.0292        0.8989        0.0112
b
        0.0109
a
       0.0858  0.4899
b
         5.6136
c 
 0.0112
b
        0.0114
a
       0.0378       0.0640        0.4084 
-6  0.0099
b 
 0.0100
a
        0.2728       -0.0839        1.9039        0.0099
b 
 0.0099
a
        0.0962 -0.0266         0.7864        0.0099
b 
 0.0099
a
        0.1739
b
      -0.1869        6.4931
b 
-5  0.0098
b
       0.0093
a 
 0.5926
a
        0.8460
b
       13.2535
a
       0.0098
b
       0.0096
a
        0.0556       0.7303
a
     11.3688
a
        0.0098
b
       0.0096
a
       0.1071 -0.0240         1.9363 
-4  0.0084
b
       0.0087
a
        0.3095        0.0812   2.4367       0.0084
b
       0.0084
a
      0.0558     -0.1162       0.5405        0.0084
b
       0.0083
a
       0.2304
a
       0.1750      10.1234
a 
-3  0.0075
b
       0.0074
a 
 0.5725
a
        1.4851
a
      21.9786
a
        0.0075
b
       0.0073
a
       0.4817
a
      0.7657
a
      31.5505
a
        0.0075
b
       0.0076
a
       0.0792      -0.3220
b
       5.3657
c 
-2  0.0045
b
        0.0048
a
        0.2447        0.5270        3.2335        0.0045
b
        0.0044
a 
-0.0720       0.0864         0.5879       0.0045
b
        0.0046
a
      -0.0023       0.0013         0.0009 
-1  0.0015        0.0014
a
       -0.0106        0.0476         0.0170        0.0015        0.0014
a
        0.2247
b
    -0.0979   4.4067        0.0015        0.0015
a
        0.1023      0.3112
b
        5.7776
b 
0  0.0028      0.0029
a
        0.2102 -0.4502       2.3714        0.0028      0.0027
a
       -0.0037        0.1974         0.8129        0.0028     -0.0028
a 
-0.0425        0.0346        0.3513 
1  0.0031       0.0026
a
       -0.2911       -0.1441       2.2488       0.0031       0.0031
a
     -0.2131
b
       0.2990         5.6467
b
        0.0031       0.0028
a
        0.0497       -0.0030        0.4115 
2  0.0027       0.0028
a
        0.1236        0.3075         0.9730        0.0027       0.0026
a
      -0.0582       0.3131        2.3249        0.0027       0.0030
a
     0.1437
c
       -0.2842
c
        6.8065
b 
3 -0.0006      -0.0007
b
       -0.0572       -0.4594        1.4006       -0.0006      -0.0005
a
       0.1691 -0.0616        2.4611       -0.0006      -0.0005
a
        0.0353       -0.1533        1.1870 
4 -0.0024       -0.0021
a
        0.1712       -0.2637         1.1675       -0.0024       -0.0018
a
       -0.0052       -0.4863
b
         4.9281
c
       -0.0024       -0.0024
a
       -0.0510       0.2481         2.9982       
5 -0.0028      -0.0024
a
       -0.1570      -0.0023        0.6164       -0.0028      -0.0028
a
       -0.2563
b
        0.0787         5.6013
c 
-0.0028      -0.0028
a
       -0.1067        0.1643         3.0222 
6 -0.0017       -0.0017
a
       -0.0600 -0.0181      0.0920       -0.0017       -0.0018
a
      0.0525      0.1430         0.6556      -0.0017       -0.0016
a
        0.1002       -0.0027         1.6721       
7 -0.0009      -0.0005       -0.2135        0.3326       1.8303       -0.0009      -0.0009
a
       -0.0576       0.0339        0.3003       -0.0009      -0.0011
a
        0.0725       -0.1738        2.1342 
8 -0.0021       -0.0020
a
       -0.4337
b
       -0.2054        4.9661
c
       -0.0021       -0.0022
a
      -0.0547       -0.4293
b
         4.0880      -0.0021       -0.0020
a
       -0.0105       -0.1669        1.1795 
9 -0.0017      -0.0013
a
        0.1303       -0.4505         1.6926       -0.0017      -0.0015
a
       0.0481      -0.0933   0.3745       -0.0017      -0.0018
a
      -0.1654
b
       0.1526       5.5301
c 
10 -0.0028       -0.0028
a
       -0.0405        0.1897       0.2661      -0.0028       -0.0025
a
       0.0597  0.1011        0.5098      -0.0028       -0.0024
a
       0.0723        0.0675   1.0619 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics.  
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                                                                                            Table 7.10: Bootstrapping Simulation for Acquirer Firms’ CARs under the FF using GJR-GARCH Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstra
p 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque- 
Bera 
-10  0.0121        0.0122
a
       -0.4356
b
        0.3612         5.5590
c
        0.0121        0.0123
a
      -0.4045
a
       0.2578      15.0181
a
        0.0121        0.0120
a
      -0.5632
a
       0.6933
a
        72.8986
a 
-9  0.0086      0.0087
a
      -0.1323       -0.1462        0.5714       0.0086      0.0097
a
       -0.3225
a
        0.1645         9.2311
a
        0.0086      0.0082
a
       -0.5039
a
       0.5336
a
        54.1813
a 
-8  0.0088        0.0081
a
       -0.5303
a 
-0.0609         7.0532
b
        0.0088        0.0087
a
     -0.2991
a
       -0.0714        7.5632
b
        0.0088        0.0088
a
      -0.4057
a
       0.3263
b
        31.8679
a 
-7  0.0083        0.0079
a
      -0.3823
b
        0.0035        3.6536      0.0083        0.0082
a
       -0.4307
a
        0.4199
b
     19.1284
a
       0.0083        0.0083
a
       -0.3010
a
       0.1328         15.8370
a 
-6  0.0073     0.0071
a
       -0.2672       -0.3566        2.5798       0.0073     0.0075
a
       -0.3017
a
       0.2450        8.8385
b
       0.0073     0.0073
a
      -0.3710
a
       0.3465
b
        27.9419
a 
-5  0.0076  0.0086
a
     -0.3955
b
        0.6639         6.6646
b
        0.0076  0.0074
a
       -0.3079
a
       0.4149
c
      11.4847
a
        0.0076  0.0076
a
       -0.4071
a
       0.7786
a
        52.8741
a
       
-4  0.0066  0.0059
a
      -0.1587       -0.6575         3.3318      0.0066  0.0067
a
     -0.4763
a
       0.5147
b
       24.4260
a
       0.0066  0.0064
a
      -0.4532
a
       0.8123
a 
  61.7301
a
       
-3  0.0060        0.0057
a
      -0.1074        0.4784        1.7189  0.0060        0.0062
a
       -0.1025        0.4227
b
         4.5995       0.0060        0.0061
a
      -0.0513       0.1519           1.4007 
-2  0.0034      0.0034
a
       -0.2243        0.1461        1.3913        0.0034      0.0033
a
      -0.5707
a
        1.2212
a
      58.2106
a
        0.0034      0.0034
a
       -0.3352
a
       0.3050
b
        22.6003
a 
-1  0.0009        0.0009
a
       -0.1666       -0.5410         2.5226        0.0009        0.0009
a
     -0.2811
b
      0.0962         6.7769
b
       0.0009        0.0009
a
       -0.3654
a
       0.5037
a
        32.8291
a 
0  0.0020       0.0020
a
       0.0461        0.1078         0.1258       0.0020       0.0020
a
        0.1877
c
        0.4047
c
         6.3498
b
        0.0020       0.0021
a
       0.2070
a
       0.1108           7.6521
b 
1  0.0025        0.0022
a 
-0.0062       -0.1687         0.1788        0.0025        0.0025
a
       -0.0905       0.2103   1.6041        0.0025        0.0024
a
       -0.1142       0.1013         2.6024 
2  0.0015        0.0021
a
        0.0108       -0.3795   0.9030  0.0015        0.0017
a
       0.0258      0.4175
b 
  3.6874        0.0015        0.0012
a 
-0.2165
a
       0.0458          7.9014
b 
3 -0.0020       -0.0018
a
      -0.0937        0.3325        0.9103       -0.0020       -0.0019
a
       -0.0916       0.2464         1.9648       -0.0020       -0.0021
a
       -0.3440
a
       0.7588
a
        43.7185
a 
4 -0.0040      -0.0040
a
       -0.5265
a
        0.8624
b
       11.5774
a
       -0.0040      -0.0038
a
       -0.3976
a
        0.4027
c
       16.5547
a
      -0.0040      -0.0037
a
       -0.3676
a 
0.1676   23.6959
a 
5 -0.0050       -0.0049
a
       -0.6335
a 
 1.4219
a
       22.6694
a
       -0.0050       -0.0054
a
       -0.4588
a
        0.6574
a
       26.5439
a
     -0.0050       -0.0049
a
      -0.3186
a
       0.1358        17.6836
a 
6 -0.0039       -0.0035
a
      -0.5055
b
       -0.1843         6.6018
b 
-0.0039       -0.0037
a
       -0.2878
a
      0.0559        6.9677
b
      -0.0039       -0.0038
a
       -0.4102
a
       0.2467   30.5785
a 
7 -0.0033       -0.0042
a
       -0.5047
b
        0.0117        6.3686
b
      -0.0033       -0.0031
a
       -0.6326
a
       0.8629
a
       48.8638
a
       -0.0033       -0.0031
a
       -0.3824
a
       0.1691         25.5576
a 
8 -0.0052      -0.0062
a
      -0.7212
a
        0.5601       14.9629
a
       -0.0052      -0.0056
a
       -0.4665
a
        0.5037
b
       23.4186
a
       -0.0052      -0.0052
a
       -0.5592
a
       0.5547
a
        64.9459
a 
9 -0.0053       -0.0050
a
       -0.2773       -0.3913       2.8801       -0.0053       -0.0056
a
      -0.7019
a
       0.6148
a
      48.9251
a
       -0.0053       -0.0055
a
       -0.5879
a
       1.0481
a
       103.3759
a 
10 -0.0065       -0.0061
a
       -0.4665
b
        0.4771         6.8625
b
    -0.0065       -0.0063
a
      -0.5570
a
       0.0210       25.8611
a
       -0.0065       -0.0066
a 
-0.4373
a
       0.7562
a
        55.7043
a 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statist
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7.7 ROBUSTNESS of CARs for Acquirer Firms under Carhart Model 
Table 6.11 and 6.12 show the results of the bootstrapping simulation of the acquirer firms’ 
CARs using the Carhart model. The simulations are performed for the CARs estimated 
under the same estimation methods. In order to compare the two set of CARs, we also 
indicated the actual CARs in the table. Our results show a slight difference between the 
OLS and GJR-GARCH methods. Under the GJR-GARCH estimate, the 
bootstrapping mean CARs are statistically significant throughout the entire period (-
10, +10). The results of the OLS estimate exhibit a similar trend. The simulated 
mean CARs over the period of twenty-one days are significant, using 500 draws. 
Whilst simulated mean CARs when 150 and 1000 were drawn are significant for 
thirteen days (t=-10 up to t=+2). Notice that day t=+3 up t=+10 simulated mean 
CARs under the OLS are also significant using 150 and 1000 replications. The actual 
mean CARs are for day t=-2 and earlier before the announcement are significant 
under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods. Under the GJR-GARCH 
method, the actual mean CARs under CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models 
contrast to a large extent with those of the Carhart four-factor model for t=-2 and 
earlier. Whilst the window of t=-2 to t=-10 are statistically significant under the 
Carhart model, those of CAPM and Fama-French are statically insignificant.  
 
The test statistics of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera should be considered and 
commented on to see how they perform under the Carhart model. First, skewness 
under the GJR-GARCH estimates are normally positive and significant relative to the 
OLS estimates which are normally positive but less than that achieved under the 
GJR-GARCH estimates are normally not significant.   
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                                                                                             Table 7.11: Bootstrapping Simulation for Acquirer Firms’ CARs under the Carhart using OLS Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstra
p 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque- 
Bera 
-10  0.0154
a 
 0.0157
a
        0.5865
a
        0.9234
b
     13.9284
a
        0.0154
a 
 0.0154
a
        0.2136
b
       -0.0616         3.8803       0.0154
a 
 0.0155
a
       0.0524        0.0161         0.4693 
-9  0.0114
b 
 0.0116
a
      -0.1603        0.1152         0.7254        0.0114
b 
 0.0109
a
        0.1655      -0.3528         4.8767
c
       0.0114
b 
 0.0113
a
        0.0862       -0.2268         3.3803       
-8  0.0114
b
        0.0115
a
       0.4666
b
      -0.0813        5.4841
c
        0.0114
b
        0.0117
a
       -0.0926       -0.2838   2.3917       0.0114
b
        0.0114
a
        0.1670
b
        0.1531         5.6228
c 
-7  0.0112
b
        0.0111
a
        0.1094       -0.2529        0.6991        0.0112
b
        0.0108
a
        0.2810
b
        0.1735         7.2059
b
        0.0112
b
        0.0112
a
       0.2090
a
        0.0283        7.3132
b 
-6  0.0099
b
        0.0095
a
        0.4020
b
        0.1238         4.1359        0.0099
b
        0.0101
a
        0.1086     -0.0116         0.9854        0.0099
b
        0.0099
a
        0.2584
a
        0.0840      11.4198
a 
-5  0.0098
b
        0.0096
a
        0.0071        0.0260         0.0055        0.0098
b
        0.0101
a
        0.2454
b
        0.2363         6.1825
b
       0.0098
b
        0.0098
a
        0.1669
b
       -0.0459          4.7276
c 
-4  0.0085
b
        0.0086
a
        0.4314
b
        0.1321        4.7622
c
        0.0085
b
        0.0085
a
       0.2558
b
       0.0473         5.5012
c
       0.0085
b
        0.0087
a
        0.2231
a
        0.0217         8.3180
b 
-3  0.0078
b
        0.0081
a
        0.4587
b
        1.3764
a
       17.1006
a
        0.0078
b
        0.0081
a
       0.3111
a
        0.8361
a
       22.6307
a
        0.0078
b
        0.0078
a
        0.2583
a
       -0.0690       11.3162
a 
-2  0.0047
b
       0.0049
a
       -0.0095       -0.1439         0.1316       0.0047
b
       0.0048
a
       -0.0480      -0.1482        0.6496       0.0047
b
       0.0047
a
        0.0742       -0.0316          0.9589         
-1  0.0014        0.0011
a
       -0.1629        0.2853         1.1723  0.0014        0.0014
a
       0.0968       0.1362        1.1680       0.0014        0.0014
a
        0.0621       -0.0894          0.9745       
0  0.0025        0.0027
a
        0.0949        0.0315         0.2315        0.0025        0.0029
a
       0.1611       -0.0613         2.2409       0.0025        0.0025
a
        0.1536
b
        0.1944         5.5066
c
       
1  0.0031      0.0027
a
       0.2022       -0.1051        1.0910        0.0031      0.0031
a
      -0.0606       -0.2671         1.7920        0.0031      0.0030
a
        0.0213       -0.2743
c
          3.2116 
2  0.0030        0.0027
a
        0.1453      -0.3773         1.4182       0.0030        0.0029
a
       0.0135       -0.1473         0.4670        0.0030        0.0028
a
      -0.0442        0.2301         2.5315 
3 -0.0002      -0.0000       -0.1142        0.0223        0.3294       -0.0002      -0.0006
a
      -0.1357       -0.0072         1.5353       -0.0002       0.0000      -0.0302       -0.2013          1.8419 
4 -0.0023       -0.0019
a
       -0.0348       -0.1259         0.1294       -0.0023       -0.0025
a
       -0.1307       -0.2803         3.0611       -0.0023       -0.0025
a
       -0.0510       -0.0729          0.6543 
5 -0.0028      -0.0023
a
        0.1571       -0.2754         1.0911       -0.0028      -0.0028
a
      -0.0635        0.1428        0.7613      -0.0028      -0.0029
a
      -0.1665
b
       -0.0268          4.6478
c 
6 -0.0019       -0.0018
a
       0.0363        0.1102        0.1088      -0.0019       -0.0020
a
       -0.2336
b
       0.1789         5.2121
c
      -0.0019       -0.0019
a
        0.0496        0.1022          0.8452 
7 -0.0011       -0.0010
a
      -0.3577
c
       0.3568         3.9946       -0.0011       -0.0012
a
        0.0886       -0.3818
c
        3.6901      -0.0011       -0.0009
a
        0.0567       -0.0490          0.6362 
8 -0.0025     -0.0026
a
        0.1709        0.6003        2.9824       -0.0025     -0.0024
a
       -0.0696        0.2938        2.2022      -0.0025     -0.0024
a
       -0.0251       -0.1033          0.5499 
9 -0.0021       -0.0021
a
       0.0530       -0.0422         0.0812      -0.0021       -0.0020
a
       -0.0423       -0.1527         0.6352       -0.0021       -0.0024
a
       -0.0317        0.0240          0.1914 
10 -0.0032      -0.0030
a
        0.1463       -0.4572        1.8416      -0.0032      -0.0029
a
       -0.0918       0.2149         1.6639 -0.0032      -0.0031
a
       -0.1234        0.0602         2.6895 
Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics. 
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                                                                                            Table 7.12: Bootstrapping Simulation for Acquirer Firms’ CARs under the Carhart using GJR-GARCH Estimation  
 150 simulations 500 simulations 1000 simulations 
Days Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Actual 
Mean  
Bootstrap 
Mean 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque- 
Bera 
-10 0.0351
b
       0.0347
a
       0.8125
a
        0.7885
b
       20.3877
a 
0.0351
b
       0.0353
a
        0.9063
a
        0.6767
a
         77.9909
a 
0.0351
b
       0.0350
a
       0.7926
a
        0.3783
b
       110.6757
a 
-9 0.0295
c
       0.0293
a
        0.7070
a
        0.5676       14.5114
a
      0.0295
c
       0.0298
a
       0.7330
a 
 0.7849
a
         57.6070
a 
0.0295
c
       0.0305
a
      0.8157
a
        0.8101
a
       138.2477
a 
-8 0.0271
c
      0.0250
a
        0.7232
a
        1.0922
a
       20.5306
a
       0.0271
c
      0.0264
a
        0.6511
a
        0.3092         37.3213
a
       0.0271
c
     0.0264
a
       0.8379
a
        0.9530
a
       154.8635
a 
-7 0.0245
b
      0.0241
a
        0.5575
a
       -0.0677        7.7986
b 
0.0245
b
      0.0241
a
        0.6523
a
        0.1313         35.8198
a
       0.0245
b
      0.0242
a
       0.7155
a
        0.6979
a
       105.6065
a 
-6 0.0211
b
       0.0212
a
       0.7041
a
        0.4334      13.5664
a
       0.0211
b
       0.0209
a
        0.7281
a
       0.5162
b
         49.7346
a
       0.0211
b
       0.0208
a
       0.6978
a
        0.2543        83.8422
a 
-5 0.0193
b
      0.0200
a
        0.5453
a
        0.0643         7.4585
b 
0.0193
b
      0.0196
a
        0.7542
a
        0.6860
a
        57.2100
a
       0.0193
b
      0.0193
a
       0.7017
a
        1.0048
a
       124.1335
a 
-4 0.0160
b
      0.0162
a
        0.8322
a
        0.4701      18.6961
a 
0.0160
b
      0.0161
a
        0.8086
a
        1.8166
a
       123.2457
a
       0.0160
b
      0.0158
a
      0.6654
a
        0.7328
a
         96.1579
a 
-3 0.0130
b
       0.0126
a
        0.9280
a
        2.1361
a
       50.0486
a 
0.0130
b
       0.0132
a
       0.5147
a
       0.1074         22.3140
a
      0.0130
b
       0.0131
a
       0.6872
a
        0.7416
a
      101.6238
a 
-2 0.0079
c
       0.0076
a
        0.1678       -0.2751         1.1769       0.0079
c
       0.0078
a
       0.5577
a
        0.3584         28.5920
a
       0.0079
c
       0.0079
a
       0.4825
a
        0.0967         39.1896
a 
-1 0.0032       0.0034
a
       0.1753 -0.3464        1.5183 0.0032       0.0033
a
        0.3171
a
        0.1002           8.5890
b
       0.0032       0.0032
a
      0.4233
a
        0.2558
c
         32.5904
a 
0 0.0040      0.0034
a
      -0.0308 -0.5639         2.0110       0.0040      0.0040
a
       -0.0500      -0.1872           0.9379       0.0040      0.0041
a
     0.1495
b
        0.1222           4.3490 
1 0.0051       0.0054
a
        0.3582
c
        0.2093         3.4807      0.0051       0.0049
a
        0.4322
a
       0.3102         17.5694
a
      0.0051       0.0052
a
       0.2854
a
        0.1326        14.3110
a
       
2 0.0068 0.0071
a
        0.5308
a
       -0.0409        7.0548
b
      0.0068 0.0066
a
        0.6596
a
        0.5752
a 
  43.1469
a
      0.0068 0.0066
a
       0.4114
a
       -0.0276         28.2372
a 
3 0.0057      0.0062
a
       0.8719
a
        1.2383
a
       28.5884
a
      0.0057      0.0055
a
       0.6517
a
        0.4287
b
        39.2236
a
      0.0057      0.0056
a
       0.6956
a
        1.0433
a
       126.0028
a 
4 0.0055       0.0060
a
        0.1017       -0.7294
c
         3.5834      0.0055      0.0058
a
        0.6666
a
        0.6978
a
        47.1789
a
       0.0055       0.0051
a
       0.5831
a
        0.1174         57.2323
a 
5 0.0068       0.0072
a
        0.8128
a
        0.5506       18.4091
a
       0.0068       0.0070
a
       0.6983
a
        0.5644
b
         47.2741
a
       0.0068       0.0069
a
       0.8103
a
        0.8206
a
       137.4774
a 
6 0.0097       0.0091
a
        0.5339
a
        0.1083         7.2006
b
       0.0097       0.0092
a
        1.1509
a
        2.1195
a
      203.9755
a
       0.0097       0.0098
a
       0.7156
a
        0.2920
c
         88.8945
a 
7 0.0126       0.0131
a
        1.1796
a
        1.1796
a
      55.5239
a
      0.0126       0.0129
a
        0.6167
a
        0.2028         32.5542
a
       0.0126       0.0132
a
       0.7159
a
        0.5867
a
         99.7585
a 
8 0.0131       0.0113
a
        0.4247
b
       -0.3000         5.0721
c
       0.0131       0.0132
a
        0.7238
a
        0.2131         44.6055
a
       0.0131       0.0135
a
      0.7209
a
        0.8013
a
      113.3714
a 
9 0.0151       0.0141
a
       0.8171
a
        0.2898       17.2156
a
      0.0151       0.0155
a
       0.7014
a
        0.1208         41.3056
a
       0.0151       0.0156
a
       0.9090
a
        1.0104
a
       180.2618
a 
10 0.0163       0.0158
a
        0.8209
a
        0.5527       18.7541
a
      0.0163       0.0173
a
       0.7785
a
        0.1894        51.2552
a
       0.0163       0.0162
a
       0.8591
a
        1.1318
a 
176.3846
a 
 Note: a, b, c, indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The statistical significance of skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-Bera are estimated using student t-statistics   
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Second, the kurtosis under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates are normally 
distributed with the GJR-GARCH estimates normally positive compared to the OLS 
estimates. Third, comparing the results of the Jarque-Bera under the GJR-GARCH 
and OLS methods, it seems that the GJR-GARCH estimates are not normally 
distributed yet normally significant, whilst the OLS estimates are normally distributed 
but mostly insignificant. That is to say, the Jarque-Bera statistic for acquirer firms 
under the GJR-GARCH method for all three methodologies show that most values 
cause possible rejection of the normality assumption when replications of 500 and 
1000 are drawn. In addition, 150 draws under the Carhart four models also cause 
possible rejection of the normality assumption. These are direct opposite to target 
firms which mostly reject normality assumption under the OLS estimates using 1000 
replications. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we perform bootstrapping simulation to determine the robustness of 
the actual mean CARs. In all specifications, the simulation appears to exhibit some 
sort of change from the earlier analyses. We are not sure why this result has arisen.  
The pre-event simulated CARs were statistically significant, which contradicts the 
original actual CARs obtained before the announcement. However, the post-events 
simulated CARs appear to be consistent with the actual CARs. In other words, the 
bootstrap result after the announcement confirmed our earlier analyses. As the 
simulation increases (e.g. 1000 draws) the standard errors are typically small and 
the distribution of the CARs tends to normality. It is widely recognised that 
bootstrapping simulation in particular has been reliable. Thus, our actual CARs or 
earlier analyses cannot be disputed or these concerns cannot influence our earlier 
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results. But, this provides a review of the main idea that has shaped the event 
studies with respect to M&As, namely that when people estimate CARs they should 
perform bootstrapping simulation to determine its robustness.  
 
Test statistics of the skewness show that CARs are normally negatively skewed 
under the GJR-GARCH estimates compared to the OLS estimates for acquirer firms 
under both the standard CAPM and Fama-French four-factor models. This result 
follows because the CARs are more efficiently estimated under the GJR-GARCH. 
The measures of kurtosis indicate that returns are normally distributed under both 
the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates for the two sets of companies. The target firms’ 
and acquirer firms’ test statistics of Jarque-Bera are opposite to each other. 
Particularly, the Jarque-Bera under the OLS estimates for target firms are not 
normally distributed but mostly significant compared to the GJR-GARCH estimates. 
Similarly, under the acquirer firms, the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods show 
considerable differences in terms of normally distributed and significant levels. 
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                                                   CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
8.0                                   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this thesis we have investigated the theoretical and empirical evidence on the 
wealth effect of both target and acquiring firms on M&As. It has been established 
theoretically that M&As can result in economic benefit for both the target and 
acquiring firms thereby increasing shareholders’ wealth. This is particularly apparent 
where failing firms are rescued via M&As bring economic benefits for shareholders 
as well as the government for tax purposes. De Bondt and Thompson (1992) used 
macro-economic variables in their U.S. studies and found a correlation between 
takeovers and economic efficiency. Using U.S. firms our empirical results suggest 
positive return continuations for target firms whilst for acquirer firms we document 
negative return continuations after the announcement. These results are consistent 
with earlier studies in the U.S. who documented positive returns for target firms and 
negative returns for acquirer firms. These findings have both theoretical and practical 
importance to the M&As industry. 
 
Prior researchers used different methodologies in estimating shareholders’ wealth 
effect. However, the results of such studies may be unreliable if certain risk factors 
are not adequately captured. For this reason we estimate our pricing models using 
the standard CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models. 
Since the results from these models might be affected by ARCH and asymmetric 
effects in the data, we estimate the models using the GJR-GARCH estimation 
method. To verify that the GJR-GARCH estimates are to be preferred, we also 
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estimate the models using the standard OLS method. This makes our study different 
from earlier studies. In this analysis, evidence has shown that model specification 
has a significant effect in determining shareholder wealth on announcement. In 
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, under the OLS method, empirical evidence on M&As has 
shown that before the announcement CARs were substantially bigger for acquiring 
firms relative to target firms across all three methodologies. However, after the 
announcement, CARs for shareholder of acquiring firms declined significantly 
compared to acquired firms for the three methodologies applied in this empirical 
study. In other words, shareholders of target firms gain considerable returns after the 
announcement. The deterioration or depreciation of the share price of shareholders 
of acquiring firms after the announcement might have happened because there was 
a transfer of capital in the form of stock or cash to target shareholders. 
 
Interestingly, in contrast to the OLS method, CARs under the GJR-GARCH method 
showed a clear distinction for each of the methodologies. The CARs under CAPM 
and Fama-French three-factor models follow a similar pattern when estimated under 
the OLS estimation. That is, post-announcement returns to shareholders of acquirer 
firms’ degenerated. However, as noted in Table 4.3 the result obtained under the 
CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models was directly opposite to that of the 
Carhart four-factor model for acquiring companies. Under the Carhart four-factor 
model, acquiring firm shareholders had substantially higher CARs before and after 
the announcement relative to the target firms. Even though, pre-event CARs were 
not big as post-event CARs. Whilst there is circumstantial evidence that returns to 
target firms are higher than acquired firms after the announcement, these results are 
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directly contradictory to this hypothesis and this evidence might have occurred 
because of the model specification. 
Using both market capitalization and trading volume as a measure of liquidity, we 
observed strong return continuations in the medium firms relative to the small and 
large firms for target shareholders under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods 
across all the three methodologies. Pre- and post-event CARs under the GJR-
GARCH estimation were large for target firms compare to the OLS method. The 
large CARs under the GJR-GARCH method might be the result of increased 
estimation efficiency relative to the OLS method. This finding is opposite to that of 
Hong and Stein (1999), who estimated the standard OLS model and found that short 
run return continuations should be manifested in small stocks. We found resilient 
support for the existence of momentum in medium stocks. Under the target firms, the 
evidence for market efficiency (overreaction) is consistently found in both small and 
large firms across the three methodologies used in the study. This implies that target 
firms for small and large firms overreact to new information resulting to market 
efficiency.  
For the acquirer firms, after announcement small liquidity stocks exhibit larger CARs 
compared to both the medium and large liquidity stocks under the OLS method for 
both CAPM and Fama-French three-factor models. However, the returns were not as 
strong as that achieved under the medium stocks for the target firms. For Carhart 
four-factor model, post-event CARs were bigger for small liquidity stocks under both 
the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods. For acquiring firms, the evidence is consistent 
with market efficiency for small, medium and large liquid stocks under the GJR-
GARCH method, mostly for CAPM and Fama-French methodologies. Overall, the 
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CARs are insignificant in most cases under the GJR-GARCH method relative to the 
OLS method based on our measures of liquidity.  
This empirical study proves that liquidity measure has considerable impact in 
determining the size of firm that must be acquired on announcement of takeover.  
Using both market capitalization and trading volume for investment purposes, 
acquirer firms’ shareholders would like to buy medium target firms.  
We used Wilcoxon signed rank test and to test the differences in the magnitude of 
the two CARs to see whether the CARs are statistical different from zero under both 
the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods for target and acquirer firms. The 
results of the Kruskal-Wallis test statistics clearly show that there is a statistically 
significant difference among the CARs for small, medium and liquidity stocks.  Based 
on the estimation of GJR-GARCH mean and variance equations of the coefficient 
variables, there is strong evidence to suggest that tSMB and tHML had much more 
explanatory power than tMOM in explaining time series regression in returns, 
especially for acquirer firms.  
 
We execute bootstrapping simulation to establish the robustness of the actual CARs 
generated in the original data to make certain that the CARs are dependable and 
that our results are not affected by data mining. The negative skewness can be 
related with negative asymmetry. The results achieved from the means simulation of 
150, 500 and 1000 replications showed no substantial discrepancy. Our results 
suggest that the pre-event simulated CARs are significant, which contradicts the 
original CARs realised before the event. Nevertheless, post-announcement 
simulated CARs confirmed our earlier results. The test statistics of the skewness 
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indicate that returns are negatively skewed under the GJR-GARCH method relative 
to the OLS method for both companies. Nevertheless, as the replications increases, 
for example 1000, we observed less non-normality in the test statistics of skewness, 
kurtosis and Jarque-Bera. The measure of kurtosis reveals that returns are normally 
distributed under the two estimation methods for both sets of firms. The Jarque-Bera 
test statistics mostly reject the normality assumption for bootstrapping simulation 
under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimates for target and acquirer firms 
respectively.  
 
 
8.1                                LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
We examined how the acquirer’s payment method will impact the ARs by using the 
announcement dates for the analyses. However, we have not examined whether the 
form of payment in these situations has an effect on the ARs. If this is the case, then 
this might affect our results.  
 
8.2                              RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
The current study employed a relatively small sample size of 401 firms in relation to 
the total population of target and acquirer firms in the U.S. This might have had a 
significant influence on the result. Therefore, in future, a large sample size is 
intuitively demanded or is encouraged to assess the situation under consideration or 
the ongoing research analysis. Also future research needs to do the estimate for 
other countries to determine if the U.S. results are universal. Studies have indicate 
that the GJR-GARCH model might not capture all the non-linearity and asymmetry in 
data (Nam, Pyun and Arize, 2002), so the asymmetric non-linear smooth-transition 
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(ANST) GARCH might also be used in future research. According to Nam et al., 
(2002), ANST GARCH model is efficient and parsimonious that allows a non-linear 
specification to capture an asymmetry in both the conditional mean and variance 
processes. 
 
One area that would be interesting for future research is how the shareholders 
proposal (e.g. antitakeover devices) outcome affects the stock price. There are a lot 
of different shareholder proposals that shareholders can apply for corporate control. 
Because these proposals affect the firm in diverse ways, it is an important area that 
might affect the share price or their growth strategies, hence future research is 
advocated. 
 
Given the discrepancy of financing (cash, stock or both) decisions on M&As between 
target and acquirer firms, there are still opposing views as to which of the methods of 
payment is best. We do not know when the payment was made or the effective date 
of payment. I therefore suggest that future studies should endeavour to acquire the 
data on the date at which the payment was effective to measure its impact on the 
ARs on the shareholders’ wealth. 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
 
203 
 
References: 
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, F. J., Mandelker, N. G., 1992. The Post-Merger Performance of 
Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly. The Journal of Finance Vol. 
XLVII, No.4, 1605-1621. 
 
Ahern, R. K., 2008. Sample Selection and Event Study Estimation. Working Paper. 
 
Ahn, D-H., Boudoukh, J., Richardson, M., Whitelaw, F. R., 2002. Partial Adjustment 
or Stale Prices?  Implications from Stock Index and Futures Returns 
Autocorrelations. The Review of Financial Studied, Vol.15. No. 2. 
 
Aivazian, V., Qiu, J., 2006. How Do Creditors Value Corporate Diversification? 
Evidence from Bank loan Contracting. Working Paper. 
 
Akhigbe, A., Johnston, J., Madura J., 2004. Consolidation in the Financial Services 
Industry: Are there Industry Gains for Acquisitions of Security Firms. Journal of 
Economics and Finance Vol. 28, No. 1. 
 
Akhigbe, A., Madura, J. 2001. Intra-Industry Signals resulting from Insurance 
Company Mergers. The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 68, No.3, Pp. 489-505. 
 
Albert, A., Cannella, J., Hambrick, C. D., 1993. Effects of Executive Departures on 
the Performance of Acquired Firms. Strategic Management Journal  Vol. 14, pp. 137-
152. 
 
Alexandridis, G., Antoniou, A., Zhao, H., 2006. Valuation Effects of Short Sale 
Constraints: The Case of Corporate Takeovers. European Financial Management, 
Vol. 12, No. 5, 747-762. 
 
Allen, P. R.,  Sirmans C. F., 1987. An Analysis of Gains to Acquiring Firm’s 
Shareholders: The Special Case of REITs.” Journal of Financial Economics 18, 175-
84. 
 
Al-Sharkas, A. A., Hassan, K. M., Lawrence, S., 2008. The Impact of mergers and 
Acquisitions on the Efficiency of the US Banking Industry: Further Evidence. Journal 
of Business Finance and Accounting, 35 (1) & (2), 50-70, 0306-686X. 
 
Ambrose, B. W., Megginson, W. L., 1992. The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership 
Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 4   
 
Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time Series 
Effects. Journal of Financial Markets 5, 31-56. 
 
Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., 1986. Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread. Journal of 
Economics 17, 223-249. 
 
204 
 
Andersen, G. T., Bollerslev, T. 1997. Heterogeneous Information Arrival and Return 
Volatility Dynamics: Uncovering the Long-Run in High Frequency Returns. The 
Journal of Finance Vol. IJI, No. 3.  
 
Andrade, C. S., Chang, C., Seasholes, S. M., 2008. Trading Imbalances, predictable 
Reversals, and Cross-Stock Price Pressure. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 406-
423.  
 
Andrade, G., Stafford, E., 2004. Investigating the Economic Role of Mergers. Journal 
of Corporate Finance 10, 1-36. 
 
Andrikopoulos, P., Daynes, A., Latimer, D., Pagas, P., 2008. Size Effect, 
Methodological issues and Risk-to-Default: Evidence from the UK Stock Market. The 
European Journal of Finance 
 
Andreoni, J., Che, Y-K.,  Kim J., 2007. Asymmetric Information About Rivals’ Types 
in Standard Auctions: An experiment. Games and Economic Behavior 59, 240-259. 
 
Auerbach, J. A., Reishus, D., 1986. Taxes and the Merger Decision: An Empirical 
Analysis. Working Paper No. 1855. National Bureau of Economic Research.  
 
Avramov, D., Chordia, T., 2006. Asset Pricing Models and Financial Market 
Anomalies. The Review of Financial Studies I Vol. 19 No. 3 
Aw, M.S.B.,  Chatterjee, R. A.,  2004. The performance of UK firms acquiring large 
cross-border and domestic takeover targets. Applied Financial Economics 14, No. 5, 
337-349. 
Bae, J., Kim, C-J., Nelson, R. C., 2007. Why are Stock Returns and Volatility 
Negatively Correlated? Journal of Empirical Finance 14, 41-58. 
Balaban, E., Constantinou, T. C., 2006. Volatility Clustering and ERvent-induced 
Volatility: Evidence from UK Mergers and Acquisitions. The European Journal of 
Finance 12: 5, 449-453. 
 
Banz, R.W., 1981.The Relationship Between Return and Market Value of Common 
Stocks. Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 3−18. 
 
Barber, M. B., Lyon, D. J., 1997. Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns: The 
Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics. Journal of Financial Economics 
43, 341-372. 
 
Barberis, N., Huang, M., Santos T., 2001. Prospect Theory an Asset Prices. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. CXVI, Issue 1.  
 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. A Model of Investor Sentiment. Journal of 
Financial Economics 49, 307-343. 
 
Barnes, P., 1990. The Predicting of Takeover Targets in the UK. By Means of 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 17(1). 
205 
 
 
Barnes, P., 1999. Predicting UK Takeover Targets: Some Methodological Issues and 
Empirical Study, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 12, 283-301.  
 
Becher A. D., 2000. The Valuation Effects of Bank Mergers, Journal of Corporate 
Finance 6, 189-214. 
 
Behr, A., Heid, F., 2011. The Success of Bank Mergers Revisited. An Assessment 
Based on a Matching Strategy. Journal of Empirical Finance 18, 117-135. 
 
Bekaert, G., Wu, G., 2000. Asymmetric Volatility and Risk in Equity Markets. The 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol.13, No. 1. pp. 1-42. 
 
Ben-Amar, W., Andre, P., 2006. Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring 
Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 33 (3) & (4), 517-543. 
 
Berger, A. N., Demsetz, R. S., Strahan, P. E., 1999. The Consolidation of the 
Financial Services industry: Causes, Consequences and Implications for the Future. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 23, 135-195. 
 
Bergh D.D., 2001. Executive Retention and Acquisition Outcomes: A Test of 
Opposing Views on the Influence of Organizational Tenure. Journal of Management 
27:5, 603-622. 
 
Berk, B. J., 1995. A Critique of Size-Related Anomalies. The Review of Financial 
Studies Summer. Vol. 8, No. 2. pp.275-286. 
 
Berkovitch, E., Narayanan, P. M., 1990. Competition and Medium of Exchange in 
Takeovers. Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 3 No. 2, 153-174. 
 
Berkovitch, E., Narayanan, P. M., 1993. Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical 
Investigation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 3.  
 
Bethel E. J., Leibeskind, J., 1993. The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate 
Restructuring. Strategic Management journal Vol. 14, 15-31. 
 
Bigelli, M., Mengoli, S., 2004. Sub-Optimal Acquisition Decision Under a Majority 
Shareholder System. Journal of Management and Governance Vol. 8, pp. 373-405. 
 
Billett, T. M., King, D., Mauer, C. D., 2002. Bondholder Wealth Effects in Mergers 
and Acquisitions: New Evidence from the 980s and 1990s. Seminar Paper.  
 
Binder, J. J., 1998. The Event Methodology Since 1969. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 11: 111-137. 
 
Biswas, R., Fraser, R. D., Mahajan, A., 2001. The International Market for Corporate 
Control: Evidence from Acquisitions of Financial Firms. Global Finance Journal, 8 
(1), 33-54. 
 
206 
 
Black, J. A., 2006. Macroeconomic Risk and the Fama-French Three-Factor Model. 
Managerial Finance, Vol. 32. No. 6, pp. 505-517. 
 
Boehmer, E., 2000. Buisness Group, Bank Control and Large Shareholders: An 
Analysis of German Takeovers. Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 9, pp. 117-
148. 
 
Bollerslev, T., 1986. Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedascity. 
Journal of Econometrics, 31, pp. 307-327. 
 
Boots, A., 1992. Why Hang on to Losers. Divestitures and Takeovers. Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 47, 1401-1423. 
 
Bornholt, G., 2006. Extending the CAPM: The Reward Beta Approach. Working 
Paper.  
 
Bosveld, R., Meyer, P., Vorst, T., 1997. Takeover premiums in Netherlands. 
Financieringen an Beleggingen deel 20. Erasmus University Rotterdam, pp. 125-
158. 
 
Bradbury, E. M., Mak, T. Y., 2000. Ownership Structure, Board Composition and The 
Adoption of Charter Takeover Procedures. Journal of Corporate Finance 6, 165-188.  
 
Brav, A., 1998. Inference in Long-Horizon Event Studies: A Bayesian Approach with 
Application to Initial Public Offerings. Working Paper. Duke University. 
 
Brav, A., Heaton, B. J., 2002. Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies. The 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol.15, No. 2. 
 
Bremer, M., Sweeney, J. R., 1991. The Reversal of Large Stock Price Decreases. 
The Journal of Finance Vol. XLNL. No. 2. 
 
Brennan, J. M., Chordia, T., Subrahmanyam, A., 1998. Alternative Factor 
Specifications, Security Characteristics, and The Cross-Section of Expected Stock 
Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 49, 345-373. 
 
Brennan, M., Subrahmanyam,  A., 1996. Market Microstructure and Asset Pricing: 
On the Compensation for Illiquidity in Stock Returns, Journal of Financial Economics 
41, 441-464. 
 
Brock, A. W., LeBaron, D. B., 2001. A Dynamic Structural Model for Stock Return 
Volatility and Trading Volume. Working Paper.   
 
Brockman P., Chung, Y. D., 2000. An Empirical Investigation of Trading on 
Asymmetric Information and Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs. Journal of Empirical 
Finance 7, 417-454. 
 
Brookman T. J., Chang S. and Rennie G. C., 2007, CEO Cash and Stock-Based 
Compensation Changes, Layoof Decisions, and Shareholder Value. The Financial 
Review 42, 99-119. 
207 
 
 
Brooks, C., 2002. Introductory Econometrics for Finance. Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Brooks, C., 2008. Introductory Econometrics for Finance. Second Edition, 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Brown, T. D. and Ryngaert, D. M., 1991, The Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers: 
Taxes and Asymmetric Information. The Journal of Finance, Vol. XLVI, No. 2.0 
 
Brown, J. S., Warner, J. B., 1980. Measuring Security Price Performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics 8, 205-258. 
 
Brown, J. S., Warner, J. B., 1985. Using Daily Returns: The Case of Event Studies. 
Journal of Financial Economies 14, 3-31. 
 
Bruce, A. B., Christopher, T.T., 2000. R&D Intensity and Acquisitions in High-
Technology Industries: Evidence from the US Electronic and Electrical Equipment 
Industries. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 48, No.1, pp. 47-70.  
 
Bruner, R. F., 2002. Does Mergers and Acquisition Pay? A Survey of Evidence for 
the Decision Maker. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 12, 48-68. 
 
Bruslerie, D. L. H., 2007. Acquisition Bid price: Is There an Optimal Cash Equity 
Payment Mix? Working Paper Series.  
 
Byun, J., Rozeff, M., 2003. Long-Run Performance after Stock Splits: 1972 to 1996. 
The Journal of Finance Vol. LVIII, No. 3. 
 
Campa, M. J., Hernando I., 2004. Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As. 
European Financial Management, Vol. 10. No. 1, 47-81. 
 
Campa, M. J., Hernando I., 2006. Mergers and Acquisitions Performance in the 
European Financial in Industry. Journal of Banking & Finance 30, 3367-3392. 
 
Campa, M. J., Kedia, S., 2002. Explaining the Diversification Discount. Journal of 
Finance (in preparation). Caves, R., Porter, M., Spence, A. M., 1980. Competition in 
the Open Economy: A model Applied to Canada. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
Campbell, J. Y., Hentschel, L.,1992. No news is good news: An Asymmetric Model 
of Changing Volatility in Stock Returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 31, 281–
318. 
 
Cannella, A., Hambrick, D., 1993. Effects of Executive Departure on the 
Performance of Acquired Firms. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 14,137– 52. 
 
Cao, H. H., Coval, D. J., Hirshleifer, D., 2002. Sidelined Investors, Trading-
Generated News, and Security Returns. The Review of Financial Studies 15, No. 2.  
 
208 
 
Capron, L., 1999. The Long-Term Performance of Horizontal Acquisitions. Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 20, No. 11, pp.987-1018. 
 
Capron, L., Mitchell, W., Swaminathan, A., 2001. Asset Divestiture Following 
Horizontal Acquisitions: A Dynamic View. Strategic Management journal, Vol. 22, pp. 
817-844. 
 
Carhart, M. M., 1997. On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. The Journal of 
Finance. Vol.LII. No. 1.  
 
Carletti, E., Hartmann, P., Ongena, S., 2008. The Economic Impact of Mergers 
Control Legislation. Working Paper, TILEC Discussion Paper. 
 
Carlile, R. P. 2004. Transferring, Translating and Transforming: An Integrative 
Framework for Managing Knowledge Across Boundaries. Organization Science Vol. 
15, No. 5. 
 
Carpenter E. R., 1994. Finance Constraints of Free Cash Flow? The Impact of 
Asymmetric Information on Investment. Department of Economics, Emory University, 
Atlanta, GA 30322, 404-727-7834. 
 
Cebenoyan, S. A., Papaioannou, J. G., Travlos G. N., 2001. Foreign takeover 
Activity in the U.S. and Wealth Effects for Target Firm Shareholders. Journal of 
Financial Management.  
 
Clarke E. J., Fee, E, C., Thomas, S., 2004. Corporate Diversification and 
Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Stock market Trading Characteristics. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 105-129. 
 
Clayton, J. M., Ravid, A. S., 2002. The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: 
Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions. The Review of Financial Studies, 15, 
No. 3. 
 
Chan, C. K. L., Lakonishok, J., 1992. Robust Measurement of Beta Risk. The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.27, No.2. 
 
Chan, K., Hameed, A., Tong, W., 2000. Profitability of Momentum Strategies in the 
International Equity Markets. Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis 35, 153-172. 
 
Chang, S., 1998. Takeovers of Privately-held Targets, Method of Payment and 
Bidder Returns. Journal of Finance 53, 773-84. 
 
Chang, S., Mais, E., 2000. Managerial Motives and Merger Financing. The Financial 
Review 35, 139-152 
 
Chatterjee, S., !986. Types of Synergy and Economic Value: The Impact of 
Acquisitions on Merging and Rival Firms. Strategic Management Journal 7, 119-39. 
 
209 
 
Chen, H., Singal, V., 2004. All Things Considered, Taxes Drive the January Effect. 
The Journal of Financial Research Vol. XXVII, No. 3, pp. 351-372. 
 
Chen, J., Hong, H., 2002. Discussion of ‘’Momentum and Autocorrelation in stcok 
Returns’’. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol.15, No. 2. 
 
Chiao, C., Hueng, J. C., 2005. Overreaction Effects Independent of Risk and 
Characteristics: Evidence from the Japanese Stock Market. Japan and the World 
Economy 17, 431-455. 
 
Cho M-H., 1998. Ownership Structure, Investment and the Corporate Value: An 
empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 47, 103-121. 
 
Cho, M-H., Cohen A. M., 1997. The Economic Causes and Consequences of 
Corporate Divesture. Managerial and Decision Economics Vol. 18, No. 5 pp. 367-
374. 
 
Chollete, L., Pena, D. I. V., Lu, C-C., 2011. International Diversification: A Copula 
Approach. Journal of Banking and Finance 35, 403-417. 
 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2001. Market Liquidity and Trading Activity. 
The Journal of Finance Vol. LVI, No. 2 
 
Chordia, T., Subrahmanyam, A., Anshuman, R. V., 2001. Trading Activity and 
Expected Stock Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 59, 3-32. 
 
Chopra, N., Lakonishok, J., Ritter, J. R., 1992. Measuring Abnormal Performance: 
Do Stocks Overreact? Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 235-268. 
 
Comment, R.,  Schwert, G. W., 1995. Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrent 
and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, Journal of Financial 
Economics 39, 3-44. 
 
Conn,  L. R., 1985. A Re-examination of Merger studies that Use The Capital Asset 
Pricing Model Methodology. Cambridge Journal of Economics 9, 43–56. 
 
Conn, L. R., Cosh, A., Guest, M. P., Hughes, A., 2005. The Impact on U.K. 
Acquisitions of Domestic, Cross-Border, Public and Private Acquisitions. Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 32 (5) & (6), 0306-686X.  
 
Conrad, J., Kaul, G., 1998. An Anatomy of Trading Strategies. The Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp.489-519. 
 
Conyon, M. J., Clegg, P., 1994.  Pay at the Top: A Study of the Sensitivity of Top 
Director Remuneration to Company Specific Shocks. National Institute Economic 
Review 149, 83-92. 
 
Conyon, M. J., Girma, S., Thompson, S., Wright, W. P., 2002. The Impact of Mergers 
and Acquisitions on Company Employment in the United Kingdom. European 
Economic Review 46, 31-49. 
210 
 
 
Cook, W.A., 1992. Time to Levy a ‘’Syn’’ Tax. Journal of Advertising Research. 
 
Copeland, E. T., Weston, F. J., Shastri, K., 2005. Fnancial Theory and Corporate 
Policy. International Edition, Fourth Edition. Pearson Addison Wesley. 
 
Corhay, A., Rad, A., 1996. Conditional heteroskedasticity adjusted market model and 
an event study. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 36; 529-538. 
 
Cox, R.D., Peterson, R.D., 1994. Stock Returns Following Large One-Day Declines: 
Evidence on Short-Term Reversals and Longer-Term Performance. The Journal of 
Finance Vol. 49, No.1, pp. 255-267. 
 
Cramton, P., Gibbons, R., Klemperer, P., 1987. Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently. 
Econometrica 55 (3), 615-632. 
 
Dahya, J., McConnell, J. J., Travlos, G. N., 2002. The Cadbury Committee, 
Corporate Performance and top Management Turnover. The Journal of Finance Vol. 
LVII, No. 1. 
 
Danielson, G. M. and Karpoff, M. J. 2006, Do Pills Poison Operating Performance. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 536-559. 
 
Datta S., Iskandar-Datta E. M., 1995. Corporate partial Acquisitions, Total Firm 
Valuation and the Effect of Financing Method. Journal of Banking & Finance 19, 97-
115. 
 
Davis R. J., Hillier David and McColgan Patrick 2005, Qwnership Strucure, 
Managerial behaviour and Corporate Value. Journal of Corporate Finance 11, 645-
660. 
 
De Bondt, F. M. W., 2002. Discussion of ‘’Competing Theories of Financial 
Anomalies’’. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15. No. 2. 
 
De Bondt, F. M. W., Thaler, R., 1985. Does The Stock Market Overreact. The 
Journal of Finance Vol. XL, No. 3.  
 
De Bondt, F. M. W., Thaler, R., 1987. Further Evidence On Investor Overreaction 
and Stock Market Seasonality. The Journal of Finance Vol. XLII, No. 3.  
 
De Bondt, F. M. W., Thompson, E. H. 1992. Is Economic Efficiency the Driving Force 
behind Mergers? Managerial and Decision Economics Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 31-44. 
 
Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B.,2001. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 209-233. 
 
Daniel, K., Titman, S., 1997. Evidence on the Characteristics of Cross Sectional 
Variation in Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance Vol. LIL, No. 1. 
 
211 
 
Denis, J. D., Denis, K. D.,  Atulya, S., 1997. Ownership Structure and Top Executive 
Turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 45, 193-221. 
 
De Young, R. 1997, Bank Mergers, X-Efficiency, and the Market for Corporate 
Control. Managerial Finance, 23 ,1. 
 
Dickerson, P. A., Gibson D. H.,  Tsakalotos, E., 2002. Takeover Risk and the Market 
for Corporate Control: The Experience of British Firms in the 1970s and 1980s. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 1167-1195. 
 
Dimson, E., Marsh, P., 1999. Murphy’s Law and Market Anomalies. Journal of 
Portfolio Management 25, No.2: 53-69.  
 
Dissanaike, G., 1997. Do Stock Market Investors Overreact? Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, Vol. 24, pp 27-47. 
 
Doukas J., Travlos G. N., 1988. The Effect of Corporate Multinationalism on 
Shareholders’ Wealth: Evidence from International Acquisitions. The Journal of 
Finance Vol. XLIII, No. 5 
 
Dutta, S., Jog, V., 2009. The Long-term Performance of Acquirer Firms: A Re-
examination of an Anomaly. Journal of Banking and Finance 33, 1400-1412. 
 
Dutz, M. A., 1989.Horizontal Mergers in Declining Industries. International Journal of 
Industrial Organisation 7 (1), 11-37. 
 
Eckbo, B. E., Thorburn, S. K., 2000. Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic and 
Foreign Acquisitions in Canada. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 1-
25. 
 
Engle, F. R., 1982. Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with estimates of 
the variance of UK Inflation. Econometrica Vol. 50, pp 987-1007. 
 
Engle, F. R., 2001. GARCH 101. The use of ARCH/GARCH models in applied 
econometrics. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 157-168. 
 
Engle, F. R., Ng, K. V., 1993. Measuring and Testing the Impact of News on 
Volatility. The Journal of Finance, Vol. XLVIII. No. 5. 
 
Evi, N., Cecilio, M. M., 2004. Predicting Corporate Failure in the UK: A 
Multidimensional Scaling Approach. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 31, 
(5) & (6). 
 
Faccio, M., Masulis, R.W., 2005. The Choice of Payment Method in European 
Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Finance 60, 1345-1388. 
 
Faff, R. W., 2001. An Examination of the Fama-French Three-Factor Model Using 
Commercially Available Factor. Australian Journal of Management, Vol.26, No.1. 
 
212 
 
Faff, R. W., 2003. Creating Fama-French Factors with Style. The Financial Review 
38, 311-322. 
 
Faff, R. W., 2004. A Simple Test of the Fama-French Model Using Daily Data: 
Australian Evidence. Applied Financial Economics, 14, 83-92. 
 
Falaschetti, D. 2002. Golden Parachutes: Credible Commitments or Evidence of 
Shirking. Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 159-178. 
 
Fama, F. E., 1998. Market Efficiency, Long-term Returns and Behavioral Finance. 
Journal of Financial Economics 49, 283-306. 
 
Fama, F. E., French R. K., 1987. Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Returns. 
Working Paper. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
 
Fama, F. E., and French R. K., 1988. Permanent and Temporary Components of 
Stock Prices. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 246-273. 
 
Fama, F. E., and French R. K., 1992. The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns. 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. XLNIL. No. 2.  
 
Fama, F. E., and French R. K., 1993. Factors in the Returns of Stocks and Bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56. 
 
Fama, F. E., and French R. K., 1995. Size and Book-t-Market Factors in Earnings 
and Returns. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 1, No. 1.  
 
Fama, F. E., and French R. K., 1996. Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing 
Anomalies. The Journal of Finance, Vol. LI, No. 1. 
 
Fama, F. E., and French R. K., 1997. Industry costs of Equity. Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, 153-193. 
 
Fama, F. E., and French R. K., 2005. Financing Decisions: Who issues Stock? 
Journal of Financial Economics 76, 549-582. 
 
Fama, F. E., and French R. K., 2006. Profitability, Investment and Average Returns. 
Journal of Financial Economics 82, 491-518. 
 
Feld, A.J. 1982.Tax Policy and Corporate Concentration. Lexington, Mass. D.C. 
Health and Company. 
 
Ferreira, D., Ornelas, E., Turner L. J., 2005. Ownership structure and the Market for 
Corporate Control. Working Paper. 
 
Ferson, E. W., Harvey, R. C., 1999. Conditioning Variables and the Cross Section of 
Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance Vol. LIV, No. 4,  
 
Field, L. C., Karpoff, M. J., 2002. Takeover Defences of IPO Firms. Journal of 
Finance 57, 1857-1889.  
213 
 
 
Firth, M., 1991. Corporate Takeovers, Stockholders returns and Executive returns 
and Executive Rewards. Managerial and Decision Economies 12, 421-8. 
 
Fishman, M., 1989. Pre-emptive Bidding and the Role of Medium of Exchange. 
Journal of Finance 44, 41-57. 
 
Foucault, T., Gehrig, T., 2008. Stock Price Informativeness , Cross-Listings and 
Investment Decisions. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 146-168.  
 
Frank, J., Mayer, C., 1996. Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of Managerial 
Failure. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 163-181. 
 
Frank, M. Z., Goyal, V. K., 2003. Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital 
Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. Vol. 67, 217 – 248. 
 
Frankel, R., Li, X., 2004.Characteristics of A Firm’s Information Environment and The 
Information Asymmetry Between Insiders and Outsiders. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 37, 229-259. 
 
Gasper, J-M., Massa, M., Matos, P., 2005. Shareholder Investment Horizons and the 
Market for Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics 76, 135-165. 
 
Gharghori, P., Chan, H., Faff, R. W., 2007. Are the Fama-French Factors Proxying 
Default RisK. Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 32, No. 2. 
 
Gibbons, M., Hess, P., 1981. Day of the Week Effects and Asset Returns. Journal of 
Business 54, 579-596. 
 
Glenn, N. P., John, M.C., 2001. Estimating Expected Returns in an Event Study 
Framework: Evidence from the Dartboard Column. Quarterly Journal of Finance and 
Accounting 
 
Goergen, M., Renneboog, L., 2004, Shareholder Wealth Effects of European 
Domestic and Cross-Border Takeover Bids. European Financial Management, Vol. 
10, No.1, 9-45. 
 
Gomes, J., Kogan, L., Zhang, L., 2003. Equilibrium Cross Section of Returns. 
Journal of Political Economy Vol. III. No. 4.  
 
Gordon, M., 2002. Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing? Stanford 
Law Review 55, 105. 
 
Gregory, A., 1997. An Examination of The Long Run Performance of UK Acquiring 
Firms. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 24(7) & (8), 0306-686X. 
 
Gregory, A.,  McCorriston, S., 2005. Foreign Acquisitions by UK Limited Companies: 
Short and Long-run Performance. Journal of Empirical Finance 12, 99-125. 
 
214 
 
Gross, H. K. S., Lindstadt, H., 2006. Horizontal and Vertical Takeover and Sell-off 
Announcements: Abnormal Returns Differ by Industry. Corporate Ownership and 
Control, Vol. 3, Issue 2. 
 
Grossman, S., Hart, O., 1980. Takeover Bid, Free-rider Problem, and The  
Theory of the Corporation. Bell Journal of Economics 11, 42-64. 
 
Gujarati, N. D., 2006.  Essentials of Econometrics. Third Edition. McGraw-Hill 
International Edition. 
 
Gupta, A., LeCompte, R. and Misra, L., 1997. Acquisitions of Solvent Thrifts: Wealth 
Effects and Managerial Motivations. Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 1431-1450. 
 
Halil, K., 2004. International Mergers and Acquisitions: A Jump Diffusion Model 
Application. Journal of Economics and Finance. 
 
Harford, J., Jenter, D., Li, K., 2011. Institutional Cross-holdings and their Effect on 
Acquisition Decisions. Journal of Financial Economics 99, 27-39. 
 
Harris S. Robert and Revenscraft (1991), The Role of Acquisitions in Foreign Direct 
Investment: Evidence from the U.S. Stock Market. The Journal of Finance Vol. XLVI, 
No. 3. 
 
Haugen, R., Jorion, P., 1996. The January Effect: Still There After all These Years. 
Financial Analysts Journal 52, 27-31.  
 
Hayward, M. L. A., Hambrick, C. D., 1997. Explaining the Premiums paid for Large 
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 
1. 
 
He, T. L., Reichert, K. A., 2003. Time Variation Paths of Factors Affecting Financial 
Institutions and Stock Returns. Atlantic Economic Journal, 31 (1), pp.71-86. 
 
Healy, P. M., Palepu, K. G., 2001. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, 
and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of 
Accounting & Economics, 31, 405–440. 
 
Hein, E. S., Westfall, P., 2004. Improving Tests of Abnormal Returns by 
Bootstrapping the Multivariate Regression Model with Event Parameters. Journal of 
Financial Econometrics, Vol. 2 No. 3, 451-471. 
 
Helwege, J., Liang, N., 1996. Is There a Pecking Order? Evidence From a Panel of 
IPO Firms. Journal of Financial Economics 40, 429–458. 
 
Hermalin E. B., Weisbach S. M., 1991. The Effects of Board Composition and Direct 
Incentives on Firm Performance. Financial Management 20, 101-112. 
 
Heron, R., Lie, E., 2002. Operating Performance and the Method of Payment in 
Takeovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Vol. 37, No. 1. 
 
215 
 
Higson, C., Elliott, J., 1998. Post-Takeover Returns: The UK Evidence. Journal of 
Empirical Finance 5, 27-46. 
 
Hijzen, A., Gorg, H., Manchin, M., 2006. Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions and 
the Role of Trade Costs. The University of Nottingham,. Research Paper 2005/17. 
 
Himmerlberg P. C., Hubbard R. G., Darius, P.,1999, Understanding the 
Determinants of Managerial Ownersship and the link Between Ownership and 
Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 353-384. 
 
Hodrick, J. R., 1992. Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Returns: Alternative 
Procedures for Inference and Measurement. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol.5, 
No.3, pp.357-386. 
 
Hogan, S., Jarrow, R., Teo, M., Warachka, M., 2004. Testing Market Efficiency using 
Statistical Arbitrage with Applications to Momentum and Value Strategies. Journal of 
Financial Economics 73, 525-565. 
 
Holl, P. and Kyriazis, D. 1997, Wealth Creation and Bid Resistance in UK Takeover 
Bids. Strategic Management Journal Vol. 18, No. 6, pp. 483-498. 
 
Hong, H., Stein, J., 1999. A Unified Theory of Underraction, Momentum Trading and 
Overreaction in Asset Markets. Journal of Finance 54, 2143-2184 
 
Hopner, M. and Jackson G. 2006, Revisiting the Mannesmann Takeover: How 
Markets for Corporate Control Emerge. European Management Review 3, 142-155.  
 
Horowitz, J., Loughran, T., Savin, N., 2000. Three Analyses of the Firms Size 
Premium. Journal of Empirical Finance 7, 143-153. 
 
Hu, O., 2007. Applicability of The Fama-French Three-Factor Model in Forecasting 
Portfolio Returns. The Journal of Financial Research, Vol. XXX, No. 1, pp. 111-127. 
 
Ikenberry, L. D., Ramnath, S., 2002. Under reaction to Self-Selected News Events: 
The Case of Stock Splits. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2. 
 
Inoue, K., Uchida, K., Bremer, M., 2010. Post-restructuring Performance in Japan. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 18, 494-508. 
 
Jagannathan, R., Wang, Z., 1996. The Conditional CAMP and the Cross-Section of 
Expected Returns. The Journal of Finance Vol. LJ, No. 1. 
 
Jarrell, A. G., Brickley, A. J., Netter, M. J., 1988. The Market for Corporate Control: 
The Empirical Evidence since 1980. Journal of Economic perspectives 2, 49-68. 
 
Jegadeesh, N., 1990. Evidence of Predictable Behaviour of Security Returns. 
Journal of Finance Vol. 45, pp. 881-898. 
 
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 1993. Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: 
Implications for Stock Market Efficiency. The Journal of Finance Vol. XLVIII, No. 1. 
216 
 
 
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 2001. Profitability of Momentum Strategies: An 
Evaluation of Alternative Explanations. Journal of Finance LVI, No. 2. 
 
Jegadeesh, N., Titman, S., 2002. Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Determinants of 
Momentum Returns. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No.1.pp. 143-157 
 
Jensen C. Michael (1986), Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers. American Economic Review Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 323-329. 
 
Jensen M. C., 1987. The Free Cash Flow Theory of Takeovers: A Financial 
Perspective of Mergers ad Acquisitions and the Economy. Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/ABSTRACT =350422. 
 
Jensen M. C., 1988. Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 2, No.1. 
 
Jensen C. M., Ruback S. R., 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The scientific 
Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11 pp. 5-50. 
 
Jones, M. C., 2002. A Century of Stock market Liquidity and Trading Costs. Working 
Paper.  
 
Joseph, L. N., 2008. Price Reaction to Large Changes: Over-Reaction or Return 
Continuation. Working Paper. 
 
Kane, E., 2000. Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives might 
Regulators Infer from Event-study Evidence?. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
32.0 
 
Karim, S., Mitchell, W., 2000. Path-Dependent and Path-Breaking Change: 
Reconfiguring Business Resources Following Acquisitions in the US Medical Sector, 
1978-1995. Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 21, No. 10/11, pp. 1061-1081. 
 
Kesner, I.F., Shapiro, D.L., Sharma, A., 1994. Brokering Mergers: An Agency Theory 
Perspective on the Role of Representatives. Academy of Management Journal 37, 
No.3, 703–721. 
 
Kim, S. W., 2000. Does FDI Increase Firm Value in Emerging Markets? Working 
Paper Series 00-03 
 
Kini, O., Kracaw, W., Shehzad, M., 1995. Corporate Takeovers, Firm Performance 
and Board Composition. Journal of Corporate Finance 1, 383-412. 
 
Kiymaz, H., 2003. Cross-Border Acquisitions of U.S. Financial Institutions: Impact of 
Macroeconomic Factors. Journal of Banking and Finance. Forthcoming.  
 
Kiymaz, H., Kilic, O., 2004. International Mergers and Acquisitions: A Jump Diffusion 
Model Application. Journal of Economic and Finance, Vol. 28, No.2. 
 
217 
 
Kohers, T., 2001. Domestic Versus Cross-Border Takeovers of U.S. Targets: Why 
Do Foreign Bidders Pay More? Financial Management Association meeting in 
Toronto, Canada.  
 
Kohers, N., 2004. Acquisitions of Private Targets: The unique Shareholder Wealth 
Implications. Applied Financial Economics, 14, 1151-1165. 
 
Köke, J., 2004. The Market for Corporate Control in a Bank-based Economy: A 
Governance device? Journal of Corporate Finance 10, 53-80. 
 
Kothari, P. S., Shanken, J., Sloan, R., 1995. Another Look at the Cross-Section of 
Expected Stock Returns, Journal of Finance 50, !85-224. 
 
Kothari, P. S., Warner, B. J., 1997. Measuring Long-Horizon Security Price 
Performance. Journal of Financial Economics 43, 301-339. 
 
Kothari, P.S., Warner, B. J., 2006. Econometrics of Event Studies. Forthcoming in B. 
Espen Eckbo (ed), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, 
Volume A (Handbooks in Finance Series) Ch. 1. 
 
Krishnan, H.A., Miller, A., Judge, W.Q., 1997. Diversification and Top Management 
team Complementarity: Is Performance Improved by Merging Similar or Dissimilar 
Teams? Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 18, 361–374. 
 
Kroll, M., Wright, P., Toombs, L.,  Leavell, H., 1997. Form of Control: A Critical 
Determinant of Acquisition Performance and CEO Rewards. Strategic Management 
Journal 18(2): 85–96. 
 
Lasfer, A. M., Melnik, A., Thomas C. D., 2003. Short-term Reaction of Stock Markets 
in Stressful Circumstances. Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 1959-1977. 
 
Lamont, O., Polk, C., Saa’-Requejo, J., 2001. Financial Constraints and Stock 
Returns. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 14, No.2. 
 
Lang, L. H. P., Stulz, M. R., 1994. Tobin’s q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm 
Performance. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No.6, pp. 1248-1280. 
 
Lang, L. H. P.; Stulz, M. R., Walkling, R. A., 1989. Management Performance, 
Tobin’s q, and the Gains from Successful Tender Offers. Journal of Financial 
Economics 24, 137-154. 
 
Lang, L. H. P.; Stulz, M. R.,  Walkling, R. A., 1991, A Test of the Free Cash Flow 
Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder Return. Journal of Financial Economics 29 (2), 315-
336. 
 
Le, T. H.; Schultz, E. 2007. Toeholds and the Bidder Shareholder Wealth Effects of 
Takeover Announcements. Australian Journal of Management, Vol. 32, No. 2 
 
Lee, C. M. C., Swaminathan, B., 2000. Price Momentum and Trading Volume. The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, No.5. 
218 
 
 
Lefanowicz E. Craig., Robinson R. John., Smith R., 2000. Golden Parachutea and 
Managerial Incentives in Corporate Acquisitions: Evidence from the 1980s and 
1990s. Journal of Corporate Finance 6, 215-239. 
 
Lettau, M., Ludvigson, S., 2001. Resurrecting the (C)CAMP: A Cross-Sectional Test 
When Risk Premia Are Time-Varying. Journal of Political Economy Vol. 109, No. 61. 
 
Lewellen, J., 2002. Momentum and Autocorrelation in Stock Returns. The Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2. 
 
Levy, H., Levy, M., 2004. Prospect Theory and Mean-Variance Analysis. The Review 
of Financial Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4.  
 
Lewis, D. and Webb, R. J., 2007, Potential Cost Synergies from Banks Acquiring 
Real Estate Brokerage Services. Journal of Banking & Finance 31, 2347-2363. 
 
Li, K. W., Ling, S., Wong, H., 2001. Estimation for Partially Nonstationary Multivariate 
Autoregressive Models with Conditional Heteroscedasticity.. Biometrika, Vol. 88, 
No.4, pp. 1135-1152. 
 
Limmack, R., 2003. Discussion of Glamour Acquirers, Method of Payment and Post-
Acquisition Performance: The UK Evidence. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 30 (1) & (2). 
 
Lin, W., Madura, J. J., Picou, A., 1994. The Wealth Effects of International 
Acquisitions and the Impact of the EEC Integration. Global Finance Journal 5 (1), 65-
74. 
 
Lo, W. A., MacKinlay, C. A., 1988. Stock Market Prices Do Not Follow Random 
Walks: Evidence from a Simple Specification Test. The Review of Financial Studies 
Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 41-66.  
 
Lo, A., MacKinlay, C., 1990. Data –Snooping Biases in Tests of Financial Asset 
Pricing Models. Review of Financial Studies 3, 431-467.  
 
Lo, W. A., MacKinlay, C. A., 1990. When Are Contrarian Profits Due to Stock Market 
Overreaction. The Review of Financial Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 175-205. 
 
Loughran, T., Vijh*, M. A., 1997. Do Long-term Shareholders Benefit from Corporate 
Acquisitions?, Journal of Finance vol. 52, No. 5, 1765-1790. 
 
Lyon, D. J., Barber, M. B., Tsai, C-L., 1999. Improved Methods for Tests of Long-
Run Abnormal Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance Vol. LIV, No.1  
 
MacKinlay, C. A., 1997. Event Studies in Economics and Finance. Journal of 
Economic Literature Vol. XXXV, pp. 13-39. 
 
MacKinlay, C. A., Richardson, P. M., 1991. Using Generalised Method of Moments 
to Test Mean-Variance Efficiency. The Journal of Finance, Vol. XLVI. No. 2. 
219 
 
 
Malatesta, P.H., Thompson, R., 1993. Government Regulation and Structural 
Change in the Corporate Acquisitions Market: The impact of the Williams Act, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28, 363-379. 
 
Malliaropulos, D., 1996. Are Long-Horizon Stock Returns Predictable? A Bootstrap 
Analysis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 23 (1), 0306-686x. 
 
Maloney, M. T., McCormick, R.E., Mitchell, M. 1993. Managerial Decision Making 
and Capital Structure. Journal of Business 66, 189-217. 
 
Manasakis, C., 2006. Shareholder Wealth Effects from Mergers and Acquisitions in 
the Greek Banking Industry. Working paper 2006-12. 
 
Manry, D., Nathan, K., 1999. Greenmail Premia, Board Composition and 
Management Shareholdings. Journal of Corporate Finance 5, 369-382. 
 
Martin, J. K.,1996. The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment 
Opportunities and Management Ownership. The Journal of Finance Vol. LI, No. 4. 
 
Martynova, M., Renneboog, L., 2006. Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe. 
Forthcoming in ‘Advances in Corporate Finance and Asset Pricing’. Working Paper 
N, 114/2006. 
 
Mayfield, S., 2004. Estimating the market risk premium. Journal of Financial 
Economics 73, 465–496. 
 
Mazouz, K., Joseph, L. N., Joulmer, J., 2009. Stock Price Reaction Follwing Large 
One-day Price Changes: UK Evidence. Journal of Banking & Finance 33, 1481-
1493. 
 
McCann, M., 2004. Motives for Acquisitions in the UK. Discussion Papers in Applied 
Economics and Policy. No. 2004/1. 
 
McQueen, G., Vorkink, K., 2004. Whence GARCH? A Preference-Based Explanation 
for Conditional Volatility. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 915-
949. 
 
Megginson, L.W., Morgan, A., Nail, L., 2004. The Determinants of Positive Long-
term Performance in strategic Mergers: Corporate Focus and Cash. Journal of 
Banking and Finance 28, 523-552. 
 
Merton, C. R., 1973. An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model. Econometrica, 
Vol.41, No.5, pp. 867-887. 
 
Mitchell, L. M., Stafford E., 2000. Managerial Decisions and Long Term Stock Price 
Performance. Journal of Business, Vol. 73, No. 3. 
 
Moeller B. S., Schlingemann P. F., Stulz M. R., 2004. Firm size and the gains from 
Acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 73, 201-228. 
220 
 
 
Moeller B. S., Schlingemann P. F., Stulz M. R., 2003. Do Shareholders of Acquiring 
Firms gain from Acquisition? NBER Working Paper No. 9523. 
 
Mueller, D. C., Sirower, M. L., 2003. The Causes of Mergers: Tests Based on the 
Gains to Acquiring Firm’s Shareholders and Size of Premia. Managerial and 
Decision Economics 24, 373-391.  
 
Mukherjee, K. T., Kiymaz, H., Baker, K. H., 2004. Working Paper, American 
University,  Kogod School of Business. 
 
Myers, R. J., 1991. Estimating Time-varying Optimal Hedge Ratios on Futures 
Markets. Journal of Future Markets 11, 39-53. 
 
Myers, S.C., 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance 39, 575–592. 
 
Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S., 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms have Information that Investors Do not Have. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13 (2): 187-221. 
 
Nam, K., Pyun, S. C., Arize, C. A., 2002. Asymmetric Mean-Reversion and 
Contrarian Profits: ANST-GARCH Approach. Journal of Empirical Finance 9, 563-
588. 
 
Nam, K., Pyun, S. C., Kim, S.-W., 2003. Is asymmetric mean-reverting pattern in 
stock returns systematic? Evidence from Pacific-basin markets in the short-horizon. 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 13, 481–502. 
 
Nelson, D., 1991. Conditional Heteroscedasticity in Asset Returns: A new approach. 
Econometrica 59, 347-370. 
 
North S. D., 2001. The Role of Managerial Incentives in Corporate Acquisitions: The 
1990s evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 125-149. 
 
Pastor, L., Stambaugh, F. R., 2003. Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns. 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. III, No. 3. 
 
Palepu, K. G., 1986. Predicting Takeover Targets. Methodological and Empirical 
Analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 8, 3-35. 
  
Platt D. H., Platt B. M., 2002. Predicting Corporate Financial Distress: Reflections on 
Choice-based Sample Bias. Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 26 No. 2. 
 
Pham, V. T. L., 2007. Constructing Fama-French Factors from Style Indexes: 
Japanese Evidence. Economic Bulletin. 
 
Pham, T. L. V., Nguyen, D.Q.T., To, T-D., 2007. Abnormal Retturns after Large 
Stock Price Changes: Evidence from Asia-Pacific Markets. Asia-Pacific Financial 
Markets: Integration, Innovation and Challenges, Vol. 8, 2007. 
 
221 
 
Pontiff, J., Schall, D. L., 1998. Book-to-Market ratios as Predictors of Market 
Returns. Journal of Financial Economics 49, 141-160. 
 
Pontiff, J., Schill, J. M., 2001. Long-run Seasoned-Equity Offering Returns: Data 
Snooping, Model Misspecification, or Mispricing? A costly Arbitrage Approach. 
Working Paper. 
 
Pound, J., 1992. On the motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure: A 
Study of Corporate Reaction to the Pennsylvania Takeover Law. Journal of law, 
Economics and Organisation 8, No. 3, 656-672. 
 
Powell, G. R. 2001. Takeover Prediction and Portfolio Performance: A Note. Journal 
of Business Finance & Accounting 28 (7).  
 
Powell, G. R., Stark, W. A., 2005. Does Operating Performance Increase Post-
Takeover for UK Takeovers? A Comparison of Performance Measures and 
Benchmarks. Journal of Corporate Finance 11, 293-317. 
 
Powell, G. R., Yawson, A., 2005. Are Corporate Restructuring Events Driven by 
Common Factors? Implications for Takeover Prediction. Forthcoming Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting 
 
Ranft, L. A., Lord D. M., 2000. Organisational Learning about new International 
Market: Exploring the Internal Transfer of local Market Knowledge. Journal 
International Business Studies 31, No.4, 1-17. 
 
Ranft, L. A., Lord D. M., 2002. Acquiring New Technologies and Capabilities: A 
Grounded model of Acquisition Implementation. Organisation Science, Vol. 13, No.4, 
pp. 420-441. 
 
Rege, P. U., 1984. Accounting Ratios to Locate Take-over Targets. Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting 11, 3.   
 
Reinganum, M. R., 1999. The Significance of Market Capitalisation in Portfolio 
Management over Time. Journal of Portfolio Management 25, 39-50.  
 
Roll R., 1986. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Business, 
59, 197-216. 
 
Rosen, J. R., 2006. Merger Momentum and Investor Sentiment: The Stock Market 
Reaction to Merger Announcements. Working Paper. 
 
Sarig, H. O., Talmor, E., 1997. In Defence of Defence Measures. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 3, 277-297. 
 
Schlingemann, P. F., 2004. Financing Decision and Bidder Gains. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 10, 683-701. 
 
Schrimpf, A., 2010. International Stock Return Predictability under Model 
Uncertainty. Journal of International Money and Finance 29, 1256-1282. 
222 
 
 
Schwert, G. W., 1989. Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change Over Time. The 
Journal of Finance Vol. XIIV, No. 5 
 
Schwert, G. W., 2000. Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder? Journal of 
Finance 55 (6), 2599-2640. 
 
Serra, P. A., 2002. Event Study Test: A Brief Survey. Working Paper FEP. No. 117. 
 
Servaes, H., 1991. Tobin’s Q and the Gains from Takeovers. The Journal of 
Finance. Vol. LXVI, No. 1.  
 
Shaked, I., Michel A., McClain 1991. The Foreign Acquirer Bonanza: Myth or Reality. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 18 (3). 
 
Sharpe, F. W., Alexander, J. G., Bailey, V. J., 1999. Investments. Prentice-Hall 
International, Inc. 
 
Shih, S. H. M., 1994. Corporate Tax Incentives for Conglomerate Mergers: Model 
Development and Empirical Evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 10, 
No. 2, pp. 453-481. 
 
Shivdasani, A., 1993. Board Composition, Ownership Structure and Hostile 
Takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16, 167-198. 
 
Shyam-Sunder, L., Myers, S.C., 1999. Testing Static Tradeoff Against Pecking Order 
Models of Capital Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 51, 219-244. 
 
Siddique, R. A., 2003. Common Asset Pricing Factors in Volatilities and Returns in 
Future Markets. Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 2347-2368. 
 
Sinha, R., 2006. Regulation: The Market for Corporate Control and Corporate 
Governance. Journal of Global Finance Vol. 16, 3, pp. 264-282. 
 
Siriopoulos, C., Georgopoulos, A., Tsagkanos, A., 2006. Does the Market for 
Corporate Control Hypothesis Explain Takeover Targets? Applied Financial 
Economics Forthcoming. 
 
Sirower, M. L., 1997. The Synergy Trap. Working Paper.  
 
Small, K., Smith J., Yildirim, S., 2007. Ownership Structure and Golden Parachutes: 
Evidence of Credible Commitment or Incentive Alignment. Journal of Economics and 
Finance Vol. 31 No. 3 
 
Smith, K. L., Bracker, K., 2003. Forcasting changes in Copper Futures volatility with 
GARCH Model using an Iterated Algorithm. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting 20, 245-265. 
 
223 
 
Song H. M., Walkling A. R., 1993. The Impact of Managerial Ownership on 
Acquisition Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial 
Quantitative Analysis  Vol. 28 No. 4. 
 
Sorbonne, I., 2006. Acquisition Bid Price: Is There an Optimal Cash-Equity Payment 
Mix? Working paper, Professor Universite’ Paris. 
 
Sorensen, D. E., 2000. Characteristics of Merging Firms. Journal of Economies and 
Business Vol.52, Issues 5, Pages 423-433. 
 
Stout, L.A., 2002. Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The ex 
ante and ante Valuation Problem. Stanford Law Review 55, 845–861. 
 
Stulz, R. M., 1988. Managerial Control of Voting Rights; Financing Policies and the 
market for Corporate Control. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 1&2, 25-54. 
 
Subramaniam, C., Daley A. L., 2000. Free Cash Flow, Golden Parachutes, and the 
Discipline of Takeover Activity. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 27 (1) & 
(2).  
 
Subramanian, R., Gondhalekar, V., Narayanaswamy, R. C. 2006. Technology and 
Marketing Alliances, 1996-2003. Working Paper. 
 
Sudarsanam, P. S., 1995. The Role of Defensive Strategies and Ownership 
Structure of Target Firms: Evidence from UK Hostile Takeover Bids. European 
Financial Management, Vol. 1, No.3, pp.223-240. 
 
Sudarsanam, P. S., 2004. Discussion of Increasing Market Share as a Rationale for 
Corporate Acquisitions .Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 31,1 & 2. 
 
Sudarsanam, S., Mahate, A. A., 2003. Glamour Acquirers, Method of Payment and 
Post-Acquisition Performance: The UK Evidence. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 30 (1) & (2), 299-341. 
 
Sudarsanam, S., Mahate, A. A., 2006. Are Friendly Acquisition Too Bad For 
Shareholders and Managers? Long-Term Value Creation and Top Management 
Turnover in Hostile and Friendly Acquirers. British Journal of Management, Vol. 17, 
S7-S30. 
 
Sullivan, R., Timmermann, A., White, H., 1999. Data-Snooping, Technical Trading 
Rule Performance, and the Bootstrap. The Journal of Finance, Vol.LIV. NO. 5. 
 
Thompson, J. E., 1988. More Methods that Make Little Difference in Event Studies, 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 15: 77-86.  
 
Thorburn, K. S., 2000. Bankruptcy Auctions: Costs, Debt Recovery and Firm 
Survival. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 337-368. 
 
Titman, S., Discussion of ‘’Under reaction to Self Selected News Events’’. The 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2. 
224 
 
 
Travlos, G. N., 1987. Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment and Bidding 
Firms’ Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, No.4, pp. 943-963. 
 
Travlos, G. N. and Waegelein, F. J. 1992, Executive Compensation, Method of 
Payment and Abnormal Returns to Bidding Firms at Takeover Announcements. 
Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 13, 493-501 
 
Tsai, I-C., Chen, M-C., 2009. The Asymmetric Volatility of House Price in the UK. 
www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints. 
 
Tuch, C., O’Sullivan, N., 2007. The Impact of Acquisitions on Firm Performance: A 
Review of the Evidence. International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 9, Issue 
2, pp. 141-170. 
 
 
Ushijima, T., 2010. Understanding Partial Mergers in Japan. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 34, 2941-2953 
 
Van Dijk, M. A., 2007. Is Size Dead? A Review of the Size Effect in Equity Returns. 
Available at SSRN: http// ssrn.com/ abstract=879282 
 
Van de Ven, H. A. 2007, Engaged Scholarship: A Guide for Organizational and 
Social Research. Oxford University Press, Forthcoming. 
 
Veronesi, P. 2002. Discussion of ‘’Sidelined Investors, Trading-Generated News, 
and Security Returns’’. The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2. 
 
Villalonga, B., 2004. Does Diversification Cause the ‘Diversification Discount’? 
Financial Management 33, 5-27. 
 
Vogelvang, B., 2005>Econometrics Theory and Applications with EViews. Pearson 
Education Limited. 
 
Wahal, S., Wiles, K. W., Zenner, M., 1995. Who opts out of State Antitakeover 
Protection? The Case of Pennsylvania’s SB 1310. Financial Management 24, No. 3, 
22-39. 
 
Waheed, A., Mathur, I., 1995. Wealth Effects of Foreign Expansion by U.S. Banks. 
Journal of Banking & Finance 19, 823-842. 
 
Walker, M. M., 2000. Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objectives, and Acquiring Firm 
Shareholder Wealth. Financial Management Vol. 29, No1., pp.53-66.  
 
Wang, X., 2000. Size Effect, Book-to-Market Effect and Survival. Journal of 
Multinational Management 10, 257-273. 
 
Weir, C., Laing, D., 2003. Ownership Structure, Board Composition and the Market 
for Corporate Control in the UK: An Empirical Analysis. Applied Economics 35, 1747-
1759.  
225 
 
 
Weir, C., Laing, D., Wright, M., 2005. Incentive Effects, Monitoring Mechanisms and 
the Threat from the Market for Corporate Control: An Analysis of the Factors 
Affecting Public to Private Transactions in the UK. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 32, 909–944. 
 
Weston, F. J., 1994. Divestiture: Mistakes or Learning? In Readings in Mergers and 
Acquisitions. Blackwell: Oxford. 
 
Weston J. F., Siu, J. A., Johnson, B. A., 2001. Takeovers, Restructuring & Corporate 
Governance, Third Edition-Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Wooldridge, M. J., 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Sectionand Panel Data. The 
MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
Wu, X., Wang, Z., 2005. Equity Financing in a Myers-Majluf Framework with Private 
Benefits of Control. Journal of Corporate Financie 11, 915-945. 
 
Xing, X., Howe, S. J., 2003. The empirical relationship Between Risk and Reurn: 
Evidence from the UK Stock Market. International Review of Financial Analysis 12, 
329-346. 
 
Yang, M-J., Lai, Y-C., 2009. An out-of-sample Comparative Analysis of Hedging 
Performance of Stock Index Futures: Dynamic versus Static Hedging. Applied 
Financial Economics Vol. 19, 1059-1072. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
226 
 
                                                             Appendix I 
TARGET FIRMS 
 1. Texaco 
 2. United Television 
 3. Public Service NWH 
 4. CSX 
 5. American Brands 
 6. Sun Electric 
 7. May Dept. Stores 
 8. Viacom 
 9. Cigna INVS. SECS. 
10. Primerica 
11. Affiliated Pubs 
12. Texaco Canadaus 
13. Transco 
14. RJR Nabisco 
15. Squibb 
16. Noxellb 
17. McCaw cellular Commmunications 
19. Whirlpool 
19. Dennison Manufacturing 
20. Enserch Exploration 
21. Ford Motor WTS. 
22. Whitman ED. GP. 
23. Oryx energy 
24. USX Corp. PF. ART 
25. Continental 
26. United Artists Entertainment 
27. Occident PTL. 
28. Rockwell International 
29. American Tel.& Communication 
30. PSI Resources 
31. Weyerhaeuser 
ACQUIRER FIRMS 
 1. May Dept. Stores 
 2. Centel 
 3. Cablevision System 
 4. Transco Energy 
 5. Ford Motor 
 6. Bristol Myers Squibb 
 7. Procter & Gamble 
 8. Mccaw Cellular Communications 
 9. CIGNA 
10. West Coast Energy 
11. Whirlpool  
12. Merck & Cos. 
13. Atlantic Richfield  
14. Heinz HJ 
15. Textron  
16. Weyerhaeuser  
17. Emerson 
18. Schlumberger 
19. General Electric  
20. Lockheed Corp. 
21. CIN. Gas Electric 
22. United Airlines 
23. Citizens Utilities 
24. Eaton Corp. 
25. Litton Industries 
26. Northrop Grumman 
27. LDDS. Communications 
28. Lilly Eli & Co. 
29. Johnson & Johnson 
30. Forstmann & Co. 
31. Colgate-Palm 
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32. Kemper 
33. Amax Gold 
34. Litton Industries 
35. GTE 
36. Ahmanson HF 
37. HCA 
38. Motorola 
39. Varity Corporation 
40. Grumman 
41. Chevron 
42. Nynex 
43. Kmart 
44. Madison BCSH 
45. Lockheed Corporation 
46. Gen. Care Health System 
47. American MED. HDG 
48. Merck & Co. 
49. Allstate 
50. Quaker Oats 
51. Marion Merrell 
52. Unisys 
53. MFS Communication 
54. Travellers CO. 
55. Patrick Industries 
56. Pacific Aerospace 
57. GEICO Corporation 
58. Fort Howard 
59. Masco 
60. Marshall IND 
61. Baxter International 
62.Unitedstate Cellular 
63. Textron 
64. Millennium Chemical  
32. Union Pacific 
33. General GW. PROS. 
34. First Data 
35. Tenneco 
36. TJX Cos. 
37. Service Master 
38. Travelers Cos. 
39. Northrop Grumman 
40. Nuevo Energy 
41. Tejas Gas 
42. Foundation Health 
43. Tosco 
44. Sherwin-Williams 
45. Raytheon 
46. America Waste Services 
47. Honeywell International 
48. PG & E 
49. Marsh & Mclennan 
50. Valero Energy 
51. Edison INTL. 
52. Knight Ridder 
53. Tyco International 
54. Pan American Beverages 
55. Dow Chemical 
56. Xerox 
57. Safeco 
58. Cablevision System 
59. Inter media Communications 
60. Lyondell Chemicals 
61. Breed Technologies 
62. WorldCom GP 
63. Intersoll –Rand 
64. Ameritech 
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65. Corning 
66. AFLAC 
67. Monterey Gourmet 
68. Ryder System 
69. Marathon Oil 
70. Centerior Energy 
71. Nynex 
72. Unocal 
73. Johnson Controls 
74. Kimberly Clark 
75. Genetics Institute 
76. Texas Institute 
77. Measurex 
78. Valero Nat. Gas 
79. Lockheed Martin 
80. Rockwell Automation 
81. Edison International 
82. Walt Disney 
83. Merck & Co. 
84. Ashland 
85. Cablevision System 
86. Compuserve 
87. Xerox 
88. GPU 
89. Digital Equipment 
90. Dow Chemical 
91. Health South 
92. Browning-Ferris 
93. PG&E 
94. Ashland 
95. Reynolds Metals 
96. Dresser Industries 
97. Stone Containers 
65. Intel 
66. Integrated Health 
67. AES 
68. Caterpillar  
69. Duke Energy 
70. Ball Corp. 
71. Telephone & Data System 
72. Matrix Resources 
73. FPL Group 
74. Halliburton 
75. Aetna 
76. Health South 
77. Boston Scientific 
78. Micro Technology 
79. AT&T 
80. Stryker 
81. Albertsons 
82. AES 
83. Kerr-Mcgee 
84. Newell  Rubbermaid 
85 GMS Energy 
86. Rita Aid 
87. Info Seek 
88. AEP Industries 
89. Concord 
90. Southern Energy 
91. Omnicom GP 
92. SBC Communications 
93. Whitman ED 
94. Lear 
95. GTE 
96. Comcast 
97. Avis Budget Group 
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98. Pfizer 
99. American Stores 
100. Vanguard Cellular System 
101. Rubbermaid 
102. Bellsouth 
103. GPU 
104. Dover 
105. Union Pacific 
106. Ocean Energy 
107. Safeco 
108. UTD Industries 
109. United Technologies 
110. American Tech 
111. Fort James 
112. Avondale Industries 
113. Honeywell Industries 
114. Dynegy 
115. Baxter Industries 
116. Smurfit Stone CTNR 
117. Fairchild 
118. Tenet Health Care 
119. Temple Inland 
120. Time Warner 
121. Ingersoll-Rand 
122. Qualcomm  
123. Clear CHL. Communication 
124. Raytheon 
125. Gillette 
126. Potomac Elec. Power 
127. Pacific Gulf Props. 
128. Verizon Communication 
129. Northeast Utilities 
130. Infinity Broadcast  
98. Lamar Advertising 
99. Allstate 
100. General Dynamics 
101. Century Communication 
102. Cox Communications 
103. Rayonier 
104. Alcoa 
105. Carolina Power Light 
106. Cabot 
107. Gemstar TV Guide Intl. 
108. Westvaco  
109. Microsoft 
110. AGL Resources 
111. Celestica SBVTG SHS. 
112. Chevron 
113. Global Crossing 
114. Newell Rubbermaid 
115. Plum Creek Timber 
116. Computer Sciences 
117. McGraw Hill 
118. Dominion Resources 
119. Boeing 
120. Jacor Communication 
121. Bell South 
122. Ford Motor 
123. International Flavours 
124. Entergy 
125. Fedex 
126. Apache 
127. Univision Communications 
128. Constellation Energy 
129. Allegheny Energy 
130. Domtar 
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131. Bush Boake Allen 
132. Georgia Pac Com-Timber 
133. Alcoa 
134. Penney JC 
135. Rohm & Haas 
136. Dean Food 
137. Bristol Myers Squibb 
138. Entergy 
139.Textron 
140. CMS Energy 
141. El Paso 
142. Conagra Foods 
143. EEX 
144. TRW 
145. Pharmacia 
146. Qwest Communication Int. 
147. Dole Food 
148. Thermo Electron 
149. Wallace CMP. Service 
150. Pfizer 
151. Alltel 
152. Beacon Properties 
153. Airborne 
154. OM Group 
155. Conagra Foods 
156. Office Max 
157. Centex 
158. Marathon Oil 
159. Advance PCS 
160. WellPoint 
161. CIGNA 
162. Duke Energy 
163. Westport Resources 
131. Affiliated CMP Services 
132. General Dynamics 
133. Collins & Alkman New 
134. America Electric Power 
135. J. M. Smucker 
136. Aquila 
137. Alltel 
138. Tesoro PTL PIESCV 
139. Household International 
140. Clayton Williamsen 
141. Ameren 
142. Newfield Exploration 
143. Goodrich 
144. Pfizer  
145. Enterprise Production Partners 
146. Mace  Rich 
147. 3M 
148. Energizer HDG 
149. Chesapeake Energy 
150. Southern Union 
151. Pilgrims 
152. Dobson Communications 
153. Lockheed Martin 
154. Mead Corporation 
155. Caremark Rx 
156. Anthem EQU SEC 
157. R. R. Donnelley & Son 
158. Pentair 
159. NGC Corporation 
160. XTO Energy 
161. Atomos Energy 
162. Johnson Controls 
163. RH Donnelley 
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164. Dow Chemical 
165. Dana 
166. Westinghouse Electric 
167. Cox Communications 
168. Anadarko Petroleum 
169. Bethlehem Steel 
170. Harrahs Entertainment 
171. Sears Roebuck 
172. CSX 
173. Genencor International 
174. Cinergy  
175. Reebok International 
176. York International  
177. Shopko Stores 
178. Engel Hard 
179. Guidant 
180. Burlington Resources 
181. Hughes Supply 
182. Albertsons 
183.Keyspan 
184. Aramark 
185. AON 
186. Lyondell Chemical 
187. Caremark RX 
188.Pillsbury 
189. AMFAC 
190. Stop & Shop 
191. Emhart 
192. Ogilvy Group 
193. Singer 
194. MCA 
195. NERCO 
196. Baroid 
164. Mills 
165.Ingram Micro 
166. Dynegy 
167. Loews 
168. Marriott Corporation 
169. Pepsi Co. 
170. Sprint 
171. Eastman Kodak 
172. Energy Transfer Partners 
173. Chiquita Brands International 
174. Conoco Phillips 
175. General Binding 
176. Well Point 
177. Boston Sciences 
178. Seagate Tech. 
179. Home Depot 
180. Cedar Fair 
181. Anadarko Petroleum  
182. Hercules 
183. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 
184. Atlantis Internet Group 
185. Community Health Systems 
186. Occidental PTL 
187. Tyson Foods 
188. Maytag 
189. Sybase 
190. Sunward Technologies 
191. URS Corporation 
192. Avery International 
193. Rochester Gas Electric 
194. Allied Signal 
195. Columbia Health Care 
196. BAT  Industries 
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197. IDB Communications 
198. Hill Haven Nevada 
197. Coles Myer 
198. Martin Marietta 
199. Paine Webber Group 
200. Monsanto Co. 
201. CPC International 
202. Jefferson Pilot 
203. NEC Corporation 
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                                                   Appendix II 
                                     
 
    The Statistics for Sample Skewness, Kurtosis and Jarque-Bera 
Before proceeding further, we briefly consider the skewness, kurtosis and Jarque-
Bera statistics of the simulation to determine whether these statistical features lead 
to potential rejection of the normality assumption (see. e.g. Vogelvang, 2005).  
 
Sample Skewness: Skewness is a measure of the degree of asymmetry of a 
distribution. The statistic for a sample of n series, the sample skewness is: 
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where ix is the series under investigation, x is the sample mean and n denotes the 
number of observation. 
 
Sample Kurtosis: Kurtosis is a measure tallness of distribution (Gujarati, 2006). The 
statistic for a sample of n values the sample kurtosis is: 
Kurtosis 3
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where the constituents of the equation are the same as before, as in equation 3.1. 
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Jarque-Bera: The statistic Jarque-Bera is a chi-square distribution with two degrees 
of freedom which can be used to test null hypothesis to prove that the data are from 
a normal distribution. The Jarque-Bera test is articulated in terms of the third and 
fourth moment of the disturbances (Vogelvang, 2005). This makes the third moment 
of a symmetric distribution zero. From equation 3.3, if a variable is normally 
distributed, then S is zero and ( )3K  is also zero, hence the value of Jarque-Bera 
statistic is zero (Gujarati, 2006). The Jarque-Bera test statistics is: 
 
Jarque-Bera 
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where S is a measure of skewness and K is a measure of kurtosis and n represents 
the sample observation.  
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                                                                Appendix III 
 
Definitions 
Residual-The difference between the actual and the fitter (predicted) is the residual 
Acquisition-The purchase of a company through tender offer for the target share. 
Acquirer- A company which are interested buying other company 
Bidder- The acquiring firm in a tender. 
Target company- Is the company being purchased 
Takeover- Is a term use to indicate or include both mergers and tender offers. 
 
The following terms or words have been used interchangeably 
Firm and Company  
Acquired firms and Target firms 
Acquirer firms and Bidding or Bidder firms 
Acquisition and Takeover 
Small market capitalization stocks and Small liquidity stocks 
Medium market capitalization stocks and Medium liquidity stocks 
Large market capitalization stocks and Large liquidity stocks 
 
